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-, so müssen wir selbst völlig neu anfangen. Das geschieht, wie bei 
allen prinzipiell neuartigen Aufgaben, bei welchen nicht einmal eine 
Analogie leiten kann, in einer gewissen unvermeidlichen Naivität. Am 
Anfang ist die Tat.  
- Edmund Husserl  
 
 
 
 The revolution that began with Kant’s arguments about perceptual 
experiences should be carried through to agency. 
- Susan Hurley 
 
 
 
The best we can achieve is always to some extent provisional and 
inconclusive, but that is no reason to succumb to the fantasy of an 
external validation. 
- John McDowell  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I.I The Basic Thought 
We regard perception as a way of being in touch with the world. Through perception we 
are put in contact with how things are in the world and it is through perception that the 
world can show us to be mistaken. I thought I had closed the window but now I see I 
was wrong. We also regard ourselves as agents in the world. Not only is the world 
present to us in perception but we are also present in the world as agents. Through 
intentional bodily actions we change how things are and it is through bodily actions that 
we can make changes for what we consider to be the better. I close the window because 
I consider it better that way. When I close the window this is a way of being in touch 
with the world. I act on how the world appears to me in perception and it is in the world 
I perceive that my acting makes a difference.  
 I take the dual thought, that perception is where the world reveals itself to 
us and that action is where we reveal our intentions to the world, to be fundamental for 
our self-conception. Perception must provide us with an openness to the world if we are 
to think of ourselves as thinkers with thoughts that can be rationally answerable to how 
things are in the world. Bodily action must be a way for us to act out our thoughts if we 
are to think of ourselves as agents who can be rationally and not merely causally 
responsible for certain happenings in the world. Such requirements appear to me to be at 
least constraints on the idea of what we, with John McDowell, can call ‘subjectivity as a 
mode of being in the world’, if not constraints on the notion of subjectivity as such 
(McDowell 1998a, p. 242).  
What I shall be investigating in this thesis are certain ways of conceiving 
of our perceptual sensitivity and of our motor abilities that makes it hard to consider 
ourselves as rational animals that can have beliefs about the world and intend to make 
changes in how things are in the world. In doing so I shall be developing some ideas put 
forward by McDowell about how to connect certain intellectual threats to our 
conception of ourselves as perceivers with certain threats to our conception of ourselves 
as bodily agents. My emphasis will be on bodily agency and I will mainly discuss 
perceptual intentionality in order to shed light on the problem of agency.  
The first part of the thesis is dedicated to the working out of analogies 
between the problem of perception and the problem of bodily agency. I shall propose 
that we take a conceptualist and relational view on bodily agency in analogy to 
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McDowell’s view on perception. The proposals I make are presented against the 
background of a critique of assumptions that I argue tend to undermine the very idea of 
bodily agency. The second part is dedicated to a discussion of challenges to the 
conceptualist and relational account of bodily agency presented in the first part. The 
objections that I confront primarily target the conceptual aspect of the proposal I made 
in the first part. A number of contemporary authors have found ammunition for such an 
attack on McDowell’s conceptualism in the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I find the 
constellation McDowell–Merleau-Ponty challenging for a number of reasons and the 
objections I raise in the second part all, to a greater or lesser degree, have their origin in 
the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty.  
 
I.II The Analogical Approach 
I shall follow what Husserl called a Methode der Analogie, which proceeds by seeking 
out analogies between the practical sphere and the theoretical sphere of our lives (cf. 
Husserl 1988, 349). Husserl’s motivation for his analogical method was the idea that the 
extensive work by him and others on the structures of theoretical intentionality could 
provide guidelines for the investigation of the practical sphere. This is in a certain sense 
also my motivation for proceeding via analogies. The amount of work on action theory 
since Husserl is, of course, huge and just the amount of work that has involved 
explicitly taking an analogical approach in one variant or another is massive.1 What I do 
in this thesis is to take a specific account of perception as a starting point in order to 
examine how far we can stretch an analogical understanding of bodily agency. The 
conception of perception that I shall use as point of departure is a conceptualist and 
relational account, as developed in particular by McDowell. This choice is driven by a 
conviction that such an account of perception has a lot to be said for it. It is however a 
much debated and contested view on perception and my analogical procedure does not 
as such rely on an assumption of the truth of a conceptualist and relational account of 
perception. I shall to some extent argue for such an account of perception, but to a larger 
extent I shall explicate the background motivation for the account in order to investigate 
what a parallel conception of bodily agency could look like and to what extent such a 
view is defendable.  
 
 
 
1 Some authors who explicitly take an analogical approach to action are: Danto 1973, Hornsby 1980, 
Searle 1983,  Hurley 1998 and Enç 2003.  
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It might be possible that a fundamental divergence exists between the way 
we best understand theoretical rationality and the way we best understand practical 
rationality. Such a divergence could result in basic disanalogies between the way we can 
understand perception as a rational ground for our beliefs and the way we can 
understand intentional bodily actions as expressions of our agency.2 As such an 
analogical approach does not rest on the idea of a necessary correspondence between 
what will be a correct conception of respectively perception and action. A careful search 
for analogies needs to be conducted with a keen eye for the potential disanalogies. 
 One advantage of an analogical approach is that the juxtaposition of 
problems in the area of perception with problems in the area of action can provide 
mutual clarification. In so far as certain diagnoses of problems in theories of perception 
are illuminating, the demonstration of corresponding problems in theories of action 
opens up an application of solutions familiar in the area of perception to problems 
concerning action. As Jennifer Hornsby states, the possibility of showing a one-to-one 
correspondence between philosophical confusions about perception with confusions 
concerning action may lend support to the given account of action in so far as it is 
clearer that these are confusions in the case of perception (Hornsby 1980, p. 111).  
Ideally such a clarification of confusions concerning agency will cast renewed light 
back onto the phenomenon of perception. Hornsby’s own preferred account of 
perception and action, as set out in her early book, Actions (1980), is in direct 
contradiction with the account I shall argue for. This goes to show that the possibility of 
drawing formal analogies does not amount to any mutual validation that is itself 
external to the content of the theories.  
Even if the reader should from the outset disagree with the relational and 
conceptualist conception of perception that serves as my guideline, I would argue that 
the investigation could be of some clarificatory value. To work out an understanding of 
our bodily agency parallel to such an account of perception is also partly a way of 
working out the implications of that account of perception for our conception of agency. 
These implications may be useful to know whether one is in favour or in opposition to 
the conception of perception proposed by McDowell. 
 
 
 
2 Susan Hurley has suggested the possibility of such a fundamental discontinuity between theoretical and 
practical rationality as it might be that it is only theoretical rationality that is dependent on language and 
consequently conceptual capacities (Hurley 2003).    
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 To talk about perception and bodily action as analogical phenomena 
naturally raises the question of the relation between the two faculties. Are they merely 
contingently related, does one have priority over the other, or are they perhaps mutually 
dependent? As my main purpose is to clarify certain threats to our conception of rational 
bodily agency and to argue that a conceptual account stands a good chance of evading 
the pitfalls, I shall only briefly touch upon such matters here.  
The possibility of establishing an understanding of bodily actions in 
analogy to perception does not necessarily establish any deeper mutual dependency 
between the two phenomena. The possibility of a powerless perceiver or a perceptually 
blind agent is not ruled out simply by confirming certain structural similarities. We can 
distinguish between two versions of the question concerning the possible dependency 
relations between sensibility and motility, one completely general version and one 
concerning the instantiation of the distinction in the case of rational animals.3 The 
problem of agency that I shall be dealing with is a specific problem concerning rational 
animals in possession of language. By focusing on rational animals I do not want to 
deny that there are philosophical questions concerning agency of a broader scope. As 
Harry Frankfurt states, the generic difference between bodily movements whose 
guidance can be attributed to a whole creature and those which cannot applies even to 
spiders and so cannot be understood in terms that apply only to rational animals 
(Frankfurt 1978, p. 162). If we see a frog flicking out its tongue to catch a bug and soon 
after being knocked over by a strong wind, we have an illustration of the generic 
difference (cf. McGinn 1982, p. 84). By limiting my discussion to rational animals I am 
not suggesting that we can do without such a broad notion of agency.  
In the case of rational animals one way to ask how sensibility and motility 
are linked is to ask how we should conceive of the relation between perception as the 
grounds for empirical knowledge and intentional bodily action as our way of executing 
our intentions directed at the outer world. Understood thus, McDowell argues that the 
link is stronger than the connection McGinn expresses when he exploits Kant’s famous 
dictum and writes that ‘action would be useless without perception, and knowledge 
would be pointless without action’ (McGinn 1982, p. 82). McDowell’s point is not just 
that we would lose all interest if we could only gain knowledge from a permanently 
 
 
 
3 For an extensive argument for an interdependence thesis not tied to rational animals, see O’Shaughnessy 
(1980, ch. 8.) 
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disengaged point of view, because we were without power to change anything in any 
event. His stronger claim is that we cannot even make intelligible what it would mean if 
a creature could ground its beliefs on a perceptual access to the world without 
possessing any rational control whatsoever over its bodily movements. McDowell 
sketches an argument against the intelligibility of such a possibility when discussing the 
thought experiment of a rational wolf (McDowell 1998f, p. 170). If we imagine that a 
wolf has by some unknown power been given language and rationality then we cannot 
restrict the extension of logos to the receptive part of the life of the wolf. We can 
pretend to imagine a rational wolf whose bodily agency is still completely in the hands 
of its pre-linguistic brute instincts. Such a rational wolf would experience its bodily 
movements as completely alienated from itself; they would appear as just another 
phenomenon in the world to conceptualize. The attempt of such a disintegration of the 
active and the passive bodily powers of a rational animal is however, according to 
McDowell, doomed to fail. He argues in line with Gareth Evans, that in order to be able 
to have perceptions of one’s environment with a conceptual content one needs to be able 
to locate oneself in the same objective space as where the perceived objects are located 
and that some ability to intentionally move around is a precondition for such self-
location. His conclusion is the following: 
 
A possessor of logos cannot be just a knower, but must be an agent 
too; and we cannot make sense of logos as manifesting itself in agency 
without seeing it as selecting between options, rather than simply 
going along with what is going to happen anyway. (McDowell 1998f, 
p. 170) 
 
If this conclusion is correct, it would not only mean that there could there be a specific 
transcendental problem about the possibility of bodily agency. It would mean that, just 
as a general threat to theoretical intentionality affects the possibility of intentional 
bodily actions, because intentions rely on the possibility of representational content, so 
a threat to the possibility of intentional bodily actions would affect the availability of 
the idea of theoretical intentionality. However, McDowell’s conclusion is not evident to 
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me and I shall leave it an open question to what extend the two phenomena I investigate 
through their homological structures can be said to be mutually interdependent.4 
  
I.III The Problem of Perception 
In Mind and World (1994), McDowell diagnoses the basic problem concerning 
theoretical intentionality, which he addresses there, as transcendental in the sense that it 
is a problem of making the possibility of our thoughts’ directedness towards the world 
intelligible. Intentionality is here understood as ‘aboutness’, and it is taken to be a 
fundamental feature of our thoughts in a broad sense. Empirical beliefs, whether true or 
false, display intentionality in the sense that they purport to be of the world. They aim at 
the world and may or may not hit their target. Hopes, fears, imaginings and memories 
are other examples of intentional phenomena and they would therefore belong to the 
broad notion of thoughts with which McDowell operates. Though they do not 
necessarily purport to be of an actual empirical reality, the content of such experiences 
is also the possible content of beliefs. I can believe that what I fear will actually happen. 
This general notion of intentional thoughts is comparable to Husserl’s general notion of 
intentional experiences and I shall sometimes refer to them with the term intentional 
experiences. By doing so I wish to emphasize the idea that these phenomena are 
essentially tied to the perspective of a subject and can only be fully understood if we 
consider them through the meaning they have for the subject whose experiences they 
are.5 
Amongst intentional phenomena we also find perceptual experiences. I 
can believe or disbelieve what I see, and perceiving itself is a way of being directed 
towards the world. The transcendental threat to our possibility of making sense of 
intentionality is a consequence of a threat to the conception of perception as intrinsically 
an intentional phenomenon. If we cannot make sense of perception as having an 
intentional content, it is not just our conception of perception but that of intentionality in 
general that is endangered, because perception is what ultimately grounds the possibility 
 
 
 
4 Overgaard and Grünbaum argue, via Husserl, that perception of objects merely requires voluntary 
movements with a sense of agency and not full-blown intentional actions, whereas intentional actions are 
constitutively dependent on perception (2006, p. 29).   
5 I shall not enter the growing discussion on the relation between Husserl’s and McDowell’s conception 
of intentionality, but simply appropriate Husserl’s terminology in order to emphasize the experiential 
aspect of intentional phenomena in addition to the conceptual aspect underlined by McDowell’s talk of 
thoughts. See Christensen’s Self and World – from Analytic Philosophy to Phenomenology for an 
extended discussion of the relationship (forthcoming October 2008, Walter de Gruyter).            
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of seeing our thoughts as directed towards the world. The claim is that perception is not 
just one amongst other kinds of intentional phenomenon, but is of an original kind in 
two senses of the word. It is original in the sense that qua intentional experience it is sui 
generis and so cannot be understood in terms of other more basic kinds of intentional 
phenomena. Furthermore the claim is that it is the origin of all empirical intentionality 
in the sense that it founds all other modes of thoughts with empirical content. In other 
words, perceptual intentionality is a necessary and irreducible condition for the 
intentionality of empirical thought. Remove perceptual intentionality and you lose all 
grip on the notion of our thoughts as being about the world. It is this fundamental role 
of perception that, according to McDowell, is undermined when we assume a certain 
notion of what it means that something is natural, namely a conception shaped in the 
image of modern natural science. Such, often unintended, consequences can show up 
because we also want to maintain that perception is a natural phenomenon. We share 
perceptual sensitivity with other animals, so to make the case that our perceptual 
sensitivity nevertheless is not part of nature would require quite some argument, and I 
would still find it hard not to regard such a conclusion as a sign of faulty premises.  
McDowell identifies two fundamental features of perception which are 
endangered by the scientific objectification and which we need to re-establish if we are 
to counter the threat to intentionality. First, we need to recognize that the content of 
perception is conceptual through and through i.e., that the representational content of 
perception is of a kind that constitutively depend on the possession of conceptual 
capacities. Second, we need to appreciate the relational nature of perceptual experiences 
and so the dependence of the experience on the existence of an appropriate mind-
independent object. McDowell’s arguments to the effect that we can and should assume 
these two theses do not separate neatly into two independent lines, though his 
argumentation often proceeds with an emphasis on either one or the other aspect. In fact 
we do find philosophers who claim one but deny the other of the two theses. John 
Searle, for instance, argues for a conceptual and representational account of human 
perception, but takes the perceptual experience to be independent of the existence of any 
object seen. John Campbell, in contrast, proposes a relational account of perception but 
insists that the original perceptual relation to an object does not involve conceptual 
capacities. McDowell argues that we need both. 
In Mind and World, McDowell puts emphasis on the conceptual nature of 
perception by pursuing the following line of thought. If we are to consider our thoughts 
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as thoughts that can be about the world they must be able to be, to a minimal degree, 
sensitive to how things are in the world. This sensitivity cannot consist in a merely 
causal influence if it is to be a relation to the world that can serve to justify our beliefs. 
The relation needs to be normative if it is to be possible for it to establish the 
correctness or incorrectness of our beliefs. Furthermore, for the normative relation to be 
rational it needs to be recognizable for the subject as a rational constraint stemming 
from the world itself. The demand that such recognition must be possible from the 
subject’s perspective is an expression of what McDowell considers an essential link 
between rationality and freedom. If something is to serve as a reason for a belief it must 
be possible for the subject to freely stand back from the putative reason in order to 
critically assess its rationality. For our perceptual intake to be recognizable from the 
subject’s point of view as something that can serve to justify her beliefs, the intake must 
be something that has the same kind of content as our beliefs, i.e., conceptual content. 
This is the line of thought which is to establish the need for a philosophical account of 
perception to recognize the conceptual nature of the content of perception.  
The relational aspect of perception is also implied, however, by the 
arguments set out in Mind and World. It is not enough that our perception is ascribed 
conceptual content if we conceive of that content as only externally related to the world 
through a contingent causal influence. Such an account would not make it intelligible 
how our thoughts can stand in a rational relation to the world itself. This means that 
when we have a veridical experience we need to see this experience as a direct taking in 
of what is the case in the world. It is this direct realism which is emphasized in 
McDowell’s papers on scepticism, where he proposes his disjunctive analysis of 
perceptual appearances.6 The emphasis on the two different aspects in different works is 
a consequence of these works targeting two connected but distinguishable obstacles to a 
view of perception as our basic openness to the world.  
The hindrance faced in Mind and World is the apparent incompatibility 
between the normative and rational function of perception and the need to view our 
perceptual sensitivity to the world as a natural phenomenon. The problem is how to 
regard perception as both concept-involving and natural. The specific obstacle which is 
 
 
 
6 Putnam criticises McDowell for presupposing disjunctivism and direct realism in Mind and World 
(Putnam 2002, p. 177). I think that McDowell is right that this is not the case (cf. McDowell 2002, pp. 
291-292).     
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to be removed by the introduction of a disjunctive and relational view of perception 
stems from arguments for indirect realism based on the possibility of perceptual error. 
The problem here is how to regard perception as both subjective and world-involving. I 
will focus on the argumentation of Mind and World in the first chapter of this thesis, 
and on the specific arguments for a relational so-called disjunctivism of perception in 
the second chapter. I shall by no means present an adequate discussion of all the aspects 
of either McDowell’s arguments or of the counter-arguments found in the literature. My 
aim is to lay bare the basic structures of McDowell’s arguments in order to exploit these 
in my exposition of the problem of agency. 
 I should note that on the notion of concepts, I shall follow McDowell and 
take concepts to consist in conceptual capacities that can be employed in judgements 
with propositional content. This makes conceptual content essentially tied to language 
and also inherently inter-subjective as I take the idea of a private language to be 
unintelligible. This means that I assume what Bermúdez calls the Priority Principle, 
which states that there exists a constitutive relation between linguistic and conceptual 
abilities (Bermúdez 1998a, p. 42). The term ‘concept’ can, of course, be used in many 
ways. By tying the notion closely to language it becomes a means to articulate the idea 
that with language the possibility of taking a reason as a reason and of stepping back 
and assessing the rational credentials of a putative reason enters the picture. The 
possession of conceptual capacities is on this conception indissolubly tied to rationality 
understood as a capacity to ask for and to provide reasons for beliefs and actions. 
Furthermore this demanding sense of concepts is the contrast notion used when critics 
of conceptualism claim the need for a notion of non-conceptual content. 
In his most recent writings, however, McDowell has changed his view on 
how we are to understand the idea that the content of perception is through and through 
conceptual (McDowell 2008a). McDowell no longer thinks that the content of 
perception is propositional but he insists on the fact that it is conceptual. This 
development complicates McDowell’s notion of conceptual content. In the beginning of 
the second part of this thesis, I shall explicate the changes in McDowell’s view and 
argue that his new conception of perceptual content is superior to the old view. 
McDowell’s reassessment of the idea that conceptual content must be conceptual was 
published just as I was finishing this thesis. Consequently, I decided to leave more or 
less unchanged what I had already written on the basis of McDowell’s conceptualism in 
its old version. As I think the changes are highly relevant for the theme of my thesis, I 
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decided to place a discussion of what I term McDowell’s Embodied Conceptualism in 
the context of the challenges to conceptualism coming from a Merleau-Pontian 
perspective on perception and motility. Embodied Conceptualism can, I argue, be seen 
as a rapprochement to a Merleau-Pontian view on perception.   
  
I.IV The Problem of Agency 
I shall argue that there is a problem analogous to the transcendental problem concerning 
perception with regard to bodily agency, and that the problem is one that specifically 
concerns practical intentionality as distinct from theoretical intentionality. I shall only 
specify which kind of intentionality is in question when I talk about practical 
intentionality and keep the term intentionality for the feature of ‘aboutness’, i.e., the 
possession of representational content of an experience. The transcendental problem 
concerning bodily agency would be a sub-branch of the problem of theoretical 
intentionality if it were simply a consequence of the general threat to empirical content 
of intentional experiences. My claim is that, even if the way has been cleared for a view 
on perception as our basic openness to the world, we could still encounter the obstacles 
to a satisfying view on bodily agency with which I shall be dealing. I shall follow 
McDowell’s diagnosis of the basic problem of agency as a problem of conceiving our 
bodily activity as itself imbued with intentionality (MW, p. 90).7 This problem will not 
be solved just by paving the way for conception of perception as imbued with 
conceptual intentionality. The problem of bodily agency is the problem of seeing how 
the agent herself can be essentially involved in the bodily movements through which her 
intentional bodily actions are carried out. To keep the agent in view becomes difficult 
because it seems only reasonable to regard the bodily capacity to move, our motility, as 
a natural phenomenon. After all we share the potential for self-movement with other 
biological creatures.  
With a commitment to the naturalness of our bodily motility and a due 
respect for natural science, we can seem forced to picture the agent as only externally 
related to her bodily movements. The bodily movements are conceived of as a purely 
physical phenomenon and they are as such of fundamentally the same kind, whether 
 
 
 
7 As such the problem of linguistic meaning is a specific and especially intriguing version of the general 
problem of bodily agency. We can see the problem of linguistic meaning as the problem of making it 
intelligible that linguistic behaviour can be ‘intrinsically imbued with content’ (McDowell 1987, p. 74). 
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they are a way for the subject to carry out her intentions or whether they happen because 
some neuroscientist stimulates our motor cortex. I shall argue that we have good reason 
to fear that if our intentions can only be externally related to our bodily movements, we 
will never come to understand how an agent’s intentions can rationally guide what she 
actually does in the world. The problem is analogous to the problem of how we are to 
conceive of the world as having a rational constraint on our thoughts if the world is 
merely causally related to our perceptual experiences. My proposal is that we can avoid 
the predicament if we can make sense of the following two ideas: First, the idea of a 
kind of bodily movements that are essentially agency-loaded, and second, the idea of 
intentions or ‘tryings’ that are essentially embodied in movements. In short, the 
proposal is: Our intentions are not internal to our mind and our body is not external to 
our intentions.  
My proposal with regard to bodily agency is analogous to McDowell’s 
proposals concerning perception. McDowell urges us to regard perception as an 
essentially world-involving experience and to regard the world itself as conceptually 
structured. We need to understand perception as not falling short of the worldly facts 
and we need to understand our perception as having conceptual content, this means that 
we come to conceive of the factual world as itself conceptually structured. Similarly I 
propose that we conceive of our intentions or tryings as not falling short of worldly acts 
and of our agency-expressive bodily movements as themselves essentially involving our 
practical yet conceptual abilities. What I argue is that there is a necessary link between 
our concept of intentions and our concept of bodily capacities which makes it urgent 
that we picture our bodily motility as itself imbued with conceptual intentionality. This 
claim is the analogue of McDowell’s claim of a necessary link between empirical 
beliefs and perception which makes it imperative that we regard perception itself as 
infused with conceptual content.       
McDowell appears to oscillate between two ways of understanding the 
status of his proposals. Sometimes he underlines that demonstrating the mere 
intelligibility of his proposals is enough for them to do their work (cf. McDowell 1998i, 
p. 428, n. 14). It is sufficient for his purposes if we can come to realize that the 
alternative accounts he proposes can make sense of the phenomenon in question. The 
mere availability of an intelligible alternative, combined with a perspicuous analysis of 
the original problem, should be enough to extinguish the philosophical urge to raise 
certain philosophical question, like, for instance, the transcendental question about how 
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intentionality is at all possible. However, in other places he makes the stronger claim 
that his proposals represent the only conceivable way of making sense of the 
phenomenon in question, whether it be empirical knowledge or empirical intentionality 
as such. Such claims are often found in the context of what I call negative 
transcendental arguments. Such negative arguments are arguments to the effect that 
certain assumptions will eventually make the phenomenon we set out to explain 
unintelligible (cf. McDowell 2006b, p. 23).      
My arguments have both a negative and a positive side. On the negative 
side, I shall argue that there are certain assumptions concerning the nature of bodily 
movements and the nature of mental items like intentions which together make it very 
difficult if not impossible to make sense of our capacity for intentional bodily actions. 
In doing so I shall try to identify certain basic assumptions shared by a host of different 
theories. By no means do I purport to carry through an exhaustive critique of all the 
different theories on the market that could appear to be committed to the assumptions I 
identify as problematic. For this reason, I shall restrict the negative side of my claim to 
the claim that we have good reason to suspect that theories that share the basic 
assumptions I criticise will run into the problems I expose. On the positive side, I claim 
that the alternative I propose can avoid the problems I have diagnosed as the outcome of 
the basic assumptions identified in the negative part of my argument. Again I do not 
claim that I have given an exhaustive critique of all thinkable alternatives and I do not 
claim that the proposals I make are the only intelligible way to make sense of our bodily 
agency. My purpose here is merely to establish the intelligibility of the conceptual 
account and to demonstrate its robustness when faced with a certain genre of objections 
which are more or less inspired by Merleau-Ponty. What I shall argue is that a sensible 
way to avoid making bodily agency a mystery is to assume what I will call a dual 
conception of bodily movements, as well as a conceptualist disjunctivism of trying or 
willing. 
Let me sum up the three basic claims that I aim to establish as at least 
plausible basic elements in an adequate understanding of the bodily agency of rational 
animals: 
        
Thesis (A): A dual conception of bodily movements  
In order to understand intentional bodily actions as a sui generis phenomenon in relation 
to a natural scientific explanation we need to conceive of the bodily movements 
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essential for the carrying out of such actions as of sui generis kind in relation to the kind 
of bodily movements that are explainable by natural science. This is not just an 
anomalous monism of bodily movements. The claim is not just that the same event of 
bodily movements can be given two mutually irreducible descriptions. The claim is that 
there are two fundamental ways of conceiving of bodily movements corresponding to 
two fundamentally different subject matters. The dual conception of movements claims 
that there are two different kinds of bodily movements; movements that are understood 
by being placed in the ‘space of reasons’, and movements that can be understood by 
natural scientific means.8   
 
Thesis (B): A Disjunctivism of Trying  
The experiential aspect of an intentional bodily action I shall refer to as a ‘trying’. 
Trying-disjunctivism says that even if we can imagine a case of total failure in which 
we have an experience indistinguishable from the experience we have when we actually 
carry out an intentional bodily action, the trying-experience of our normal bodily 
actions can and must be considered as of a fundamentally different kind than such 
completely ineffective tryings. A trying is either an idle trying or it is a trying of a kind 
that essentially involves bodily activity.9  
 
Thesis (C): Embodied Conceptualism 
In the case of rational animals, intentional bodily actions are realizations of practical 
concepts, or what I shall refer to as actualizations of practical, conceptual capacities. 
The intentionality with which bodily movements are imbued is the intentionality of the 
trying experience and the trying has conceptual content. The trying is the actualization 
of a teleologically basic, practical concept.      
 
These are the three main positive theses of this thesis. I spend some time explaining the 
Thesis of Conceptualism by the end of Chapter One. In Chapter 3 I try to spell out the 
negative consequences of separating intentions and bodily movements as two 
autonomous elements of bodily actions. Furthermore I introduce a Dual Conception of 
                                                 
 
 
8 Hornsby has developed the most explicit version of a kind of dual conception of movements that I know 
of, though she terms it a disjunctivism of movements (Hornsby 1997, p. 102).  
9 To my knowledge, such a disjunctivism of trying was first explicitly formulated by Dokic (1992), 
though earlier versions of the basic idea are discussed by McGinn (1982) and A. D. Smith (1988). 
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Movements and a Disjunctivism of Trying and argue that, in combination, they provide 
the means for evading the problems of the standard conceptions. The conceptualist 
account of our agency can seem to imply a denial of the agency of other non-rational 
animals as well as human infants. I devote Chapter 4 to arguing that such an 
implausible and intolerable conclusion does not follow from a conceptualist account of 
rational agency. In Part Two I focus on a host of objections inspired by Merleau-
Ponty’s work. The target of these objections is primarily the conceptualist aspect of the 
account I developed in Part One.  
 If successful, the attempt to release the specific intellectual tension 
between our conception of ourselves as both responsive to reason and as natural 
creatures will not result in an exorcising of all philosophical questions concerning 
freedom. To think so would be, to paraphrase Husserl, to retire to the asylum of 
philosophical ignorance.10 That such a specific exercise of philosophical therapy does 
not deal with all philosophical questions concerning human freedom is explicitly 
recognized by McDowell when he writes as follows:  
 
Of course what rationality confers is only the capacity to live a life 
that is one’s own in the sense I am gesturing at. To what extent the 
capacity is exercised, and in which regions of life, depends on all 
kinds of factors. The conditions under which the potential for freedom 
can be realized are an important topic for philosophy. (McDowell 
2006c, p. 8). 
 
Here McDowell refers to issues that are not addressed when we are exclusively dealing 
with transcendental threats to the very idea of a potential for freedom. Besides from 
such issues there might to be other ways of thinking than the ones I shall be focusing 
on, that potentially poses a threat to our conception of ourselves as bodily agents.   
  
I.V Practical Knowledge and Intentional Bodily Action  
It is now time to say something about what I mean by an intentional bodily action. By 
such actions I shall understand actions that both essentially involve active or voluntary 
bodily movements and are intentional in the sense Anscombe circumscribed. 
Anscombe’s broad definition of practical intentionality says that actions are intentional 
 
 
 
10 Husserl’s talk of an ‘asylum for phenomenological ignorance’ appears in a somewhat different context 
(cf. Overgaard and Grünbaum 2007, p. 16, n.7)   
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when a specific version of the ‘Why?’ question finds application, namely the version 
where what one asks for are reasons for acting as opposed to merely asking for the 
cause of an event (Anscombe 1957/2000, p. 24).  
It is characteristic of such ‘Why?’ questions that when they find 
application the agent will immediately recognize the action put into question as her 
action. This comes out if we follow Anscombe and consider one of the ways the 
applicability of the question can be denied. Saying, ‘I didn’t know I was cutting down 
the tree with the robin’s nest’, when asked why I did so is a way of refusing the 
applicability of the specific ‘Why?’ question that aims for a response in terms of 
reasons. In such a situation, presumably, I would be intentionally cutting down the tree 
and the action of cutting down the tree with the robin’s nest would not be some further 
action but simply the same action under a different description. This goes to show that, 
as Anscombe professed, actions are always intentional under a certain description. 
As I shall use the term ‘intentional action’, it implies that the agent is 
aware of what she is doing under some description and that this awareness is in a certain 
sense non-observational. I shall say that the agent has some basic practical and non-
observational knowledge of what she is doing when what she does is done intentionally. 
It is not everything that one does intentionally that one knows one is doing while doing 
it. To use Davidson’s example: If I am filling in a form with the intention of producing 
ten carbon copies, then I will know that that is my intention, but I can only know after 
the fact whether I succeeded in fulfilling my intention (Davidson 1980c, p. 50). The 
point of saying that an intentional agent always has some basic practical knowledge is 
that if she performs an intentional action there is some description under which she has 
knowledge of what she is doing. In the case of the carbon-copy making, the agent will 
normally know that she is writing and she will know this without having to check in the 
way she needs to check whether she managed to make all ten copies. 
It could be claimed that, by focusing on the category of intentional actions 
defined as those of which the agent has practical knowledge, we limit the scope of the 
action-category in an unjustifiable, aprioristic manner. Instead we ought to leave it open 
for empirical research to narrow down the exact extension of what we should call an 
action. Arthur Danto has pushed such an idea against what he calls the ‘physiological 
recklessness’ of modern philosophy of action (Danto 1979, p. 474). Danto refers to 
Hefferline’s experiments that show that when a person is subjected to unpleasant sounds 
and her finger twitches are simultaneously registered and made to causally influence the 
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sounds, the subject will start twitching her fingers in a way that lowers the sounds. The 
twitching is not consciously registered by the subject, however, and so does not count as 
intentional action. The subject can only discover her behaviour by observing herself and 
she cannot intentionally reproduce the movements. Nevertheless the movements 
instantiate goal-directed behaviour and one could argue that an interest in bodily agency 
should therefore not confine itself to intentional actions in the strong sense.  
By focusing on intentional bodily action I do not want to deny that there 
are interesting empirical and philosophical questions related to a weaker notion of 
bodily agency. I do, however, want to claim that the features of intentional bodily 
actions are sui generis in relation to the unconscious goal-directed behaviour of the 
subject in the experiments to which Danto refers. If we want to understand the 
possibility of at least some of our actions displaying the kind of first- person practical 
knowledge characterized above we will never reach our goal if we start out with 
unconscious behaviour. My interest is in the question of exactly how we can make sense 
of the bodily agency of rational agents who can act for reasons qua reasons. To be able 
to let one’s action be rationally guided by what one takes to be good reasons, one needs 
to know what one is doing while one is doing it. This does not mean that there are not 
interesting questions about cases where it is unclear what the agent is conscious of, and 
I shall raise some of these questions in the course of the thesis. The paradigmatic case of 
an intentional bodily action is, however, a case where there is no doubt that the agent 
has practical knowledge of her own action. I assume that such actions exist and that it is 
crucial for all theories with a scope that includes the agency of mature human beings 
that they can account for such cases. 
Finally, a note on my focus on intentional bodily actions that involve 
bodily movements. Such a focus, it could be argued, puts an unjustifiable limit on what 
we understand by actions that are both intentional and bodily. If I stand still this can be 
an intentional action and it is certainly an action that is necessarily bodily and the same 
could be said about me standing still while patiently holding up a tilting snowman. 
Furthermore I can intentionally do something by refraining from doing something else. I 
can insult someone by not showing up at a party, and I can let the snowman fall to the 
ground by not intervening when it begins to lose its balance. I think we can easily see 
that in such cases of immobile doings or of intentional omission we can only make 
sense of these actions as intentional with the background of an understanding of the 
agent’s capacity to perform intentional bodily actions in the strong sense I am using for 
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the purposes of this discussion. This I think suffices to justify my focus on such bodily 
actions.11 
 
I.VI The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty 
In the second part of the thesis I will discuss a certain kind of objection to the 
conceptualist picture I presented in the first part. The basic structure of the objections is 
to agree with the thesis that intentional bodily action involves movements that are 
intrinsically agency-loaded but to deny that this means that we need to regard such 
voluntary bodily activity as permeated with practical, conceptual capacities. On the 
contrary, the objections run, we need to recognize a fundamental type of practical, 
motor intentionality that is non- or pre-conceptual if we are to make bodily agency 
intelligible. The objections I introduce will mainly be objections inspired by the early 
works of Merleau-Ponty.  
It is not my purpose to present a comprehensive interpretation of the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, and not just because I shall limit the sources I draw on to 
his early works. 12 Merleau-Ponty offers a detailed investigation of what he terms 
‘motor intentionality’. Motor intentionality is, according to Merleau-Ponty, a 
specifically practical mode of intentionality on a par with the specifically perceptual 
mode of directedness towards the world, neither of which is representational. Merleau-
Ponty suggests that both of these modes of intentionality are original in the two senses 
mentioned above; in the sense of being sui generis intentional experiences and in the 
sense of being foundational for all other kinds of intentional experiences. It is this 
specific notion of motor intentionality, combined with Merleau-Ponty’s extensive use of 
analogies between perception and action, that are my particular reasons for turning to 
his work. 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of motor intentionality is just like the notion of 
practical intentionality I argue for a notion that is inherently tied to bodily movements. 
This means that Merleau-Ponty’s account will not necessarily inherit the problems I 
diagnose as stemming from an agency-neutral conception of bodily movement. 
 
 
 
11 I leave so-called mental actions to one side and so also the question of the relation between mental and 
bodily actions.  
12 I shall first and foremost be drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s work from before his appointment as 
Professor of Philosophy at the College de France in 1952, primarily La structure du comportement (1942) 
and Phénoménologie de la perception (1945). 
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Nevertheless Merleau-Ponty’s notion of motor intentionality does not seem compatible 
with the conceptual aspect of the account I present. That Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of 
both perception and bodily agency is in conflict with McDowell’s conceptualism and 
that this indicates the shortcomings of the conceptual account has been argued by a 
number of authors. In particular, the recent debate between McDowell and Dreyfus has 
developed into an indirect discussion on the merits of Merleau-Ponty’s account. In my 
discussion of the potential impact that insights found in Merleau-Ponty’s work can have 
on a conceptualist account of perception and bodily agency, I shall begin by attending to 
the relation between the recent changes in McDowell’s position and Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of perception and then turn to the issue of agency. My main argument will 
be to the effect that, though drawing on resources from Merleau-Ponty can help clarify 
and nuance the conceptualist position, it does not, at least so far, bring in new 
arguments that have the force to shake the basic assumptions of conceptualism. The 
conclusion that conceptual capacities must be inextricably implicated in both perceptual 
experience and bodily agency if we are to make the possibility of rational animals 
intelligible still stands.                
Apart from the specific interest of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of motor 
intentionality, for the main theme of this thesis I regard Merleau-Ponty’s work as highly 
relevant for a general discussion of McDowell’s philosophy. The relevance is due to the 
large extent of overlap between their respective analyses of the basic problems of 
modern philosophy, combined with their apparently divergent positive suggestions.  
In Phénoménologie de la perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty displays a 
dialectic oscillation between what he calls Empiricism and Intellectualism as the 
symptoms of an adherence to the framework of Objective Thought. The fundamental 
mistake of Intellectualism is that it takes as given the determinate universe of science 
and therefore can only establish a temporary bulwark against the naturalization of 
subjectivity (PP, p. 58). The available alternative within the framework of Objective 
Thought, Empiricism, fares no better when it tries to explain the intentionality of 
perception as a result of merely causal relation between items that are in themselves 
meaningless. 
In Mind and World, McDowell sets out the consequences of assuming 
scientific realism as a dilemma between what he terms the Myth of the Given and 
Coherentism. The apparently forced choice between the two positions corresponds on 
many points to Merleau-Ponty’s dialectic between Empiricism and Intellectualism. 
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There are differences, however, and it is these differences that make the constellation of 
the two thinkers interesting and which have the potential to allow for a clarification of 
the phenomena in question through mutual critique. 
From a McDowellian perspective, the critical question is whether 
Merleau-Ponty, in spite of his resistance, succumbs to a version of the Myth of the 
Given, which eventually will make the relation between perception and judgments 
unintelligible. Turning the table, the immediate critical question to McDowell from a 
Merleau-Pontian perspective would be whether McDowell does not, in spite of all his 
assurances, fall into the trap of Intellectualism, when he insists that the content of 
perception must be conceptual – an intellectualism that because of its preoccupation 
with thinking constructs a picture of perceptions that falsifies the specific 
phenomenology of perception. 
 I shall not pursue a full-scale investigation of such mutual critical 
questions, but they will rise to the surface from time to time as I go along. My main 
focus and reason for turning to Merleau-Ponty remains my desire to investigate to what 
extent the conceptualist account I develop can accommodate the critical points coming 
from a perspective that shares McDowell’s rejection of science as the measure of all 
things as well as his emphasis on the need to regard some bodily movements as 
themselves imbued with intentionality. 
 I shall now turn to an exposition of McDowell’s analysis of the problem of 
perception as it is found in Mind and World and from there begin my development of an 
analogical account of the problem of bodily agency.   
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PART ONE   
AN EMBODIED CONCEPTUALISM CONCERNING BODILY AGENCY 
 
 
 
 
Für die frage nach ihren Warum dem “ich sehe es” keinen Wert 
beimessen , wäre Widersinn – wie wir abermals einsehen.  
 - Edmund Husserl 
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CHAPTER 1   
THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION AND THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY     
 
1.1 The Transcendental Problem of Perception 
1.1.1 The Diagnostic Spirit of Mind and World 
In John McDowell’s Mind and World (1994), we find a way of expressing the general 
problem of agency which will serve as my point of departure. McDowell presents the 
problem via a formulation that transposes Kant’s famous dictum from the area of 
empirical intuitions to the area of bodily agency: 
 
Kant says, ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind’. Similarly, intentions without overt activity are 
idle, and movements of limbs without concepts are mere happenings 
not expressions of agency. (MW, p. 89). 
 
Here McDowell connects the problem of agency with the central issue of Mind and 
World, namely, how we must conceive of perception if empirical content is to be 
possible. In this chapter I shall be dealing primarily with McDowell’s analysis of the 
problem of perception in order to be able to exploit my presentation of the analysis in 
my proposals concerning agency in the coming chapters.  
Mind and World takes issue with a specific threat to the intelligibility of 
intentionality, i.e., to the possibility of our thoughts to be about the world. The main 
purpose of Mind and World is to clarify the nature of this threat to the very idea of 
intentionality, to understand the genesis of the problem and to show how its origin 
shapes certain philosophical responses to the threat, which will remain ineffective 
exactly because they do not question the origin. As such, the book urges a diagnostic 
and therapeutic approach to the problem of intentionality.  
 McDowell’s overall diagnosis is that a certain conception of nature 
creates the intellectual threat to our notion of intentionality, namely, nature conceived as 
that which can be understood by modern natural science. It is when this assumption is in 
place that it can come to seem that the intentionality of our thoughts is highly 
problematic. The therapeutic element in McDowell’s approach has two steps. The first 
step consists in making the problem clear, and the second consists in clearing the way to 
seeing that certain assumptions which are essential for the emergence of the problem 
are, in spite of their appearance, not obligatory.  
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Central to the first element of the therapeutic process is the realization that 
the threat which arises is of a transcendental nature, in the sense that it is a threat to the 
possibility of making intentionality intelligible at all. One way of giving expression to 
the threat is the Kantian formulation: How is empirical content possible at all (MW, p. 
xxi)? Recognizing the transcendental nature of the problem is paramount to being able 
to deal with it. The problem is not primarily an epistemological problem about the 
possibility of knowledge about the world. Such a purely epistemological interpretation 
of the problem would not address the fact that it is the very possibility of making sense 
of our thoughts as possible cases of knowledge, i.e., as purporting to be of the world, 
which is in question. The deadlock which creates the impression that intentionality is 
ruled out is the result of two basic assumptions that both seem equally credible (cf. 
McDowell 2000, p. 6). One is the idea that in order for our thoughts to have empirical 
content they must be able to be confronted with how the world is, and that such a 
confrontation in our case can only happen in perception. The other is the idea that 
perceptual impressions are natural phenomena and so cannot be said to show us how we 
ought to think, as natural phenomena just happen and cannot be intrinsically normative. 
This is a short-hand version of the origin of the apparent impasse which I shall expand 
below.         
 Once the problem is seen clearly, the second step of McDowell’s 
therapeutic approach consists in an attempt to show that the conception of nature that 
drives the second assumption is not compulsory. This is combined with an analysis of 
what, in McDowell’s picture, are symptoms of the intellectual predicament which 
results from the non-compulsory assumption. The analysis is to reveal our predicament 
as one of being caught up in a restless oscillation between two equally unstable 
philosophical positions, namely Coherentism and a position that assumes what Wilfred 
Sellars called the Myth of the Given. These philosophical positions can be seen as 
attempts to give a straight answer to the transcendental question while the aim of 
McDowell’s approach is to show that the transcendental question arises because of 
assumptions that inevitably will make empirical content aporetic: 
 
The deeper misconception is to mistake an impossible conceptual bind 
for a tractable intellectual problem – something one might set out to 
solve without shifting one’s background assumptions. (McDowell 
2000, p. 5). 
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The purpose of this therapeutic approach is to make readers in the grip of the 
transcendental question realize that the problem owes its compelling nature to certain 
assumptions and that we can see our way to ridding ourselves of the assumptions and 
thereby exorcise the philosophical impulse to raise the question. ‘The result will be, not 
an answer to the question, but a liberation from the apparent need to ask it’ (McDowell 
2000, p. 5). The approach aims at a perspicuous deconstruction of the building blocks 
that went into making the question appear intellectually pressing; a deconstruction that 
is to make us realize that we are entitled to reclaim the phenomenon in question as 
philosophically unproblematic. 
Mind and World is focused on showing that there is nothing to hinder us 
from regarding our perception as presenting us directly with facts of the world and at 
the same time as a natural phenomenon. The point of McDowell’s short digression into 
the field of action is to emphasize that the problem he deals with is not limited to 
theoretical intentionality (MW, pp. 89-91). That the conception of nature McDowell 
works to dislodge from our thinking has disturbing repercussions when it comes to our 
understanding of ourselves as bodily agents is not simply a consequence of the fact that 
intentionality understood as ‘aboutness’ is essential for understanding intentional 
actions in general. Naturally, if we cannot make sense of intentionality in general we 
will also be unable to understand how intentions to perform actions can have any 
content. The problem of agency to which McDowell draws attention is however 
specifically agency-related. It is a problem that concerns our presumably natural ability 
to move our body that is essential for our ability to perform intentional bodily actions. 
Just as the assumption that perception is a natural phenomenon can seem to exclude the 
possibility of our perceptual experiences providing a rational constraint on our beliefs, 
so the fact that our bodily capacity to move is a natural phenomenon can seem to 
remove this capacity from our possession as rational agents. It is both our passive and 
our active bodily powers as rational animals that can gain the appearance of unthinkable 
phenomena when a certain naturalistic perspective is dominant (cf. MW, p. 111). In 
order to be able to clarify the nature of the threat to our conception of ourselves as 
bodily agents I will first spell out how the idea of theoretical intentionality can come to 
appear as deeply problematic. 
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before the conclusion that initiates the oscillation is reached. This intervention can take 
                                                
1.1.2 The Pentalemma of Mind and World 
We can clarify the origin of the transcendental questioning of intentionality by 
displaying the background for the urgency of the question as a pentalemma. The 
pentalemma is constituted by five propositions which taken together are inconsistent, 
but any four of them on their own form a coherent set. By mapping out the problem in 
this way I will have an opportunity to show how the oscillation between Coherentism 
and the Myth of Given is initiated and how McDowell argues we can find a way out of 
the impasse. The pentalemma arises from the combination of the following five theses: 
13  
  
Thesis (1) Experiential Naturalism: Our perceptual experiences are natural 
occurrences. 
Thesis (2) Sui generis Conceptualism: What it is to possess and employ conceptual 
capacities cannot be captured in natural scientific terms. 
Thesis (3) Scientistic Naturalism: All natural occurrences can be explained in 
natural scientific terms. 
Thesis (4) Minimal Empiricism: Our perceptual experiences can justify our beliefs. 
Thesis (5) Epistemological Conceptualism: Only that which itself has conceptual 
content can justify a belief.      
 
Taken together, the first three theses imply the assumption that procures the 
transcendental problem of intentionality. The crucial implication is that, given the three 
theses, it is ruled out that our perceptual experiences can, qua natural occurrences, be 
essentially concept-involving. It is this conclusion, in combination with Minimal 
Empiricism and Epistemological Conceptualism that engenders the outlook from which 
the very possibility of having thoughts that take aim at reality comes to seem 
endangered. The oscillation, which is the symptom of accepting the three first theses, 
now runs between denying either Minimal Empiricism, which is the move of 
Coherentism, or denying Epistemological Conceptualism, which is the evasion that 
leads to the Myth of the Given. McDowell’s own proposal is that we can intervene 
 
 
 
13 As will become clear later, the theses need amendments for them to come out as formally inconsistent, 
this is what the possibility of a consistent interpretation of the five theses within a Davidsonian 
anomalous monism shows (1.5. below). 
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t yet 
mentioned co
 what follows I shall first focus on the three premises that lead to the 
conclusion th
.1.3 The Logical Space of Reasons 
                                                
place when we realize that we are not forced to adhere to Thesis 3, Scientistic 
Naturalism. If the possibility of this intervention is not acknowledged, the hopelessness 
of the dilemma between Coherentism and the Myth of the Given can, according to 
McDowell, easily provide an understandable motivation for a full-scale naturalization 
project that denies the Sui generis Conceptualism and announces the unboundedness of 
natural science. This is the option McDowell terms bald naturalism (MW, p. 73).  
The only possible escape from the pentalemma which I have no
nsists in denying Thesis 1, Experiential Naturalism. This possibility is not 
explicitly discussed as an option by McDowell but it shows up in his defence of the 
possibility of denying Scientistic Naturalism. The difficulty of denying Scientistic 
Naturalism is to make it clear that it does not amount to a hidden denial of the 
naturalness of perception and so a denial of Thesis 1 (cf. MW, p. 77). As it stands, 
Thesis 1 simply states that perception is a natural phenomenon without specifying 
exactly what is to be understood by the term ‘natural’. This is the broad sense of nature 
McDowell recommends and which is simply to be understood in its contrast with ‘the 
supernatural – the spooky or the occult’ (McDowell 2000, p. 99). What is supposedly 
ruled out by this assumption is that our perceptual experiences could be the result of 
super-natural forces in the sense of forces that are neither physical nor psychological, 
where these terms are still understood in a loose sense.14 Furthermore a transcendental 
idealism that regards the subject’s perception of the world as the limit of the world, and 
therefore as not taking place in the world, would contradict Experiential Naturalism. 
These options are not discussed by McDowell as Experiential Naturalism is the one 
premise all parties within the purview of McDowell’s discussion would agree upon (cf. 
MW, p. 76).   
In
at our perceptual experiences cannot, qua natural occurrences, essentially 
involve the employment of our conceptual capacities. I shall then proceed to an 
exposition of the oscillation generated by this conclusion.  
 
1
 
 
 
14 I borrow the term Experiential Naturalism from Martin (2004). Martin points out that the sense-data 
theories of Moore and Russell involve a denial of Experiential Naturalism since they consider the sense 
data to be awareness- independent entities which are neither physical nor mental (Martin 2004, p. 86, n. 
8).  
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re of conceptual capacities. For McDowell this is 
a contrast to a
The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as 
 
cDowell takes over the idea that placing an item in the space of reasons is to 
ogical spaces is a contrast between two 
modes of th
Thesis 2 states the sui generis natu
equivalent to what he terms the sui generis nature of the logical space of reasons. This 
implication is however not a part of the thesis as it figures in the pentalemma. It is only 
the combination with Thesis 5, about the necessarily conceptual nature of all reasons 
that secures the congruence of the space of the conceptual with the space of reasons. To 
unpack Thesis 2 I will make a detour to discuss the notion of the logical space of 
reasons, and show why the logical space of reasons, according to McDowell, coincides 
with the logical space of the conceptual. This in turn will allow me to explain why such 
a congruence should be denied and how such a negation leads to the Myth of the Given. 
The term ‘logical space of reasons’ is from Wilfred Sellars, who used it as 
 logical space of empirical descriptions: 
 
that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that 
episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of 
justifying and being able to justify what one says. (Sellars 1997, p. 
76). 
M
understand the item in question as something that potentially can be justified and 
potentially serve as a justification, but, contrary to Sellars, he takes the contrastive 
logical space to be what he calls the realm of law, in which items are understood by 
being subsumed under natural law. It is essential for McDowell that not only what is 
subject to natural-scientific intelligibility but also what is understood through its space-
of-reason intelligibility are phenomena in the sense of states and occurrences that are 
part of the empirically knowable reality (McDowell 2004, p. 91; McDowell 2006, p. 
235). Only thus does a possibility occur for taking space-of-reason intelligibility as a 
way of understanding phenomena as natural.  
The contrast between the two l
ought or two kinds of intelligibility (MW, pp. 70-73) and it has, as 
McDowell points out, certain affinities with the distinction between Verstehen and 
Erklären (McDowell 2004, p. 93). As the notion of the logical space of reasons is a 
contrastive notion, it is dependent on the availability of a notion of the contrastive 
logical space, i.e., the logical space of modern science. This, of course, cannot mean 
that before around the seventeenth century people had no sense of a distinction between 
an explanation that involves reasons and an explanation that merely involves 
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It would be true to say that if I did not possess things like that – bones 
 
urthermore it was the awareness of such a distinction that left Socrates so disappointed 
I expected him to tell me in the first place whether the earth is flat or 
 
take McDowell’s point to be that it is only with the modern mathematization of natural 
rse, ask whether a prediction of an eclipse is itself justified, 
but then we a
                                                
mechanical causes. It was exactly such a contrast that Socrates drew when he argued 
that the true cause of his sitting on the bench in the prison in Athens was his decision 
and not the fact that his body had certain physiological properties (Plato 1955, 99b): 
 
and sinews and so on – I shouldn’t be able to do what I had resolved 
upon; but to say that I do what I do because of them – and that too 
when I am acting with my mind – and not because of my choice of 
what is best, would be to use extremely careless language. (Plato 
1955,  99b). 
F
when he studied Anaxagoras’ cosmology in his youth: 
 
round, and then go on to explain the cause why it must be the one or 
the other, using the term “better”, and showing how it was better for it 
to be as it is (Plato 1955, 97d). 
I 
science that we achieved a way of understanding natural phenomena that became so 
comprehensive that it gradually made Socrates’ search for a normative understanding of 
the shape of the Earth less and less relevant and by now makes it obviously non-
scientific.15 Modern natural science provides a way of understanding that excludes the 
possibility of asking scientific questions as to whether its subject matter is correct or 
incorrect. It is not a scientific question if one asks whether the firing of certain neurons 
is justified in the light of the brain activity in another area, and it would be beside the 
point of astronomy to ask whether an eclipse of the moon was correct or not, or to take 
it as a sign from the gods.   
We can, of cou
re not questioning the subject matter of science but rather our beliefs about 
the subject matter. Such concepts as belief, knowledge and in fact all notions that 
ascribe propositional attitudes serve, according to McDowell, to place their subject 
matter in the space of reasons. To place an item in the space of reasons means 
 
 
 
15 McDowell notes that in the early stages of modern science one could only have an inchoate 
understanding of the sui generis character of the space of reasons, and that such an inchoate sense might 
be part of the motivation for Descartes’ dualism (see MW, p. 90, McDowell 2004, p. 97). 
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asons is sui generis relative to the 
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understanding it in terms of normative relations, such as implication and 
probabilification, and so to understand the item as potentially reason-constituting (MW, 
pp. 7, 52). It is to understand the item as equipped to serve as a justification for a 
judgment or an action. If one proposition, say, that yesterday’s weather forecast 
promised rain today, makes another proposition, say, that it will rain today, more 
probable, then my believing the first proposition can give me reason to believe that it 
will rain. Further, given that I do not want to become wet, my belief that it will rain can 
give me a reason to take an umbrella when I go out.  
 McDowell’s claim that the space of re
re ern science is in the first instance a claim about the concepts that serve to 
place items in the space of reasons, concepts such as ‘hope’, ‘belief’ and ‘prediction’. 
The claim is that such concepts that operate in the space of reasons have a specific 
intellectual role in making phenomena intelligible in a way that cannot be overtaken by 
concepts that serve to make phenomena intelligible in a natural scientific manner (cf. 
MW, p. 74). It is this claim that is denied by bald naturalism. McDowell makes a 
distinction between two ways the naturalization project of bald naturalism can be can be 
undertaken. It can either attempt to reconstruct the space-of-reason kind of intelligibility 
out of the natural scientific way of understanding or it can try to reduce the first kind of 
understanding to the latter.16 McDowell does not claim to deliver any cogent arguments 
that show that all such naturalization projects are in principle impossible. His strategy is 
to undermine a certain philosophical motivation for thinking that we need to take such a 
project upon us, namely the motivation that stems from the appearance that such an 
approach is the only way to save our ability to think, act and perceive from becoming 
supernatural powers: ‘I have no need to say anything against bald naturalism except that 
 
 
 
16 On one reading, Quine belongs to the camp of reductionists, though his position is notoriously 
ambiguous (cf. MW, p. 134, n. 5). Loar’s functionalist theory of mind and Millikan’s teleosemantics are 
two attempts at a reconstructive naturalism explicitly criticized by McDowell (McDowell 1998g, 
McDowell 2004, see also McDowell 2002a, p. 304, n. 25)). A third kind of naturalism is a ‘sociological 
naturalism’ which holds on to the sui generis of the space of reason relative to natural science but regards 
the norms of rationality as constituted by social institutions themselves understandable in terms of 
independent social facts. McDowell identifies Kripke’s and Wright’s readings of Wittgenstein’s rule 
following considerations as such a sociological reductionism (MW, p. 92, n. 7). Bloor and Barnes’ 
sociology of knowledge would be another case in point.    
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it does not relieve the philosophical difficulty I consider’ (McDowell 1998i, p. 428, n. 
13).17 
 In explaining why the space of reason is sui generis, McDowell refers to 
Davidson’s idea that that intentional explanation cannot be reduced to nomological 
explanations (MW, p. 74). Davidson argues that by giving explanations in terms of 
reasons we regard the phenomena in question as governed by a ‘constitutive ideal of 
rationality’ (Davidson 1980c, p. 223). This means that we make things intelligible by 
revealing them as, at least approximately, being as they rationally ought to be 
(McDowell 1998a, p. 328). When someone packs an umbrella before going out, we can 
make this behavior intelligible as rational if we, for instance, know that the person 
expects it to rain. It is crucial that making the behavior intelligible in this way involves 
regarding the person herself as bringing her umbrella for this reason, which means 
seeing her as herself aspiring to live up to the norms of rationality. This means that the 
person herself would ordinarily know the reasons why she does what she does. If asked 
why she acted as she did, she would know her reason in the non-observational way 
paradigmatic for intentional action of rational animals. If we cut this tie between what 
the agent takes as her reason and what we, who understand her action as rational, take to 
be her reason, we also remove our understanding from the space of reasons and we are 
no longer trying to understand her action as intentional.  
By the notion of conceptual capacities that I stipulated in the introduction 
above, such capacities are understood via their actualization in judgments, i.e., in the 
taking of a certain propositional stance. This makes it evident why the sui generis of the 
space of reasons implies the sui generis of conceptual capacities. If propositional 
attitudes are what they are in terms of the employment of conceptual capacities, and 
such attitudes can only be understood by being placed within the space of reasons, then 
what it is to possess and employ such capacities must be sui generis in relation to the 
realm of science. This is what Thesis 2 of the pentalemma claims: What it is to possess 
and employ concepts can only be understood in a normative context that involves the 
idea of correct and incorrect use of the concepts in judgments. Combined with Thesis 1, 
Experiential Naturalism, and Thesis 3, Scientistic Naturalism, the implication is that our 
 
 
 
17 On this point, McDowell’s defense of the sui generis character of the space of reasons seems different 
from the classical attacks on psychologism of Frege and Husserl, as well as, for instance, Nagel’s defense 
of a priori universal norms of rationality in The Last Word (1997). 
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perceptual experience cannot, qua natural occurrences, involve an actualization of 
conceptual capacities. That this conclusion is problematic becomes clear when it is 
viewed in relation to the last two theses of the pentalemma.  
 
1.1.4 The Unhappy Oscillation 
 If we accept the three first theses of the pentalemma we are forced to accept the 
implication about the non-conceptual nature of our perceptual experiences, and with this 
the pentalemma is narrowed down to a forceful dilemma. The two horns of the dilemma 
are, according to McDowell, equally important for the possibility of holding on to the 
fundamental idea that our thoughts can be about the world. Why is this so? Let us first 
look at Thesis 4, Minimal Empiricism.  
 Minimal Empiricism as I formulated it simply states that our perceptual 
experiences can justify our beliefs. The idea behind it is, however, that if our experience 
is not where our judgements can stand to be corrected then they stand to lose all 
content: 
 
That is what I mean by ‘a minimal empiricism’: the idea that 
experience must constitute a tribunal, mediating the way our thinking 
is answerable to how things are, as it must be if we are to make sense 
of it as a thinking at all. (MW, p. xii). 
 
That our thinking can be about the world must mean that our thoughts can be correct or 
incorrect according to how things actually are. For this to be the case, how things are in 
the world cannot be completely inaccessible to us, there must be a minimal contact with 
the world and, in our case, this contact can only be established in our perceptual 
experiences. This contact cannot be a merely causal relation, because such a relation 
would not give any content to the idea that we can be corrected through experience. The 
world would simply push our thoughts around but there would be no possible rational 
relation between where our thoughts would end up and how the world actually is. In 
other words, perception would not be able to justify our judgements. This line of 
thinking seems to me very difficult to dispute. The basic idea is that, if perception does 
not allow the world to put rational constraints on our thinking, we become unable to 
recognize our thinking as having any intentionality at all and further that the only 
conceivable way the world can, in a natural way, reveal itself to humans is in 
perception.  
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If we endorse Minimal Empiricism and if the consequence of the three 
first theses is accepted, i.e., that perception cannot have conceptual content, then we are 
forced to deny Thesis 5, which states that only what is conceptually structured can 
function as a justification. The consequence is that we must claim that the space of 
reasons extends further than the sphere of the conceptual. What we get is the idea of 
perceptual impressions that are not themselves conceptually structured but can 
nevertheless serve to justify our judgments, i.e., the idea of the Given. The idea of such 
conceptually naked impressions has been a basic assumption of empiricist philosophers, 
and it is the minimal empiricism left for Quine after his critique of the two dogmas of 
Empiricism; the dogma of a distinction between the synthetic and the analytical, and the 
dogma of empirical significance tied to individual statements. If this position is to 
distinguish itself from a bald naturalism that reduces the notion of empirical evidence to 
a notion used in a scientific explanation of human behaviour, it needs to claim that the 
sensuous impressions can be what warrant the application of a concept and not simply 
what blindly triggers the actualization of conceptual capacities. This dissociation proves 
highly difficult. 
The distinction between the justified judgment and the justifying Given is 
the distinction Davidson criticizes as a dualism of conceptual schema and content 
(Davidson 1973-74). The content that is supposed to give a conceptual schema a foot in 
reality is a matter waiting to receive its conceptual form. The basic problem with the 
Given is that it lies beyond the limit of that which the subject can take a critical stance 
towards (cf. MW, p. 52). The Given is unquestionable, and if our thoughts’ 
answerability to the world is given over to a Given we lose the idea of ourselves as 
beings who can resume responsibility for what we think. When I make up my mind 
about an empirical question, my thinking ought to be constrained by how the empirical 
world presents itself to us in experience; otherwise I cannot be a responsible thinker. If 
what ultimately is to justify my empirical judgments is a Given that has no conceptual 
content, I cannot point to what I see and say I believe P because I see that P is the case. 
All I can do is to say I believe P because..., and then point to what is given. This 
pointing cannot be a pointing to something I can share with you by telling you what I 
see; it cannot even be something I myself can articulate, as it is by definition non-
conceptual. That our judgments should be under the control of such a given can, as 
McDowell puts it, never amount to a justificatory relation; it can at the most give us 
exculpations for our belief. Such exculpations would be analogous to how a person 
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dumped by a tornado in a place she is forbidden to enter is exculpated by the fact that 
her trespassing was beyond anything for which she is responsible (MW, p. 8, n. 7).18 In 
fact not even exculpations are available, as it is the very idea of beliefs as items that can 
be about the world that is undermined. There is a strong expression from Merleau-
Ponty: ‘Our experiences have been mutilated from below’ (PP, p. 65). This is why 
McDowell, with Sellars, calls the idea of the bare presences the Myth of the Given. 
If we are still in the grip of the force of the argument provided by the first 
three theses, there is only one alternative to the Myth of the Given – to give up the idea 
that our thoughts need to have external rational constraints, i.e., to renounce Empirical 
Empiricism. This is exactly the consequence Davidson draws from his dismissal of the 
dualism of schema and content. The Myth of the Given tried to pull out a justification 
from what it could only make sense of as a merely causal influence from the world, 
given the denial of the conceptual content of perception. Davidson recognizes this but 
thinks that we can do without any justification from the world and make do with the 
internal coherence of our belief system as what justifies our beliefs: ‘Nothing can count 
as a reason for holding a belief except for another belief’ (Davidson 1986, p. 310). 
This move will not, however, overcome the shortcomings of the Myth of 
the Given. It simply takes us one step further back from the world and as the problem in 
the first place was that the world was removed from the sight of the rational subject this 
will not help. The problem with the Myth of the Given was that it took perception to be 
non-conceptual and thereby made perceptions or intuitions blind, with the consequences 
that our thoughts became empty, i.e., not really thoughts at all since they could no 
longer even pretend to be of the world. Coherentism tries to rid intuitions of any 
epistemological importance, but to let the already empty thoughts interact cannot bring 
back intentionality, it can amount to no more than a ‘frictionless spin in the void’ (MW, 
p. 11). 
 Our dilemma should be clear by now. We could try to make the natural 
impingements of the world serve as justification and fail because we have a 
 
 
 
18 In other places McDowell diagnoses part of the motivation behind Scientific Naturalism to be ‘an 
intelligible wish to avoid responsibility’ (McDowell 1998c, p. 181). If the real forces behind our beliefs 
are placed outside the space of reasons we cannot be blamed for what we believe. McDowell indicates 
that the rise of modern science would be part of the explanation of why we are especially prone to feel the 
responsibility of thought as a burden. One way to understand this connection would be through the 
specifically modern threat to the idea of intentionality as such and the apparent burden of proof in the face 
of modern radical scepticism.    
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preconception of the natural as that which is in the realm of science and therefore by 
definition it cannot have any normative force. To think otherwise would be to commit a 
kind of naturalistic fallacy where we take a brute impact as somehow being able to 
provide the means whereby a judgment can come to be as it ought to be for it to be 
justified. Or we could try to make our thinking independent of the world’s 
impingements, in which case we avoid the naturalistic fallacy. The cost of this retreat, 
however, is that our thoughts become a play of empty forms (MW, p. 6) which, since no 
understanding is left, will lack even the pleasure of the free play of understanding 
promised by Kant’s aesthetics. Without any alternative, this philosophical deadlock 
seems fit to provide a forceful motivation for giving up the whole project of answering 
the transcendental question of how empirical content is in the first place possible, and 
instead to engage in the project of explaining perception and cognition on a wholly 
naturalistic basis. 
 
1.1.5 Anomalous Monism 
If we consider Davidson’s anomalous monism, it appears that an option opens up that 
would allow us to hold on to all five theses and so show that the pentalemma was not in 
effect a real pentalemma. McDowell only briefly mentions Davidson’s anomalous 
monism in Mind and World. It could seem that McDowell’s view is not so far removed 
from Davidson’s, but McDowell argues that his conception of perception is made 
impossible by Davidson’s anomalous monism (MW, p. 75). Anomalous monism can be 
seen as a way of combining recognition of the sui generis character of the space of 
reasons with Scientistic Naturalism. All the events that are made intelligible by being 
placed in the space of reasons are regarded as token-identical to events that, only under 
another description, can be subsumed under nomological laws. The sui generis 
character is here interpreted as a feature of a certain intentional description of an event 
and the description is sui generis in the sense that it is seen as in principle impossible to 
establish law-like connections between intentional descriptions of events and 
descriptions of events in natural scientific terms that would allow us to deduce the truth 
of one kind of description from the truth of a description of the other kind.  
Anomalous monism in fact provides a way of combining the crucial 
implication of the first three theses of the pentalemma – that, qua natural occurrence, 
perception cannot involve conceptual capacities – with the idea that perception 
nevertheless does involve conceptual content. In fact, if it is assumed that perception 
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involves conceptual capacities, the three first premises function as local variant of 
Davidson’s general argument for anomalous monism (Davidson 1980c, p. 208).  
Davidson’s first premise is the Principle of Causal Interaction – that at 
least some mental events interact causally with physical events. Thesis 1 of the 
pentalemma, Experiential Naturalism, can be regarded as a local consequence of this 
principle, taking perception to be natural in the sense of causally interacting with other 
events, some of them physical and none of them supernatural. Davidson’s second 
premise is the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality. Thesis 3 of the 
pentalemma, Scientistic Naturalism, simply adds to the Principle of the Nomological 
Character of Causality, that it is in virtue of such nomological, causal relations that 
something can be said to be a natural phenomenon. The third and last premise in 
Davidson’s argument for anomalous monism is the Anomalism of the Mental, which 
states that there are no strict deterministic laws that could allow us to predict or explain 
mental events. The Anomalism of the Mental equates with the sui generis character of 
conceptual capacities claimed by thesis 2 of the pentalemma. The anomalism, Davidson 
argues, is at least partly a consequence of the ascription of mental states being made in 
the light of a constitutive ideal of rationality and he takes this to be crucial in order to 
keep humans as rational animals in focus (Davidson 1980c, p. 223). These are the 
characterizations of intentional explanations that McDowell takes over from Davidson 
and which he expresses by his claim about the sui generis nature of the space of 
reasons.   
If we take the first three premises of the pentalemma and further add the 
thesis that perception does involve conceptual capacities, an anomalous monism of 
perception seems the only way to maintain consistency if we are not to regard the 
concept of perception as equivocal in meaning between an event of concept-involving 
perception and a natural event of perception.  The anomalous monistic interpretation 
would regard the two meanings as two descriptions of the same event in intentional and 
in natural-scientific terms. Such an interpretation would make it possible to combine all 
the five theses of the pentalemma as I formulated them above. Perceptual experiences 
could be seen both as justifying our beliefs and as possessing conceptual content, only 
none of these characterizations would be of perception qua natural phenomena. The 
problem with this proposal, according to McDowell, is that it prevents us from saying 
that it is qua natural occurrence that perception can serve as the place where the world 
can restrain our thinking in a rational manner (cf. MW, p. 76). McDowell ends his brief 
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discussion of anomalous monism with the remark that, prevented from seeing the 
conceptual capacities as essentially involved in perception qua natural phenomena, we 
are stuck within the framework that generates the interminable oscillation (see also 
MW, p. 98). Why should this be so if anomalous monism manages to make the 
pentalemma dissipate? I shall try to show that the dissolution of the inconsistency 
provided by anomalous monism does not engage with the fundamental problem exposed 
by the pentalemma.  
Davidson himself held that if X sees P, then X believes P and P is true 
(Davidson 2003, p. 695). That this view confuses perception with belief in what seems 
to me an unfortunate manner can be brought out by a counter example (cf. McDowell 
2003, p. 680).19 We can imagine a situation where we visit a shop that sells ties, but 
because we believe a friend who has told us that the lighting conditions of that 
particular shop make the colours of the ties appear different from what they actually are, 
we do not take the colours we see at face value. As it happens, however, it was the shop 
next door and not this one that had the illusory lighting conditions, and the conditions in 
the present shop are just fine. In this situation, a certain tie would appear to us to be of a 
certain colour and this appearance in fact would make the actual colour available to us. 
This situation shows the implausibility of holding that the only thing that can justify a 
belief is another belief. In the case described, we would be epistemically entitled to the 
belief that a certain tie is scarlet red on the grounds of what appears to us perceptually, 
and not on the grounds of a belief with such content. Given Epistemological 
Conceptualism the possibility of such a rational entitlement that does not lead to the 
acquisition of a belief shows that the relevant perception must possess conceptual 
content that could become the content of a judgment if, after consideration, one decided 
to take the appearance at face value after all (cf. McDowell 2006c, p. 10).20  
 As such, the example above is not, however, a counter example to an 
anomalous conception of perception but only to a belief-based coherentism. McDowell 
does discuss a position along the lines of the anomalous conception in the ‘Afterword’ 
of Mind and World (MW, p. 139). Here he points out that it seems open for Davidson to 
 
 
 
19 The example also appears in a response to Stroud’s critique to the effect that perception must contain 
an endorsement of a propositional content (McDowell 2002a, p. 277). 
20 Davidson seems to miss the point of this kind of example when he paraphrases it as an example of the 
kind where the lighting conditions are in fact so as to make any belief about the colours of what I see 
unwarranted (Davidson 2003, p. 695). 
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include perceptual appearances with conceptual content amongst the propositional 
attitudes that come together and provide justification for beliefs through their internal 
coherence. The possibility of such a position indicates that to remedy the transcendental 
predicament it is not sufficient to introduce a conceptual conception of the content of 
perception. It is not enough that the content of perception and judgments are claimed to 
be of the same kind, if perception stops short of the facts of the world. The spinning in 
the void was not primarily caused by the fact that perceptual experiences could have no 
rational influence on our beliefs but by the fact that perception could not be the place 
where the world itself could constrain our thoughts rationally. It is at this point that the 
specific problem concerning the possibility of hallucinatory appearances 
indistinguishable from veridical appearances arises. If such indistinguishable 
hallucinations are intelligible they seem to provide additional reason to take the 
perceptual appearance to be only indirectly of external objects. This is the problem 
McDowell confronts via his disjunctivist and relational account of perception. I shall 
return to these problems in the next chapter. In Mind and World the argument from 
hallucination is not explicitly discussed. McDowell mentions the possibility of 
perceptual error a couple of times but only  to underline that the conception of 
perception he urges has no problem with allowing for such errors without this opening 
the door for radical scepticism (MW, p. 9, p. 112, p. 143). This is because the 
conception he urges involves regarding the world itself as conceptually structured and 
the veridical perception as openness to the conceptually structured facts of the world. 
The obstacle for such a view that he deals with directly in Mind and World is not the 
possibility of perfect hallucinations but the conception of nature that rules out that our 
perception can allow the world to function as a rational constraint on our beliefs (cf. 
McDowell 2002a, p. 291). 
I think one way to bring out the problem of an anomalous monism of 
perception is to notice that it very easily ends up placing the perception as an event 
physically inside the perceiver.21 If it is possible to generate an experience that is 
indistinguishable from a veridical perception by reproducing an event more proximate 
to certain brain areas than the object of the veridical perception, then it seems natural to 
 
 
 
21 The idea is indicated by McDowell in another short discussion of anomalous monism, where he writes: 
‘The fundamental mistake is the thought that a person’s mental life takes place in a part of her.’ 
(McDowell 2000, p. 16). 
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conclude that the experience also in the veridical case is merely causally related to the 
object alleged to be seen. In other words we are back in the picture where we must 
distinguish the impression of the world on the subject and the perceptual appearance, 
not as two ways of describing the same event but as one event that is the cause of 
another event. Apart from the problems with this picture, which I shall address in the 
next chapter dealing with disjunctivism, the picture seems to reenact the fundamental 
problem of both Coherentism and the Myth of the Given. Since the impact of the world 
is something that works behind the back of the subject as a mere cause, the world 
cannot rationally constrain our thoughts, and consequently perception cannot provide us 
with any justificatory relation to the world.  
The general problem that also confronts anomalous monism is that, given 
Scientistic Naturalism, it is disallowed that human sensibility, our way of being affected 
by the world, can qua sensibility essentially involve conceptual capacities (cf. MW, pp. 
97-98). It is qua sensibility that our perception is taken as a natural phenomenon. 
Sensibility is something we share with non-linguistic animals and it is a special, yet 
natural, way the world can affect biological organisms. Kant was clear on the need to 
take our sensibility to be infused with understanding if it is to open our eyes to objective 
reality. On McDowell’s reading, Kant’s difficulty of making room for such a conceptual 
sensibility within the empirical, natural world was part of the motivation behind his 
making the unperceivable Thing-in-itself responsible for the appearances of the 
empirical world (MW, p. 98).22 The Davidson-inspired anomalous monism of 
perception moves in the opposite direction and makes the appearances a result of the 
impact of the empirical world, but the outcome is the same: the world as it is in itself is 
not itself manifest in the perceptual appearance. 
 
1.1.6 Conceptualism as Alternative 
McDowell’s strategy is to intervene before we reach the conclusion that, qua natural 
phenomena, our perceptual experiences cannot involve conceptual capacities. What he 
attempts is to dismantle thesis 3, Scientistic Naturalism. His counterproposal is that we 
accept that there are natural phenomena that, qua natural phenomena, can only be made 
sense of by being placed in the space of reasons, and that the perception of mature 
 
 
 
22 This in effect makes Kant’s transcendental idealism a way of tackling the pentalemma by denying 
thesis 1, Experiential Naturalism. 
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human beings is amongst such phenomena. The argument for his conceptual conception 
of perception is basically that it allows us to hold on to both Minimal Empiricism and 
Epistemological Conceptualism and so to avoid the dilemma that made intentionality 
seem problematic. If such a conceptualistic conception is not to result in a denial of 
thesis 1, Experiential Naturalism, and so a ‘super-naturalism’, it requires that our 
concept of the natural is not restricted to what natural science makes intelligible. 
McDowell does not present his so-called relaxed or liberal naturalism as a thesis for 
which he provides independent arguments, but as a Wittgensteinian reminder of an 
intellectual opportunity modern philosophers have often missed. The basic idea is that 
we can understand our learning a first language as the acquisition of a second nature 
that makes us responsive to reasons as reasons (MW, p. 84). To attain such 
responsiveness to reasons is what is specific for the life form of biological creatures that 
have the natural potential for maturing into rational animals. I shall not discuss this idea 
in its generality but focus on the conception of perception that McDowell proposes 
within his liberal naturalism.23 
 McDowell proposes to regard perception as undergoing a thorough 
transformation through our initiation into language. In mature human beings the content 
of perception is permeated with concepts that leave no room for residual elements of 
pre-linguistic perception. Perception of rational animals is seen as a passive, involuntary 
actualization of conceptual capacities in sensuous consciousness. That perception 
involves the actualization of the same conceptual capacities that the subject can 
actualize when actively making up her mind or when just passively acquiring a belief is 
essential for the content of perception to be able to serve as a justification for our 
beliefs, i.e., to avoid the Myth of the Given. That this actualization is passive and 
involuntary is paramount in order to avoid a conflation of perception with beliefs or 
judgments, which would reduce perception to just another belief and end up in world-
impoverished Coherentism.  
 
 
 
23 Nagel has a different way of expanding the concept of nature, namely by referring to the possible future 
revolutions of science. Nagel’s assumption is that, as intentionality is possible, it must be able to be 
completely accounted for by science, only a possible science which must have revealed to us unknown 
natural laws (Nagel 1986, pp. 84-85, Nagel 1997, pp. 132-133). He admits that this belief in a future 
science has a quasi-religious ring to it when presented within our ‘disenchanted’ world view (Nagel 1997, 
pp. 132-133). This is a replacing of ‘super-naturalism’ with a ‘super-scientism’, and Nagel is perfectly 
clear on the fact that this does not solve any problems: ‘Our position is problematic so long as we have 
not even a candidate for such an account’ (Nagel 1986, p. 84).        
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We can ask whether such a conceptualist conception is committed to the 
claim that all sensuous awareness of a mature rational animal is necessarily permeated 
with concepts. It is certainly committed to the view that the ascription of such non-
conceptual experiences would be of no use in facing up to the transcendental worry 
concerning the intentionality of our thinking. If such non-conceptual experiences were 
possible they would in a sense not be the experiences of the rational animal qua rational 
animal since they would not be potentially reason-constituting. McDowell sometimes 
adds a caveat to his claim that our experiences are permeated with rationality or 
concepts, with the qualifying statement: ‘…in so far our lives are distinctively human’ 
(McDowell 2007a, p. 349). In so far as what is distinctive about human animals is that 
they are rational animals this is of course a tautological statement. There is no doubt 
that I can, as the animal I am, be perceptually sensitive to features of my environment 
without this sensitivity amounting to an experience in the strong sense of Kant’s 
intuitions, i.e., experiences with conceptual content. I can be subject to subliminal 
priming because of the sensitivity of my body. 
The fact that such perceptual sensitivity can be non-conceptual does not 
prevent it from being a way of gaining empirical knowledge. The case of the legendary 
chicken sexers would be a case in point. The chicken sexers, we are told, can sort 
chickens into males and females though when asked they cannot explain by which 
perceptual features they tell the difference. Presuming that the chicken sexers do not 
have paranormal abilities, their skill must be explainable in terms of their perceptual 
sensitivity to the environment, perhaps by reference to subliminal olfactory stimuli. 
Such sensitivity is, however, of a different kind than the perception by which we 
normally acquire perceptual knowledge.  
When we acquire a perceptual belief under normal circumstances, for 
instance, the belief that there is a chicken in front of us, such a belief would be justified 
by our having the fact made manifest to us in perception: I know there is a chicken in 
front of me because I see that such is the case. The chicken sexers, on the contrary, 
cannot justify their belief by referring to what they see, as the male and female chickens 
judged only by their immediate perceptual appearances are ex hypothesi 
indistinguishable. What justifies the belief of the chicken sexer is her knowledge about 
her sorting skill. It is because of her reliable sorting skill that she is entitled to take the 
fact that, under the relevant circumstances, she is inclined to believe that a chicken is a 
male as a reason for believing that it is in fact a male.  
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As McDowell notes, the chicken sexers’ epistemic position is equal to that 
of a bystander (McDowell 2002a, p. 280).24 We can spell out the equalizing of the first- 
and the third-person perspective as follows. A third-person observer, who knows what a 
reliable chicken sexer is inclined to believe, can have the same and as good a reason to 
take the sex of a chicken to be as the sexer is inclined to believe as the sexer himself. 
The only asymmetry resides in the fact that the chicken sexer has first-person 
knowledge about what she is inclined to believe. This contrasts with the normal case of 
perceptual knowledge, where the epistemic role of knowledge about what the subject is 
inclined to believe on the basis of perception is relative to the perspective. From a third-
person perspective, the inclination can be taken as evidence for the truth of the belief in 
question, given that the subject in focus is taken to be a reliable perceiver. From a first-
person perspective, the inclination to believe that there is a chicken in front of one is not 
under normal circumstances taken as evidence that there is a chicken in front of one. 
The perceiver’s reason to believe that she actually sees a chicken is not that she has an 
inclination to believe that there is a chicken, or even an inclination to believe that she 
sees that there is chicken there. It is the other way around. She believes there is chicken 
there because she sees that such is the case and it is the seeing that justifies her belief.   
 
1.1.7 Qualifications of Mind and World 
So far I have characterized the space-of-reasons mode of understanding and the natural-
scientific way of making phenomena intelligible in accordance with how they are 
presented in Mind and World. Both of these characterizations however stand in need of 
some qualification. I shall first attend to the conception of natural science and then to 
the conception of the space of reasons in order to show how both of them are in a sense 
too narrow.   
In Mind and World, the natural-scientific mode of understanding is said to 
consist in explanations via nomological laws. For two reasons McDowell wants to set 
his understanding of the contrast between the two modes of intelligibility apart from an 
understanding that marks the difference by reference to a contrast between reasons and 
causes (MW, p. 71, n. 2). The first reason is that he wants to leave it open that reasons 
might be causes. Facing misunderstandings on this point McDowell in other places 
 
 
 
24 Both Brandom and Stroud employ the chicken sexers in a critique of McDowell, who responds in 
McDowell 2002a. 
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makes it clear that he follows Davidson in thinking that some rational understanding is 
causal understanding and he mentions the way explanations in terms of reasons for 
believing or acting can be causal (McDowell 1998g, p. 335, 2002a, pp.270, 293, 2006a, 
p. 218). This possibility is something I shall come back to in the next chapter. The 
second reason is that he follows Russell and takes the idea of law-governed processes 
and not the notion of causality to be the basic organizing principle of science.    
McDowell does not explain in any detail what is meant by subsuming 
under natural law but it would seem to be an ideological call to make natural science 
depend on nomological explanations that requires subsuming under universal laws. As 
has been pointed out this seems to rule out certain functional explanations of biology 
and the explanations of special sciences depending on ceteris paribus clauses 
(Macdonald 2006, Putnam 2002, p. 187). Furthermore the idea that the concept of law-
governed processes should, as suggested by Russell, replace the notion of causality in 
our understanding of scientific explanations is far from obvious.25 McDowell has 
conceded in a number of places that the notion of the realm of science he works with in 
Mind and World is an ‘unsatisfactorily monolithic conception’ (McDowell 2000, p. 98): 
 
So the intelligibility of the realm of law should have figured as at best 
exemplary of the kind of intelligibility I want to contrast with space-
of-reason intelligibility, not as coextensive with the contrasting kind 
of intelligibility. (McDowell 2006a, p. 235). 
 
This more pluralistic attitude to the realm of science does however not change the basic 
contrast with the space- -of-reasons intelligibility which McDowell upholds as sui 
generis in relation to any natural scientific explanation, however sophisticated (cf. 
McDowell 2000, p. 104). 
 The conception of the space-of-reasons intelligibility of Mind and World 
is restricted to making sense of empirical natural phenomena and this can seem to be too 
narrow a conception. The distinction between the two kinds of intelligibility is not 
meant to be exclusive, however. Just the fact that understanding pure mathematics is not 
a matter of making empirical phenomena intelligible makes the nature of mathematical 
 
 
 
25 For a recent challenge to the nomological conception of scientific explanation, see Woodward (2003), 
especially Chapter 5.  Woodward argues for an interventionist, non-reductive account of causality, which 
takes causal explanation to be best understood in terms of counterfactuals that describe the outcome of 
interventions, human or natural. For a take on expanding the interventionist approach to the intentional 
actions of mature human beings, see Campbell (2007).    
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understanding different from the two kinds associated with the two contrasted logical 
spaces (cf. McDowell 2006a, p. 235). When we explain to someone why a specific 
mathematical proof is valid and use locutions like ‘it is because of this and this 
definition’, then the ‘because’ is not a causal ‘because’. We could say we are trying to 
make the other see the reasons why the proof is valid. So in an extended sense the 
understanding of pure mathematics could be said to be space of reason-intelligibility. 
Now we have a picture where some causes are only intelligible as mere causes, some 
causes are only intelligible as reasons, and some reasons are intelligible as mere 
reasons. 
Apart from mathematical understanding there might be other areas which 
belong to neither of the two logical spaces contrasted by McDowell. We could ask 
whether understanding a novel or a poem functions by placing items in the space of 
reason in the strict sense in which such placing serves to make empirical phenomena 
intelligible via reasons that are causes. Taken in a broad sense, I think there is no doubt 
that such items display space-of-reasons intelligibility in a way that makes the 
understanding irreducible to a natural scientific understanding. McDowell’s main focus 
is however on the way the ‘because’ is used in rational explanations of perceptual 
beliefs: ‘He believes there is a book in front of him because he sees the book’, and of 
actions: ‘He picks up the book because he wants to read’ (cf. McDowell 2006c, pp. 1). 
As my focus is similarly on the specific threats to intentionality that arise when we think 
we are forced to accept a naturalistic conception of our perceptual sensitivity and our 
motility, I shall leave aside the complications that occur because of the non-exclusive 
character of the distinction between the two logical spaces. Even though there are 
interesting things to be said about the different kinds of intelligibility we can find within 
a broader notion of the space of reasons, such investigations are not necessarily relevant 
for the specific problems of perception and bodily agency I am dealing with.    
 
1.2 The Transcendental Problem of Bodily Agency 
1.2.1 The Analogous Problem of Bodily Agency 
So far I have presented McDowell’s analysis of the problem of intentionality in terms of 
a pentalemma and it is now time to ask what the analogous problem concerning agency 
looks like. The transcendental problem concerning perception is how it is possible that 
our thoughts can become responsible to the world through perception. The analogous 
problem concerning action could be formulated as the problem of how is it possible that 
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I, through my intentional bodily actions, can be responsible for things that happen in the 
world.  
 The transcendental problem of agency is not just a corollary of the 
transcendental problem of perception. This would be the case if the problem of agency 
were simply the problem of understanding how our intentions can have empirical 
content. If this were the problem of agency it would not require a treatment separable 
from the treatment of the problem of theoretical intentionality. The problem of agency 
consists in a threat to the very idea of such intentional phenomena that we can call 
willings, intentions or tryings. It is a problem of making sense of the specific practical 
mode of the intentionality that is involved in what we call intentional bodily actions. 
The problem of theoretical intentionality can be seen as a problem about how to hold on 
to perception as a specific kind of passive intentional phenomena, the intentionality of 
which can neither be reduced to the intentionality of beliefs (Coherentism) nor be 
explained in terms of a causal relation to an essentially non-conceptual given (the Myth 
of the Given). By analogy, the problem of agency can be seen as the problem of holding 
on to intentional, bodily actions as a specific kind of active intentional phenomena that 
cannot be reduced to either the intentionality of some inner mental intention or to some 
essentially non-intentional movements being caused by such intentions. If perception 
cannot be the place where the world manifests itself to us directly and where it can 
correct our beliefs, it is not just that we are faced with a sceptical problem about the 
possibility of knowledge, it is the very intelligibility of our beliefs as aiming at the 
world that is endangered. The analogous threat concerning agency would be the 
following. If my bodily movements cannot be where I express myself directly as an 
agent, and so where my will manifests itself in the world, then it is not just that we face 
a problem of epiphenomenalism, but we also run the risk of losing our grip on the very 
notion of willing or intending as our way of aiming for changes in the world.  
The problem of theoretical intentionality is the problem of recognizing the 
specific character of perception as the intentional experience where the world manifests 
itself to us. In order to do so we need to recognize that perceptual capacities can 
inextricably involve conceptual capacities without these getting in between us and the 
world, and without such involvements of concepts making perception a supernatural 
phenomenon. If we fail to do so the rational constraint on our thoughts that the world 
should present cannot be rational because it is not recognisable as such from the 
perspective of the perceiving subject. The subject’s mind comes under the control of 
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powers that are, so to speak, alien to her rationality. We cannot any longer make sense 
of our thoughts as being responsible to the world and perception as the place where they 
can face up to that responsibility. The effect is that we cannot make sense of the thinker 
as someone who can take responsibility for her own thinking by being responsive to 
reasons as reasons. This is the diagnosis of Mind and World, which to my mind presents 
a penetrating and perspicuous way to make sense of some central problems of modern 
epistemology. 
What I propose is that there is a problem of agency of a similar kind to the 
transcendental problem of perception. I shall argue that it is that the problem of agency 
requires an approach that is analogous to the suggestion that we regard perception as the 
immediate and conceptual presentation of worldly facts. What we need in order to hold 
on to the idea of practical intentionality is to be able to regard our practical capacities to 
perform intentional, bodily actions as both inextricably involved in our bodily 
movements and as capacities of a conceptual nature. If we conceive of the bodily 
movements expressive of agency as a natural phenomenon – and what else could they 
be? – and if we furthermore regard the natural as that which is explicable by natural 
science, then the actual capacity of the body to move is seen as a capacity that must be 
understandable in purely natural scientific terms. The result is that our practical 
conceptual capacities cannot be involved in our bodily movements qua natural events. 
We get a separation of bodily motility and the practical conceptual capacity of the agent 
to form intentions and to direct her will towards changing the world. Consequently it 
has to be claimed that such intentions are recognizable as intentions solely on the 
grounds of their ability to cause the natural motility of the body to be set in motion (cf. 
MW, p. 90). In Brewer’s apt phrase, bodily behaviour becomes ‘more like a mentally 
induced reflex’ (Brewer 1993, p. 311). In McDowell’s pregnant formulation the 
problem is the following: 
 
Our powers as agents withdraw inwards and our bodies with the 
powers whose seat they are – which seem to be different powers, since 
their actualizations are not doings of ours but at best effects of such 
doings – take on the aspect of alien objects. It comes to seem that 
what we do, even in those of our actions that we think of as bodily, is 
at best to direct our wills, as it were from a distance, at changes in 
those alien objects. (MW, p. 91). 
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The picture we receive of our motility is the inverse version of the picture of our 
sensibility as a natural capacity that, as such, cannot involve the workings of our 
conceptual capacities. In such a picture sensibility can merely make us causally 
responsive to the world, and the sensibility of our body can only be causally responsible 
for changes in our inner perceptual appearances or in our belief system, with the 
consequence that Minimal Empiricism is abolished. What I will try to show is that the 
consequence of the separation of the motility of our bodies from our intentions is an 
undermining of what we might call a Minimal Pragmatism.  
 
1.2.2 Introducing Minimal Pragmatism 
By Minimal Pragmatism I shall be referring to the following requirement:  
 
Minimal Pragmatism: 
If an agent is to be intelligibly ascribed any intentions to perform bodily actions then 
she must be ascribed some practical rational capacity to perform teleologically basic 
bodily actions.  
 
This is parallel to the thought behind Minimal Empiricism:  
 
Minimal Empiricism: 
If a subject is to be intelligibly ascribed any empirical beliefs then she must be ascribed 
some perceptual capacity to let the world rationally constrain her empirical beliefs.  
 
Minimal Empiricism states that we can only understand the notion of beliefs with 
empirical content if we, the subject, have the necessary perceptual capacity to let the 
world rationally constrain our beliefs. As such this formulation does not explicitly tell 
us that we need a relational account of perception or that we need a conceptual account. 
It is only by working through the consequences of not regarding perception as relational 
and as conceptual that we might come to realize the need for such an account. Minimal 
Pragmatism states that we can only understand the notion of intentions with empirical 
content, i.e. intentions to perform actions that essentially involve bodily movement, if 
we can regard the subject as possessing some practical capacity that could allow the 
intention to have a rational bearing on the movements of her body. As such it does not 
say that we need a conceptual account of our bodily motility and an account of willing 
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or trying as essentially movement-involving. It is this need I shall try to demonstrate in 
the next chapter.  
It could seem that there is a disanalogy between the two minimalisms, 
because the one refers directly to a perceptual capacity whereas the other refers to a 
practical rational capacity to perform bodily actions. In the formulation of the basic 
thought of Minimal Empiricism given above, the possible threat is so to speak on the 
surface, since the identification of the perceptual capacities referred to with our natural 
perceptual sensitivity to our environment seems quite natural. In the formulation of 
Minimal Pragmatism, the reference to the practical rational capacity of the agent might 
not appear to be so obviously identified with the natural motility of the body. It is this 
identification that I shall argue is needed, however, in order to hold on to the idea of 
bodily agency. Furthermore I shall try to show that the appearance of a need for a 
distinction between bodily motility and the rational capacity to perform bodily actions is 
a result of a naturalistic perspective which, eventually, will leave us with a picture of 
our movements as entirely out of our rational control. 
     To explain the import of Minimal Pragmatism I shall use two definitions. 
First, let me define what I shall refer to as the basic practical abilities of an agent, A:  
 
Definition of basic practical ability: 
A basic practical ability of A to X is an ability of A to intentionally be X-ing without 
making use of any means-ends knowledge of how to X by Y-ing. 26 
 
I shall talk of an agent’s basic action repertoire as the collection of such basic practical 
abilities possessed by the agent. The second definition I want to work with is the 
following: 
 
 
Definition of teleologically basic action 
A’s intentionally X-ing is a teleologically basic action if she has the ability to X without 
making use of any knowledge of how to X by Y-ing and if on this particular occasion she 
makes no use of any such means-end knowledge in her intentionally X-ing27. 
                                                 
 
 
26 This definition is a reformulation of Hornsby’s definition of the actions in an agent’s repertoire that are 
teleologically basic (Hornsby 1980, p. 84).  
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The connection between the two definitions is that it is by virtue of an actualization of a 
basic practical capacity of an agent that she, on a given occasion, performs a 
teleologically basic action.     
When we understand a person as intentionally doing something (X) this 
often involves ascribing a means-end knowledge to the person, by which we make it 
intelligible why a person is intentionally doing the thing in question (is X-ing). If an 
agent flips a switch we can make minimal sense of this behaviour as intentional if we 
regard the agent as wanting the light to go on, and also attribute to him the belief that by 
flipping the switch he will turn on the light. In this case, the attributing of means-end 
knowledge is, at least on one conception of action-individuation, knowledge about what 
is in fact an identity-relation. The flipping of the switch is, on such a conception, when 
it results in the light coming on, identical to the turning on of the light. Independently of 
whether this is to be understood as an identity-relation, I take the relevant notion of 
means-end knowledge for the notion of teleological basicness to be the notion of 
knowing how to do Y by doing X. In the case of flipping the switch, it would, under 
normal circumstances, be something a person can do without performing some 
intentional action by which he flips the switch, and consequently a teleologically basic 
action.28   
Hornsby mentions two other kinds of means-end relations that she takes to 
be relevant for the teleological notion of basicness, namely part-whole relations and 
preparatory relations (Hornsby 1980, p. 80). I do not find these relations directly 
relevant for the notion of teleological basicness as I defined it above and I shall restrict 
the notion of teleology to that kind of basicness. I shall briefly relate this notion of 
teleologically basicness with first the mereological kind and then the preparatory or 
procedural kind in order to clarify the notion and simultaneously establish a broader 
notion of practical means-end rationality.  
The switching on of the light might be a part of the agent’s intentionally 
lighting up the whole of her apartment. In that case we can make further sense of her 
turning on of the light by attributing to her the belief that doing so will contribute as a 
 
 
 
27 This definition is a slightly altered version of the definition given by Grünbaum (2006, p. 86).  
28 It would be more correct to say that it is the description of the intentional action which is teleologically 
basic as it would be natural to take the two descriptions – ‘A’s flipping the switch’ and ‘A’s turning on of 
the light’ – to be of the same action. So to avoid the conclusion that the same action is both basic and non-
basic, we should take basicness to be a mark of descriptions of actions. For convenience I shall sometimes 
refer to teleologically basic descriptions of actions simply by talking about teleologically basic action.  
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part to the greater action of lighting the whole apartment. We can say that a given 
intentional action is mereologically basic if it is carried out without any use of any part-
whole knowledge about how other intentional actions contribute as parts to the whole of 
the action in question.29 With teleologically basic actions defined as above, it seems 
impossible that such an action could be a whole that itself is constituted by other 
intentional actions. Given that for every intentional action some description must be the 
most teleologically basic, then this would also be the case for all actions that form part 
of a larger action-unity. This means that a teleologically basic description cannot cover 
more than one mereologically basic action.  
A switching on of the light would also, under many circumstances, be a 
preparatory action, i.e., an action the agent believes must be carried out in order for him 
to be able to carry another action, such as showing a painting in the room to a visitor. In 
such a case, we can talk about making sense of the action by ascribing means-end 
knowledge that consists in knowledge about preparatory relations. In many cases such 
procedural knowledge will have been used in order to reach circumstances under which 
one can carry out a teleologically basic action. The agent might have searched for the 
light-switch in the dark by letting his hand glide down along the door-frame, and this 
behaviour makes sense to us because we take the agent to regard the locating of the 
switch as necessary in order to flip it. That the agent went through such preparation 
does not make his flipping the switch less basic from a teleological view point. It is still 
the case that the flipping of the switch would normally be carried out without any 
application of knowledge about how such an action can be carried out by doing 
something else. 
In every case of someone carrying out an intentional action there must be 
some teleologically basic description of the action. If this was not the case it would 
mean that the content of the means-end knowledge that is actualized in the intentional 
doing would involve an infinite regression (cf. Hornsby 1980, p. 88). For each piece of 
knowledge about how to X by Y-ing, there would have to be another piece of 
knowledge about how to Y by Z-ing and there would be no limit to this regression. That 
 
 
 
29 Hornsby exemplifies the mereological relationship with a part of a movement which itself is identical 
to the lighting of a match and so seems not to take the part as necessarily itself amounting to an 
intentional action.  
 
 
 
53
                                                
a person should possess such an infinite amount of knowledge in order to do anything 
intentionally is absurd.30  
The notion of the teleologically most basic action is a notion that is tied to 
the first-person perspective of the agent. The teleologically most basic action is the 
agent’s action under the description that is most basic from her point of view, i.e., the 
most basic of the descriptions under which the action is intentional. As it is exactly the 
action as intentional we want to make intelligible by placing it in the space of reasons, 
we must do so by at least understanding parts of the practical means-end knowledge 
exercised by the agent, of whatever kind it may be.  
The definition of teleologically basic actions above has two immediate 
consequences (cf. Grünbaum 2006, pp. 83-86). The first is that the repertoire of basic 
action of an agent is not necessarily, and is even unlikely, to be identified with bodily 
movements intentionally carried out. The second is that whether an instance of a kind of 
action that falls within the basic repertoire of the agent is in fact carried out as basic 
depends on the circumstances. The first consequence is the point Anscombe makes 
when she writes as follows: 
 
In general, as Aristotle says, one does not deliberate about an acquired skill; 
the description of what one is doing, which one completely understands, is at a 
distance from the details of one’s movements, which one does not consider at 
all. (Anscombe 2000, p. 54).  
 
When tying my shoelaces I would normally make use of my acquired skill to do so and 
I would not be intentionally moving my fingers in the specific way I do. I would make 
use of my basic ability to tie my shoelaces and there would be nothing I do intentionally 
by which I try to tie my shoelaces. This does not prevent me from having some 
procedural means-end knowledge about how one ties shoelace, only that I would not 
normally be drawing on that knowledge in my performance. If, however, I was to teach 
a child how to tie shoelaces, I might draw on my means-end knowledge when I 
demonstrate how one proceeds. This illustrates the second consequence of the definition 
of teleological basicness mentioned above: Whether a type of action within an agent’s 
 
 
 
30 Corresponding arguments would show the necessity of assuming mereologically and procedurally basic 
actions for any action sequence.   
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reservoir of primitive abilities is on a given occasion an exercise of the basic ability as 
such depends on the situation.  
 
1.2.3 Practical Knowledge and Practical Concepts 
The notion of the teleologically most basic action is a notion that is tied to the first 
person perspective of the agent. The teleologically most basic action is the agent’s 
action under the description that is most basic from her point of view, i.e. the most basic 
of the description under which the action is intentional. As it is exactly the action as 
intentional we want to make intelligible by placing it in the space of reasons we must do 
so by at least understanding parts of the practical means-end knowledge exercised by 
the agent of whatever kind it may be. Consequently the exercise of a basic practical 
ability not only involves practical knowledge in the sense of a knowing how to X 
without relying on any means-end knowledge, it also involved involves practical 
knowledge in Anscombe’s sense of non-observational and non-inferential knowledge of 
what one is intentionally doing. This provides a minimal basis for the claim that basic 
practical abilities are concept involving. When one is exercising a basic practical ability 
one is aware of doing so, i.e. one possesses an immediate practical knowledge of being 
engaged in an action under its teleologically most basic description. That the self-
knowledge of the agent is practical does not imply that she cannot express the 
knowledge in a judgement. If someone in the other room asks me what I am doing while 
I am engaged in a task of making copies I might say that I am writing. Thereby I would 
express my practical knowledge and the subject matter of my knowledge would be no 
different from what the other person could observe if she entered the room. The link 
between basic practical capacities and practical knowledge supply an initial reason as to 
why I shall, with McDowell, sometimes refer to basic practical capacities as practical 
concepts (cf. McDowell 2007b, p. 367).  
What makes my practical knowledge characteristically practical is the fact 
that it is knowledge that I possess in virtue of my realization of a basic practical concept 
of mine. When I introduced the notion of practical knowledge in the Introduction I 
mentioned one of the three ways Anscombe identifies as ways of repudiating the 
‘Why?’ question that specifically asks for reasons for what a person is doing. In order to 
clarify the notion of practical knowledge and to identify the distinctive features that 
justify the claim that the notion is tied is to the first-person perspective I shall now 
present all the three ways of refusing the ‘Why?’ question identified by Anscombe.   
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I illustrated the first way of refusing the applicability of the ‘Why?” 
question by the answer, “I didn’t know I was cutting down the tree with the robin’s 
nest”. What this possibility shows is that there is a certain sense in which I cannot be 
wrong about what I am intentionally doing. I can be wrong about whether I am making 
ten carbon copies or not, and under certain circumstances even about whether I am 
writing anything, but if I actually perform some intentional bodily action then I cannot 
do so without having some knowledge about what I do under some basic description. 
We might imagine a circumstance under which I am simply hallucinating that I am 
writing but in fact I am doing nothing at all, in which case I would be wrong not about 
what I intentionally do but about me performing any intentional bodily action at all.31 
While performing an intentional bodily action I cannot mistake the description under 
which I intentionally do the thing in question with a description under which the action 
is in fact not intentional. I cannot, during the execution, mistake one intentional action 
of mine for another intentional action of mine.  
That practical knowledge displays immunity to error through 
misidentification relative to action-descriptions is what is implied in saying that 
practical knowledge is non-observational.32 If I had to identify my intentional action 
amongst a variety of actions solely on the basis of observation, I would only find 
evidence for what is actually taking place with my body and in its surroundings, but 
nothing that could take the place of my immediate practical self-knowledge. If you need 
to search for evidence you will never know. This is the reason why the second way the 
non-applicability of the ‘Why?’ question can manifest itself is if I need to observe to 
make sure that I am in fact doing what the question refers to (cf. Anscombe 2000, p. 
14). If stand near a garden lamp which keeps going on and off, I might wonder why, 
and discover that it is my moving forth and back that triggers the lamp to oscillate like 
that. It is only on the basis of observation I find out I am the source of the lights going 
on and this is why the ‘Why?’ question would not apply to my making the light go on. 
The point is not that we cannot observe that an intentional action takes place, we might 
 
 
 
31 As we shall see in the next chapter some versions of the so called Trying-Theories would claim that in 
such cases of total failure we perform intentional and maybe even bodily actions (Chapter 4, section 3.5).   
32 I work with Evans’ definition of the immunity in question: A judgement “a is F” is immune to error 
through misidentification if and only if it is based upon a way of knowing about objects such that it does 
not make sense for the subject to utter “Something is F, but is it a that is F?”, when the first component 
expresses a knowledge which the subject does not think he has or may have gained in any other way (cf. 
Evans 1982, pp. 189-90). See Smith (2006) for reasons to prefer this definition. 
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do that by observing others. We might even imagine a situation in which some other 
person intentionally manipulates our brain so as to make our body perform certain 
‘actions’. In such a scenario I might know that someone intentionally makes my arm 
move and who that person is, but this would contrast with the ordinary way in which we 
know who the agent of our own intentional actions is. Under normal circumstances 
there is no room for doubt about who the agent of the intentional actions is when you 
yourself are the agent. In other words, self-ascriptions of agency for intentional actions 
are immune to error through misidentification relative the first-person personal pronoun 
‘I’.33  
The third way of repudiating the applicability of the ‘Why?’ question is to 
answer that what was done was done via some involuntary movements.34 Someone 
bumps into me and I spill soup all over you. I was the one spilling the soup but I did not 
do it on purpose, my body was out of control. In the case where some neuroscientist 
manipulates my arm, I have what has been called a sense of ownership for the 
movement; I experience it as my arm moving. I lack, however, a sense of agency, which 
I would normally have if the bodily activity was something I engaged in to carry out an 
intention.35 When I perform intentional bodily actions there is, under normal 
circumstances, no possibility of knowing that bodily movements of my body occur but 
to wonder whether they are voluntary movements. 
Let me sum up the background for each of the three ways of repudiating 
the ‘Why?’ question. The first way of denying the applicability was based on the 
possibility of not knowing what one is doing under one of its descriptions. The second 
way of denying the applicability was based on the possibility of knowing that something 
is being done but not knowing that it is oneself who is causally responsible for the thing 
in question. The third kind of situation where the question does not apply is a situation 
where I do know what is being done and I know that I am the one doing it, but where 
what is done is done via involuntary movements.     
 
 
 
33 This was recognized by Shoemaker who used ‘I am waving my arm’ as an example of such immunity 
when he first introduced the notion (Shoemaker 1968, p. 557). Such immunity of self-ascriptions of 
agency has been denied on the basis of psychopathological cases (Jeannerod and Pacherie 2004). For a 
critique of this specific use of psychopathology see Legrand (2007).  
34 Of course, as Anscombe underscores, referring to the fact that something is involuntary is not a 
negative criterion that by itself can clarify the notion of an intentional action. This is why she goes on to 
identify a certain class of involuntary bodily movements, those known to occur non-observationally and 
whose cause can only be known by observation (Anscombe 2000, p. 15).   
35 See Gallagher (2000) for the distinction between sense of ownership and sense of agency related to 
bodily movements.  
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Anscombe’s three ways of refusing the applicability of the ‘Why?’ 
question demonstrate the asymmetry between practical knowledge and observational 
knowledge of other people’s intentional actions. In the case of watching other people, I 
can know that a person is doing something intentionally without knowing what she is 
doing. I can misidentify the action relative to a description under which I take it to be 
intentional. I see someone filling in a form and think she is making an application, but 
in fact she is checking whether the carbon-copy paper works. In the case of another’s 
action, I can know someone is doing something intentionally without knowing who the 
agent is. This is the case if the agent is occluded from my perceptual field, as when I am 
chatting with someone on the internet. In such a case I could of course identify the agent 
under the description ‘the person who writes this’. Furthermore, in many situations in 
which I have knowledge that someone is doing something intentionally, I would be able 
to identify the person via a demonstrative reference based on perception. However in 
some situations, for instance, if someone taps me on the back, I might not be able to 
know who was doing the tapping. Finally, in the case of others, it is possible that I 
mistake what was in fact a voluntary movement for an involuntary movement and vice 
versa. Watching someone who is in fact an epileptic and is known to fake epileptic 
attacks, or watching someone hooked up in the experiment where the scientist can make 
the subject’s hand move, I might wonder whether what I see are voluntary or 
involuntary movements. 
The fact that such asymmetry exists should not be taken as a reason to 
think that it is only in our own case that we can truly know that someone is doing 
something intentionally. Nor should it be taken as evidence for the thesis that we can 
only know that another person is acting intentionally and what she is doing by some 
kind of inference to the best explanation of some observed behaviour that is itself 
agency-neutral. The possibility of error in itself does not establish the impossibility of a 
direct perception of facts that can serve as a non-inferential justification of empirical 
beliefs. This is, as we shall see in the next chapter, a fundamental lesson taught by a 
disjunctivism of perceptual appearances. Though I think the discussion on knowledge of 
other agents is relevant to the issues raised in this thesis, I shall leave that aspect of the 
issue to one side in what follows. Let me just state that I think the proposals I make 
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concerning bodily agency could serve to make it intelligible that we can have direct 
perceptual knowledge of the intentional bodily actions of other people.36 
The assumption that there is an internal connection between the idea of basic 
practical abilities and the idea of practical knowledge may seem to hyper-intellectualize 
our practical life. In answer to this, let me comment on some ways such a concern might 
be expressed. First, it is important to realize that the idea of the availability of practical 
knowledge as essential for our realization of  basic practical concepts does not imply 
that we are always explicitly thinking about what we are doing while we are doing it. 
McDowell gives the example of a person walking on a pathway who turns to the right 
because she sees a signpost pointing to the right (McDowell 2006c, p. 2). Such 
behaviour may be completely unreflective in the sense that the person does not engage 
in any explicit practical means-end reasoning nor in any explicit determination of the 
fact that the signpost pointing in a certain direction  gives her a reason for going in that 
direction. What shows that the person nevertheless was intentionally following the 
signpost simply might be the fact that if she was asked, ‘Why did you go to the right?’, 
she would answer something like, ‘Because the signpost pointed in that direction’. As 
McDowell puts it: 
 
Acting for a reason, which one is responding to as such, does not 
require that one reflects about whether some consideration is a 
sufficient rational warrant for something it seems to recommend. It is 
enough that one could. (McDowell 2006c, p. 2). 
 
This brings us to a second concern. It can appear as if there is an inappropriate 
moralizing attitude involved in the idea that we should understand our notion of 
intentional actions in terms of the idea of acting for a reason taken as a reason. Is 
everything we do really done for a particular reason? In order to hold on to the idea that 
our basic practical capacities are essentially conceptual we do not need to claim such a 
strict rationalism. As Anscombe remarks, among the possible answers to the ‘Why?’ 
 
 
 
36 A further issue is how to combine the non-inferential and the factive aspect of practical knowledge. I 
think we need to do so, just as we need to combine the non-inferential and factive aspect of observational 
knowledge. The latter combination is what the conception of perception as object-involving is supposed 
to make available. The former should be within reach if the account of action I articulate is on the right 
track. See Grünbaum (2006) and in particular his ‘The paradox of Practical Knowledge’ (forthcoming) for 
a detailed and perspicuous exposition of the problem of reconciling the non-inferential and the factive 
aspect of practical knowledge. Grünbaum (2008b) argues for the need to conceive of bodily movements 
as agency-involving in order to account for our practical knowledge.     
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question we also find responses like, ‘For no particular reason’, or, ‘It was an idle action 
– I was just doodling’ (cf. Anscombe 2000, p. 24). McDowell gives the example of a 
person, who walking across a park sees a frisbee flying directly towards her and catches 
it. Such a person might answer, ‘I just felt like it’, if asked why she caught the frisbee 
(McDowell 2007c, p. 369). If the person is a skilled catcher she will catch the frisbee 
without realizing the more basic practical concepts by means of which she intends to 
catch it. Her action has practical, yet conceptual, content that can be specified by 
specifying the practical concept she realizes, a specification that corresponds to the 
teleologically most basic description of her action. The point of saying that she realizes 
a practical concept is that what she does is something she could do or refrain from doing 
for a reason and she could ask herself whether she has good reasons to do it. In short, 
her action falls within the scope of her practical rationality (cf. McDowell 2007c, p. 
369). 
The example of the frisbee-catcher raises the final concern I shall address 
in this context. The worry is that the idea of a repertoire of basic practical concepts 
gives too rigid a picture of our practical engagement with the world. In what sense does 
a person walk around with a preconceived collection of concepts of all the possible 
intentional actions she could engage in? We can begin to answer this worry by 
observing that McDowell specifies the content of the action of the frisbee-catcher as the 
concept of ‘catching this’. Part of the content of the practical concept I realize can be 
provided by perceptually-based demonstrative reference to the particular objects I am 
acting on. Such an opportunity shows that I do not need to possess concepts of the 
things I intentionally do prior to my engagement in the action. Here the demonstrative 
reference plays much the same role as it does in McDowell’s answer to certain 
objections to conceptualism concerning the content of perception. The objections point 
out that we cannot possess preconceived concepts of all the shades of the colour that we 
can discriminate between in perception. To this McDowell answers that we can form 
demonstrative concepts of everything that is given in perception and that this shows that 
the content of perception must already have a conceptual form (MW, p. 59). I shall 
return to the risk of hyper-intellectualizing when I respond to challenges for 
conceptualism posed by the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
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1.2.4 The Basic Idea of Minimal Pragmatism 
Before I move on to the next chapter I shall say a bit more about the intuition I try to 
frame with Minimal Pragmatism. The point of Minimal Pragmatism is to say that we 
cannot make sense of our intentions as intentions if we cannot make it intelligible that 
we could have the capacity to carry out those intentions, i.e. some teleologically basic 
practical capacities. The idea is analogue to the idea of Minimal Empiricism. Minimal 
Empiricism says that if we cannot make sense of perception as the place where we are 
presented with how things are in a way that can rationally constrain our empirical 
beliefs then these beliefs become unrecognizable as beliefs. If it is not possible for us to 
let the world itself direct our thoughts towards it by letting the world show itself in 
perception, then the idea of our beliefs as being nevertheless directed towards specific 
facts of the world becomes a mystery. If the facts of the world never show up how are 
we to make sense of our minds as meeting up with those very facts? If we refrain from 
attributing super-natural, premonitional abilities to ourselves all we are left with is a 
vain hope for an inscrutable pre-established harmony between mind and world. Such a 
hope is a response to the total failure of making sense of what we usually assume as the 
most obvious thing in the world: That our beliefs can be about facts of the world and 
that our perceptual experiences can be of particular worldly objects. Minimal 
Pragmatism is the idea of a mutual dependence between our concept of intentions with 
empirical content and the idea of teleologically basic capacities parallel to the mutual 
dependence between our concept of empirical beliefs and the idea that perception is 
where the world reveals itself to us. 
Minimal Pragmatism has some affinities with the common assumption 
that an agent can only intend to do what the agent thinks she is capable of doing. 
Minimal Pragmatism is formulated, however, as a thesis about the intelligibility of 
ascriptions of intention and so is not confined to the first-person perspective. From a 
third-person perspective we can sometimes make sense of an agent’s trying to X even if 
we know that the agent is incapable of X-ing. This we can do if we can intelligibly 
ascribe to the agent the belief that she can, without further ado, X in the given situation 
or if we can ascribe some means-end beliefs to her about how to X by doing something 
else that we can take her to believe herself capable of in the given situation. 
If a person tries to switch on the light and we know the bulb is burned out 
we can make sense of her trying by ascribing some means-end beliefs to her that we 
know are false. If a person enters a room with which she is familiar she might without 
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looking or in the dark try to switch on the light, just by letting her finger slide down 
towards the place she takes the switch to be just as she has done a thousand times 
before. Unknown to her the switch has been removed and her finger just strikes the wall 
or slides through the air where the switch used to be. In such a case we can make sense 
of her trying because we take her to have confidence in her ability to switch on the light 
without looking. If she tries to do it once again we might still understand her as trying to 
put on the light and say that she intends to put on the light. However if she, in the dark, 
keeps moving her hand through the air just as she did the first time, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to make sense of her as intentionally trying to put on light, because 
it gets increasingly difficult to regard her as regarding herself as having the possibility 
of any success.  
The point of Minimal Pragmatism is not just that we need to be able to 
intelligibly ascribe to the agent at least some belief about the possibility of at least 
sometimes succeeding with her teleologically most basic trying if we are to see her as 
having any basic intentions to do something. The most fundamental point of Minimal 
Pragmatism is that we need to be able to make it intelligible that the agent could at all 
possess the required teleologically basic practical capacity if it is to make sense to see 
her as having the basic intention in question. If we are left without a clue as to how it 
could at all be possible that she could succeed, we also lose our grip on the idea that she 
could be trying to do the thing in question.  
If a person sits staring at a matchbox and we ask him what he is doing and 
if he answers that he is trying to make the matchbox move, we would not be able to 
understand her right away. If we ask how he intends to make the matchbox move he 
might reveal that he is participating in an experiment in which subjects are to learn to 
make use of a technology that can make them able to move things by controlling the 
alpha-waves of their brains. The alpha-waves are registered and the matchbox is 
connected to the measurements so that it moves accordingly. The subject further tells us 
that she has been instructed that the best way to increase alpha-waves is by imagining 
that he is lying in her bed relaxing, so that is what he tries to do. This story may be true 
or it may all be in the person’s imagination; in any case we can now understand her as 
trying to do something which she thinks will in turn make the matchbox move.  
If, on the other hand, our matchbox starer replies that he intends to make 
the matchbox move without doing anything else and adds: ‘You know, just like you can 
move your arm without doing anything else’, then it becomes very difficult to 
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understand what he means. The difficulty is not just that whereas we can normally only 
move the matchbox by also moving our body, we can move our body just by moving 
our body. The problem is that we cannot make sense of what he is doing as being 
anything like what we do when we intentionally lift our arm. This is I think the insight 
Anscombe expresses when she remarks that if we try to lift our arm in the way such a 
person tries to move the matchbox, our efforts will be just as vain and that if the 
problem is how to move the matchbox in the same way as we move our arm, then there 
really is no problem (Anscombe 2000, p. 52): We can just reach out and move the 
matchbox. A way to make sense of the last part of Anscombe’s remark is to say that at a 
certain level there is no difference between raising one’s arm and moving a matchbox. 
In both cases we are dealing with intentional actions that can normally be carried out as 
teleologically basic actions. The first part of Anscombe’s remark I take to express the 
thought that, in the case of the person who insists that he intends to move the match-box 
just like that, we can not make sense of him as intending at all. His position is just like 
someone who sits without moving a muscle and tells us that she is trying to make her 
arm move and says ‘You know, just like some people can make a matchbox move just 
by thinking’. Here we are at a loss as to how what he is talking about could be intending 
at all. 
 We can compare the relation between basic intentions and basic practical 
capacities to the relation between, for instance, beliefs about colours and perception of 
colours. If a person is congenitally blind then it does not make sense to say that he can 
have beliefs about the colours of a match-box with content that matches that of a sighted 
person. Of course a blind can have a belief he can express by saying, this box is red, and 
can make inferences on the basis of such a belief, but there is a sense in which he has no 
real grip on the concept. His understanding is parasitic on an understanding of the 
concept which he is debarred from. The sense of the concept ‘red’ is dependent on the 
appropriate perceptual capacity. The situation of a paralyzed man is, as Danto pointed 
out it, perfectly analogous (Danto 1965, p. 146). If one of my arms is paralysed there is 
a understanding of what it means to raise one’s arm I am debarred from. I do not 
possess a grasp of the practical concept ‘raising my arm’. I may of course still intend to 
make my arm go up by lifting it with my healthy arm or by asking someone to raise it 
for me. This is like a blind person can come to the belief that an object is red by 
inference or by being told it is so. The claim of conceptualism is that in both these cases 
of negative abnormality what is missing is a conceptual understanding. In the case of 
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the blind person what is missing is not some non-conceptual given which would give 
content to the word ‘red’ or ‘coloured’. What is missing is the passive involuntary 
actualization of colour concepts in sensuous experience. By analogy, what is missing in 
the case of paralysis is not just a physiological mechanism that would normally ensure 
that my intentions can be carried out. What is missing is the capacity to voluntarily raise 
one’s arm or simply move it by actively realizing basic teleological concepts. We 
cannot get an exemplar of pure practical understanding by ripping of bodily motility. 
What the paralytic lack is a part of his practical rationality. 
 What I argue in what follows is that if we conceive of bodily movements 
as essentially agency-neutral occurrences our intellectual predicament will be similar to 
the situation of observing the match-box starer.37 We will be unable to make sense of 
ourselves as even intending to perform any action, because we will not be able to make 
sense of our intentions as intentions. I shall try to show how conceptions of intentional 
bodily actions based on the agency-neutrality assumption violate the basic requirement 
of Minimal Pragmatism because they undermine the intelligibility of ascriptions of 
basic practical abilities. It is only because we know the possibility of being blinded that 
we can understand ourselves as seeing but this does not imply that we can make sense 
of the possibility of being blind without understanding what it means to see.  
 
 
 
 
 
37 Overgaard and Grünbaum suggest to use Husserl’s notion of ‘factual absurdity’ (sachlicher Widersinn, 
cf. Husserl 1992, p. 103) to describe cases such as the matchbox-stirrer. Such cases are not logically 
contradictory but they have preconditions that when exposed reveal the case as unintelligible and 
impossible to bring to any intuitive fulfilment in our imagination (Overgaard and Grünbaum 2006, p. 12). 
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CHAPTER 2   
A DISJUNCTIVIST ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTUAL APPEARANCES 
 
2.1 A relational account of perception 
In this chapter I introduce the idea of a disjunctivist and relational account of 
perception. I will then use this account in the presentation and discussion of a 
disjunctivism of action in the next chapter. I shall not attempt a thorough discussion of 
the pros and cons of disjunctivist accounts of perception but rather focus on the 
motivation which I take to be behind the introduction of such accounts. This focus will 
help bring out the ways in which the disjunctivism of action I envisage shares basic 
structural similarities with that of perception.        
According to Mike Martin the prime reason for endorsing disjunctivism 
concerning perception is that such an endorsement is suitable to block rejections of what 
he labels Naïve Realism. Naïve Realism claims that the direct objects of perception are 
experience-independent objects of the objective world and that genuine perceptual 
experiences are such experiences that provide us with a direct access to the world. Here 
objects of perception are understood in a broad sense that include as well concrete 
individuals, as properties of such individuals and events in which the individuals 
partake (Martin 2004, p. 39). The reason why it is urgent to hold on to this idea of Naïve 
Realism is, according to Martin, that it is the best articulation of how perceptual 
experiences strike us as being when we introspectively reflect on them.38 When I 
perceive the cherry tree in my yard it seems to me that I have the very tree itself 
presented to me and not just some representation of a tree. To use Husserl’s expression: 
the tree is given in its bodily presence (körperliche Gegenwart/leibhaften Wirklichkeit). 
A fundamental difference between such a perception and my imagining a tree in the 
garden or visually recalling the tree in blossom, is that in these other experiences the 
intentional object is not necessarily given as actually existing independently of my 
experience. In other words, it is part of the phenomenology of perception that the object 
I perceive presents itself as an object in itself, independent of my experience. The 
phenomenological findings Naïve Realism attempts to accommodate are the following. 
On the one hand, is the directness of the experience: it seems to me that it is the tree 
 
 
 
38 In other places Martin admits that Representationalism can also account for the naïve realistic 
phenomenology of perception, but argues that perceptual imagination provides a serious 
phenomenological challenge to such accounts (Martin 2004). McDowell suggests that a non-relational 
account is phenomenologically of key (MW, p. 113, McDowell 1998a, p.243).   
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itself and not some intermediary item that I am directly aware of. On the other hand, it 
seems to me that what I experience is something in itself, independent of my experience 
of it. Naïve Realism argues that the best way to understand these phenomenological 
features is to take them at face value and say that when I perceive the cherry tree I have 
an experience which depends for its existence on the actual existence of the tree I see, a 
tree which in turn exists independently of my experience of it.  A genuine perception is 
on this view a perceptual experience that is object-involving qua mental episode, 
meaning that no experience of fundamentally the same kind could have occurred 
without the existence of the appropriate candidate for perceptual awareness. For this 
reason such an account is also referred to as a relational account of perception.      
 When we characterize the view that genuine perception is object-
involving as relational this can be explained in several ways. ‘Relational’ can be used to 
highlight the fact that the relation ‘S perceives O’, where ‘S’ stands for a person and ‘O’ 
for an existing object, is taken to be a primitive, which cannot be analysed in, for 
instance, purely causal terms (cf. Campbell 2002, p. 117). Or it can be a way of 
expressing that for a perceptual episode to be of the genuine kind is just for it to stand in 
a certain relation to an object, so that if the object did not exist, the episode would not 
be of the same kind (cf. McDowell 1998i, p. 477). But whether the relation is said to be 
between a person and an object, or between an experiential episode and an object, the 
basic idea is that a genuine perception consists in a relation that requires the existence of 
both of its relata.  
Part of the motivation for such a relational view of perception has been the 
idea that the content of demonstrative propositions is object-dependent, in the sense that 
such content is only available for thought if the proper object exists. I take a thought 
content including the content of perception to be object-dependent when the content 
concerns a given experience-independent object and an intentional experience 
(perceptual or not) with the content in question could only occur given the existence of 
that object. The content of an intentional experience is then object-dependent when the 
intentional experience with that content is itself object-involving (cf. Martin 2003, p. 5).  
When I visually attend to the tree in front of me and say, ‘That tree  is blossoming’, then 
the relationist claims that the propositional content of this thought is dependent on the 
existence of the object singled out in my visual experience.  
The two most prominent alternatives to Naïve Realism are Sense-Data 
Theories and so-called Intentionalism or Representationalism. A Sense-Data Theory 
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incorporates the object-involvement of the perceptual experience in the shape of a 
sense-datum, but with the cost that perception cannot be a direct awareness of the 
worldly object seen and often with the consequence that the direct object of perception 
is seen as mind-dependent. The intentionalist or representationalist tries to capture the 
directness of perception by regarding perception as a direct awareness of a worldly 
object mediated by a representational content, but in return comes to deny that the 
content can be object-dependent (Martin 2004, p. 40). What these theories share is a 
denial of the object-involvement of perceptual experiences.39 This common ground can 
be seen as an offspring of a shared understanding of what is often called the possibility 
of perfect hallucination. It is around this possibility of a perfect hallucination that the 
debate between disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism or conjunctivism revolves.40 
 
2.2 The Argument from Hallucination  
The idea of a perfect hallucination is the idea that for any veridical experience of a 
mind-independent object it is possible that I could undergo an experience that I would 
not be able to distinguish from my actual, veridical experience just by reflection, but 
where no relevant mind-independent object exists. If I am now seeing a cherry tree in 
front of me then there is a possible hallucinatory experience which from my perspective 
would be indistinguishable from my actual experience. The disagreement is then about 
what consequences an acceptance of the possibility of perfect hallucinations has for our 
conception of the intrinsic nature of perceptual experiences.  
The conjunctivist would argue that since the two experiences are 
indiscriminable from a subjective point of view, the immediate object or the content of 
the experience must in each case be the same, or at least of the same fundamental kind. 
It is exactly the fact that the content of the experience is of a common kind that explains 
the possibility of confusing a hallucination with a genuine perception, the conjunctivist 
 
 
 
39 To some extend we can regard the Sense-Data Theory and Intentionalism as counterparts of the Myth 
of the Given and Coherentism within Theory of Perception.  
40 I shall use the terms conjunctivism and non-disjunctivism interchangeably to designate a broad range of 
theories of perception including Sense-Data Theories and Intentionalism. Conjunctivism can be regarded 
as the position that takes the phenomenon of genuine perception to be analyzable into a perceptual 
experience itself independent of its worldly object and something more (most often a relevant causal 
relation to an object). Conjunctivism is a conjunctivist conception of genuine perception in contrast to 
hallucination whereas disjunctivism is a disjunctivist conception of perceptual appearances covering both 
cases of genuine perception and of hallucination. As such the direct opposite of conjunctivism is not 
disjunctivism but a relational account of genuine perception. Disjunctivism is a way of denying the 
Common Kind Assumption that motivates Conjunctivism.   
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would claim. In so far as the content of a genuine perception is of the same kind as that 
of hallucinations the content cannot be dependent on the existence of a proper mind-
independent object and therefore the kind of mental episode that occurs when one 
actually perceives a mind-independent object cannot be object-involving. With Martin I 
shall refer to the consequences the conjunctivist wishes to draw from this “Argument 
from Hallucination” concerning the content and nature of perceptual experience as the 
Common Kind Assumption (Martin 2004, p. 40):41 whatever kind of experience occurs 
when one is genuinely perceiving it is of the same fundamental kind as is a 
hallucinatory experience.  
With the Common Kind Assumption in place there seems to be no room 
for a relational account of genuine perception. If a veridical perception is genuinely 
relational it can only be a relation between an experience and some experience-
dependent object, because the relevant object must be shared between hallucinations 
and genuine perception. This is what a sense-data theory would claim.42 If 
hallucinations are thought of as having a merely intentional object, then genuine 
perceptions will, because of the common kind assumption, also be regarded as 
essentially independent of the existence of an appropriate object (cf. Martin 2004, p. 
42). The conjunctivist, of course, would not deny that the veridicality of a veridical 
perception is dependent on the presence of an appropriate object and presumably a 
suitable causal connection between the object and the perceptual episode, but this causal 
connection is regarded as extrinsic to the experience qua perceptual experience. The 
experience is in itself veridicality-neutral. 
 The point of a disjunctivist conception of perceptual experience is exactly 
to block the inference from the indistinguishability hypothesis to the common kind 
assumption in order to be able to hold on to a relational conception of perception (cf. 
 
 
 
41 McDowell speaks of “the Argument from Illusion” as the argument that a disjunctivist conception is 
supposed to block (McDowell 1998b, p. 382). He also formulates the idea from which the argument for 
the Common Kind Assumption precede as the idea that an appearance of a red cube indistinguishable 
from a genuine perception is possible without there being any red cube there (cf. McDowell 1998a, p. 
248, McDowell 2006, p. 22). I prefer to formulate disjunctivism in terms of hallucination versus genuine 
perception, because it is the Argument from Hallucination that is supposed to ground the general thesis of 
conjunctivism, i.e. the Common Kind Assumption that implies the object-independence of perceptual 
experiences.    
42 Martin notes that some of the original sense-data theorists, namely Moore and Russell, argued that the 
objects of perceptions are mind-independent (Martin 2004, p. 86, n. 8), thereby denying them status as 
either mental or physical objects (cf. Martin 2004, p. 40).      
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McDowell 2006a, p. 25, Martin 2004, p. 38).43 According to the disjunctivist, the 
common factor between the genuine perception and the hallucination cannot be 
understood on its own, but has to be analysed in terms of a disjunction: Whenever there 
is a perceptual experience it is either of the genuine kind or it is a hallucinatory 
experience. ‘Genuine’ and ‘hallucinatory’ can then be regarded as determinates of the 
determinable ‘perceptual experience’ (cf. Hornsby 1997, p. 104, Haddock 2005, p. 
164).44  
When we say that a red object is coloured, we are not explaining what it is 
for an object to be red, in terms of the more fundamental fact of being coloured, rather 
we are identifying the red object as a member of a determinable kind which has ‘red’ as 
a determinate. Just as we cannot take the fact that something is coloured as a more 
fundamental fact than the fact that the object is either red or some other colour, we 
cannot take the fact that something is a perceptual experience as more fundamental than 
its being either a genuine perception or a hallucinatory experience. This is what 
McDowell expresses by saying that the disjunctivist conception denies that there is a 
highest common factor shared by genuine perception and hallucinations (McDowell 
1998b, p. 388). McDowell formulates his disjunctivism in the following manner:  
 
Short of the fully Cartesian picture, the infallibly knowable fact – it 
seeming to one that things are thus and so – can be taken 
disjunctively, as constituted either by the fact that things are 
manifestly thus and so or by the fact that that merely seems to be the 
case. On this account, the idea of things being thus and so figures 
straightforwardly in our understanding of the infallibly knowable 
appearance; there is no problem about how experience can be 
understood to have a representational directedness towards external 
reality. (McDowell 1998a, p. 242).  
 
That the fact that it perceptually appears to the subject that things are in a certain 
manner is constituted by the obtaining of one of the disjuncts means that a statements 
about an appearance is made true by the truth of either the one or the other disjunct. 
 
 
 
43 It is possible to combine a disjunctivist conception of perceptual experience with a non-relational view, 
if we take a relational view to imply a relation to a singular object and not just the idea that the experience 
depends on some object being actually there (cf. Smith 2008, p. 315). McDowell has raised doubts about 
the possibility of an intelligible motivation for such a position (McDowell 1998a, p. 249, n. 36).   
 
44 For a recent discussion of the distinction between determinables and determinates see Eric Funchouser 
(2006).  
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This in the same manner as the fact that something is coloured can be constituted by, for 
instance, the fact that it is either red or blue.  
 
2.3 The commitments of conjunctivism  
What the Common Kind Assumption amounts to is the idea that the fact that it 
perceptually appears to the subject that things are thus and so is constituted by a fact 
that is independent of whether the experience is of a veridical or of a hallucinatory kind. 
I do not think the assumption requires that an appearance can exist independently of the 
existence of either a veridical experience or a hallucination. All cases of a perceptual 
appearance could be a constitutive element of either a veridical perception or a 
hallucination and it is hard to conceive of it being otherwise. All the assumption 
requires is that there is nothing intrinsic to the fact that there is a perceptual experience 
that determines whether the experience is veridical or hallucinatory. 
I do not think a conjunctivist would see himself as committed to the claim 
that one can know that it seems to one that things are thus and so, without knowing that, 
in that case, things are either as they seem or they are not (cf. Smith 2002, p. 198).  
What the conjunctivist is committed to and what he would also admit to being 
committed to is that when a perceiver knows that he has an appearance of things being 
thus and so, then this knowledge is knowledge of a further fact than the fact expressed 
by the exclusive disjunction, that he is either enjoying a veridical perception of things 
being thus and so or he is suffering from an hallucinatory experience, where it merely 
seems that this is how things are.  
The Common Kind Assumption is sometimes said to consist in a 
commitment to the idea that we can grasp the fact that things seem to the subject to be a 
certain way without appeal either to the fact that the subject is having a veridical 
perception or to the fact that the subject suffers from a hallucination (cf. Haddock 2005, 
p. 163). This is a way of expressing the conjunctivist’s commitment to the idea that we 
can grasp the fact of an appearance as something which is in itself independent of 
whether it is of the veridical kind or not. It is this possibility that is supposed to allow 
for a reductive analysis of genuine perception in terms of the causal connection between 
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two independently intelligible items: The perceptual experience as such and the mind-
independent object in itself.45  
I take it to be unlikely that a conjunctivist would admit to a commitment to 
the idea that a perceiving subject could have the concept of a perceptual appearance 
without any awareness of the possibility that things can seem to be in a certain way 
without actually being as they seem. The conjunctivist would most likely want to hold 
on to the idea that, for a perceiver to possess the notion of a perceptual appearance, she 
needs to grasp the distinction between a veridical and a non-veridical appearance. For it 
to make sense to ascribe a grasp of this distinction to the perceiver, we need to see her 
as believing that it is possible that, at least sometimes, the way things perceptually 
appear to her is the way things actually are. What the conjunctivist claims is that in 
constructing a theory of perception we can make use of a notion of appearance that can 
be defined without any reference to the facts that constitute the appearance as either a 
hallucinatory experience or a veridical experience. We can compare this with the way 
some theories of intentional bodily action would claim that we, as theorists, can 
understand the facts that constitute a mental item, such as an intention or a trying, 
independently of any reference to the facts that would constitute the carrying out of such 
an intention or the success of the trying. Such a theoretical claim need not imply a 
denial of the fact that the agent herself can only intend to X or think she is actually 
trying to X, if she has the belief that X-ing is something she is capable of doing by 
virtue of her practical bodily capacities.  
The critical question is whether the conjunctivist is entitled to make the 
above distinction between the perspective of the perceiving subject and the perspective 
of the theorizing subject. The conjunctivist claims that, from a theoretical perspective, 
we can understand what it means that a subject has a perceptual appearance 
independently of any reference to the facts that would go into constituting the 
appearance as a veridical or a non-veridical perception. If this is so, however, why 
should it not be possible in principle for a perceiving subject to possess the concept of 
 
 
 
45 By a reductive analysis I mean an understanding that seeks to provide the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a given phenomenon in terms that refer to more fundamental phenomena that in turn can be 
made intelligible without reference to the analysed phenomenon. It is what Dummett has called a full-
blooded reductionism (Dummett 1978, p. 360). It tries to reduce a problematic class of propositions to a 
class of independently intelligible propositions that are claimed to specify the facts in virtue of which the 
reduced class of sentences are true. Such full-blooded reductionism is not necessarily intended as 
reductive in the sense of bald naturalism.         
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an appearance without yet possessing the idea that such appearances potentially are 
manifestations of how things are in the world? I think one way to put McDowell’s most 
fundamental critique of conjunctivism would be to say that conjunctivism cannot avoid 
a commitment to the idea of such a perceiving subject being ignorant of the possibility 
of a world as that to which appearances, when they are veridical, give access. As far as I 
can see, it would amount to a reductio ad absurdum of a full-blooded reductionism 
concerning veridical perception, if it is correct that conjunctivism is forced to claim that 
the idea of such a world-impoverished but yet perceiving subject makes sense.  
One way for the conjunctivist to try to make sense of such a perceiving 
subject with no concept of the distinction between veridical and non-veridical 
perception would be to appeal to the perception of non-linguistic animals or pre-
linguistic human infants. In such cases, it could be claimed, we have pure appearances 
without the perceiver having any concepts of veridicality or even of what appearances 
are. Such a response would constitute yet another version of the Myth of the Given. It 
would reiterate the fundamental problem of accounting for how such a naked 
appearance could even begin to be dressed up in conceptual clothing if we do not 
already assume a conceptual awareness of their nakedness, i.e., if they do not already 
have conceptual content.  
 
2.4 The Cartesian picture of the mind 
A central underlying assumption, which McDowell pinpoints as motivating the 
inference from indistinguishability to the common kind assumption, is the so called 
‘fully Cartesian picture’ of the mind. The full-blown Cartesian picture of the mind 
comes about as a certain interpretation of the fact that we can have knowledge of 
perceptual appearances independently of knowing whether we are undergoing a genuine 
perception or not. 46  The Cartesian takes the possibility of such knowledge as an 
 
 
 
46 It might seem that disjunctivism rules out this possibility. McDowell states that under some 
circumstances an experience indistinguishable from an experience of being confronted with a tomato, 
might not count as an experience of the presence of a tomato even though it results from actually being 
confronted with a tomato (McDowell 1998c, p. 390, n. 37). Such circumstance could be that one is 
confronted with a lot of tomato facades and only a few real tomatoes or that one’s perceptual apparatus is 
sometimes out of order and sometimes not without one being able to tell. Under such circumstances it 
might not be possible that it can seem to me that P without me knowing whether the fact that P is 
manifest to me or whether it merely appears to be manifest, because I know the circumstances to be so as 
to undermine that I could be in a position to know that P just by looking. However if I am in a situation 
where I wrongly think that my perception is unreliable, as in the example with the tie-shop used in the 
previous chapter, I might have second thoughts about my reasons for believing my perception to be 
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expression of the knowledge in question being of a fact that is itself constituted in 
splendid isolation from any facts of the world to which perception might give access. In 
this picture the mind is portrayed as both entirely self-enclosed and completely self-
disclosed.  
The mind is self-enclosed in the sense that the realm of the Cogito is 
regarded as an ontologically autonomous region of facts, which is set apart from the 
world to which we might have access to in perception. This is ‘the idea of a self-
contained subjective realm, in which things are as they are independently of external 
reality (if any)’ (McDowell 1998a, p. 242).  
The mind is self-disclosed in the sense that given optimal epistemic 
conditions the whole truth and nothing but the truth about consciousness is revealed to 
consciousness itself. This is the idea ‘of a realm of reality in which sameness and 
differences are exhaustively determined by how things seem to the subject, and hence 
which is knowable through and through by exercising one’s capacity to know how 
things seem to one’ (McDowell 1998a, p. 249).  
 Given the idea of a region where reality is exhausted by its appearance, the 
acceptance of the Indistinguishability Hypothesis, immediately leads to the Common 
Kind Assumption. If two appearances are in principle indistinguishable from the 
subject’s point of view, then the facts that constitute the one kind of appearance cannot 
exceed the facts that are constitutive of the other, hence qua subjective experience a 
veridical experience must be of fundamentally the same kind as a hallucination. Once 
this is established it follows that a genuine perception cannot qua experience be of a 
kind that depends on the existence of a proper, mind-independent object.47 
Given a certain first-person epistemic authority about how things appear to 
the subject, which I think we have good reasons to accept, the idea of complete self-
disclosure can seem to commit one to a Cartesian dualism of substances (cf. McDowell 
1998a, p. 245). The epistemic authority of the subject becomes an absolute authority 
when we assume that all aspects of the subjective or inner facts of appearances are 
revealed to the subject herself. It is difficult to see how the idea of a region of reality 
 
 
 
unreliable and this will be equivalent to a wonder whether my experience is veridical or not. We can 
imagine a similar case where I to begin with wrongly think that my experience is a hallucination of an 
object, but later come to doubt this. Under such circumstances I can reasonably wonder whether my 
experience is of a genuine or of a hallucinatory kind.       
47 Mike Martin (2004) delivers some intriguing arguments to the effect that the conjunctivist is committed 
to an excessive idea of a subject’s access to her own consciousness as potentially infallible. 
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over which a single person possesses full epistemic authority can be compatible with a 
materialistic conception of that region. Material reality is open to investigation from all 
sides and the conclusion seems to be, that the presumably completely private region of 
reality must be an immaterial microcosm.  
Even if one doubts the idea of complete self-disclosure because it seems 
incompatible with materialism the idea of subjectivity as a self-contained ontological 
sphere can still deliver motivation for the Common Factor View (cf. McDowell 1998a, 
p. 245). Often the possibility of imagining the perfect hallucination is backed up by an 
argument that seeks to show the empirical possibility of such experiences. The first 
premise is that our normal perceptions are caused by a series of events which begin 
where the seen object is placed and proceed through the retina into our brains which 
somehow make the experiences take place. The second premise is that the relation 
between cause and effect is contingent and therefore any effect could have had a 
different cause than it actually had. From these assumptions it seems to follow that any 
given genuine perception could have been brought about even if the seen object did not 
exist. This shows that it cannot be an essential feature of any given perception that it is 
of an existing object. Any given genuine perception could qua experience have been a 
hallucination. 
The argument above reveals what according to McDowell is the 
fundamental motivation for the assumption of the ontological autonomy of the facts that 
constitute appearances namely what I in the previous chapter named Scientistic 
Naturalism (cf. McDowell 1998a, p. 243). Within the framework of Scientistic 
Naturalism the relation between appearances and the objects of the world can only be an 
external, causal relationship, if we are not to make it a supernatural relationship. The 
urge to develop a scientific psycho-physics can help explain why Descartes searched for 
the place in the brain where the causal exchange between the mental and the physical 
could be located. In modern versions of the idea of the self-containment of the mental 
the Cartesian dualism is replaced by the idea that the mental is literally inside the person 
and presumably to be located in the brain. In so far as events are defined by their spatio-
temporal properties a scientistic monism, which takes all mental events to be identical 
with events identifiable in purely natural-scientific terms, is forced to set up a spatial 
boundary between the parts of the world that are mental and the parts of the world that 
are purely physical. Because the mind-independent objects of perception, be it facts or 
individual objects, are obviously not of a mental character, my perceptual experience 
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cannot, on this picture, be dependent for its existence on the existence of the object.48 
The perceptual appearance is identified with an event further downstream the causal 
flux that flows from the object, presumably with an event that takes place on the inside 
of  the person’s body.  
Under the conditions of Scientistic Naturalism the acknowledgement of 
the possibility of a perfect hallucination naturally leads to the Common Kind 
Assumption. This consequence is independent of whether Scientistic Naturalism tries to 
accommodate the infallible knowledge of appearances via a full-blown Cartesian 
substance dualism or whether it takes the shape of a Cartesian materialism. Cartesian 
materialism is the position that assumes that the persisting thing, presumably the brain, 
that possesses mental properties is separable from all the things that lack such 
properties.49 The situation we are in is the characteristically modern epistemological 
predicament, namely the apparent need to reconstruct our knowledge of the world 
starting out from veridicality-neutral appearances. 
 
2.5 Modern scepticism  
If we accept that we as perceivers are placed at the end of a receiver which delivers 
input to our brain, then the idea of perception as the place where the world can make 
itself manifest is under threat. The problem is that on this picture we cannot take at face 
value a justification of a belief that P via expressions such as, ‘because I can see that P 
is the case’. All we can face as perceivers is something that falls short of the fact and as 
such is consistent with non-P. If this is our predicament, we will be forced to try to 
reconstruct something with the epistemic value of ‘I can see that P’ that is something 
factive which implies ‘that P’. In so far as we follow an internalist intuition concerning 
the nature of justification, this has to be done from the perspective of the perceiver, who 
must then start out from a veridicality-neutral fact of ‘It seems that P’. This is a 
Sisyphean labour, however. If we start with something less than factive we can never 
reach something that can provide a justification for a belief that P with the same 
certainty as can the fact that we see that P (cf. McDowell 1998b, p. 399).  
 
 
 
48 A materialism or physicalism that prefers to talk about physical events as constituting mental events or 
of mental events as composed of physical events rather than to talk of identity would have the same 
consequences.        
49 I borrow this characterization of the residual Cartesianism of materialism from Hornsby (1998, p. 380). 
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According to McDowell, the characteristically modern version of 
scepticism is motivated by an often inchoately realized transcendental worry about the 
very idea that perceptual appearances purport to be presentations of objective reality. 
What is under threat is not just the possibility of knowledge of the world but the very 
notion of subjectivity as a mode of being in the world. One way the radicalism of 
modern scepticism manifests itself is in the way it not only threatens our perceptual 
knowledge of the world, but also our bodily presence in the world and thereby our 
position as agent in the world (cf. McDowell 1998a, p. 240. n. 24). The problem of 
agency referred to here is not the specific problem of agency I will be dealing with later 
in this chapter, but a corollary of the general threat to intentionality. The general threat 
in question is, I think, on a par with the transcendental threat displayed in Mind and 
World, but it manifests itself as a problem concerning our understanding of our 
perceptual appearances qua subjective experiences and not as a problem of our 
understanding of them qua natural events.  
The problem is the following. Scientistic Naturalism forces upon us a view 
of the mind as a self-sufficient region of facts, because the domain of the mind needs to 
be scientifically determinable within objective time and space in order to enter into 
causal relations with the rest of the world. The result is an internalizing of the perceptual 
appearances along with all other mental occurrences. The perceptual appearances are 
conceived as independent of whatever they supposedly make appear when they are 
veridical. Such a view rests on the assumption that we can understand our capacity to 
gain knowledge about appearances without reference to our ability to gain knowledge of 
the world through these appearances. This must be so because, according to the 
Common Kind Assumption, the appearances are constituted by facts which do not 
involve the facts that in each case determine the veridicality of the appearance. A 
further implication is that since an appearance is defined by its representational 
properties, i.e., by its purporting to be of objective reality, it must be claimed that we 
can make the objective purport of a perceptual experience intelligible independently of 
any reference to facts that actually make it possible for such an experience to be of 
objective reality. If we could not make sense of the idea of a perceptual experience as 
purporting to be of objective reality without reference to how such an experience could 
actually be of reality, we would have undermined what was to serve as a starting point 
for our reconstruction of our knowledge of the world. Furthermore we would lose our 
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grip on one of the autonomous elements that was supposed to go into the reductive 
causal analysis of what constitutes a genuine perception as distinct from a hallucination. 
 It is precisely the need to assume the conceptual separability of the idea of 
experiences as having objective purport and the idea of experiences as possible 
presentations of facts of the world that, according to McDowell, constitutes the 
transcendental predicament that surfaces in the shape of modern radical scepticism. 
McDowell argues that if we can so much as make sense of the idea that it is so much as 
possible that we can have an environmental state of affairs directly presented to us in 
experience, then this would constitute a response to radical scepticism (cf. McDowell 
2006b, pp. 24-25). This is so because radical scepticism thrives on an apparent 
unintelligibility of the idea of direct realism, relying, as it does, on the force of the 
Argument from Hallucination.    
The response McDowell gives to radical scepticism has both a positive 
and negative element. On the positive side he argues that we can make sense of direct 
realism namely via a disjunctive account of appearances. On the negative side he argues 
that if we accept the unintelligibility of direct realism we also lose the intelligibility of 
the idea of experiences as even purporting to be of objective reality. The negative side 
has the character of a negative transcendental argument that seeks to establish the 
negative consequences of radical scepticism for the intelligibility of the idea of 
appearances with objective purport. The argument is transcendental in the sense that it 
seeks to establish a necessary conceptual link between two features of our experience, a 
link without which we cannot make sense of appearances at all. It is argued that a 
condition of possibility for the intelligibility of the objective purport of perceptual 
experiences is the intelligibility of the possibility of such experiences being, at least in 
some cases, constituted by the direct manifestation of the facts of the world (cf. 
McDowell 1998c, p. 410, 2006b, p. 23).    
McDowell presents different sketchy versions of the negative 
transcendental argument, to show how the sceptic’s position is parasitic on the notion of 
direct perception. The basic idea is that the notion of a mere appearance is derivative 
from that of appearances conceived of as actually presenting the objective world as it is 
(cf. McDowell 1998c, p. 410, 2006b, p. 23): 
 
 
 
 
 
77
That is: such experiences can present us with the appearance that it is 
raining only because when we have them as the upshot (in a suitable 
way) of the fact that it is raining, the fact itself is their object, so that 
its obtaining is not, after all, blankly external. (McDowell 1998, p. 
389) 
 
The transcendental argument can be seen as putting forward a version of Minimal 
Empiricism, which McDowell also refers to as transcendental empiricism (McDowell 
2000, p. 6). It is so to speak a deeper version of Minimal Empiricism than the one I 
presented in the previous chapter. It is deeper in the sense that it digs deeper into the 
perceptual experience, as it does not just state a necessary link between empirical beliefs 
and perceptual world-presentations but between perceptual appearances and perceptual 
world-presentations. This explains why the transcendental argument against the 
Common Kind Assumption becomes relevant in the context of Mind and World when 
the suggestion of an anomalous monistic conception of perceptual appearances enters 
the scene (cf. Chapter 1, 1.1.5).     
  If we are to make sense of the idea that appearances can have 
representational content, then we must be able to see the world as able to present itself 
in appearances and not just as working as a hidden cause behind the appearances. If the 
world is such a hidden cause we are faced with the familiar challenge of scepticism, but 
not just that. The transcendental argument reveals that the mere appearances can no 
longer be recognized for what they are. Scepticism cannot keep up the appearance of 
appearances with objective purport. This is so because it requires us to make sense of an 
appearance as having a specific content that can match how the world actually is, 
without yet having any idea of how the world could manifest itself to us. How should it 
be possible that the mind should have the power to make portraits of the world if we do 
not allow for the possibility that the world can figure as a model for the mind? The mind 
would be blind and everything would, as McDowell puts it, go dark within (McDowell 
1998a, p. 249). The resource we are left with to make sense of a possible correctness of 
an appearance is an external causal relation to the world. However, an appeal to such an 
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external relation would succumb to the Myth of the Given and would need to adhere to 
the infeasible dualism of schema and content.50 
  
2.6 Disjunctivism as alternative 
The negative transcendental argument was intended to show that radical scepticism is 
self-deceiving when it pretends to be able to make sense of appearances as purporting to 
be of objective reality while basing its scepticism on an alleged unintelligibility of direct 
realism. Without an alternative account of why direct realism is after all intelligible, the 
transcendental argument could be read as a further radicalization of scepticism which 
leads to the conclusion that not even the idea of empirical content is intelligible. A 
reasonable response to such a conclusion would be leave behind any internalist 
intuitions concerning the notion of knowledge and pursue the project of a full-blown 
externalist account (cf. McDowell 1998c, p. 404).51  
   What a disjunctivist account of appearances offers is a way to appreciate 
both the possibility of infallible knowledge of appearances and the possible illusory 
character of such appearances, without this putting us under the threat of radical 
scepticism evoking the apparent need to establish our right to trust any appearance. We 
can deny that the indistinguishability of hallucinations and genuine perceptions means 
that we are stuck with less than the world itself when we have experiences of the 
genuine kind. To do so we need to deny that the truth and nothing but the truth about 
our experience qua subjective experience is revealed to us just by us having the 
experience in question. This is what disjunctivism does. The fact that a genuine 
perception is of this particular object is intrinsic to the experience, nevertheless I cannot 
have infallible knowledge about the fact that this experience is not a hallucination. My 
experience is not eminently transparent to myself and the Cartesian discovery of a 
sphere of infallibly knowable truths concerning appearances was not a discovery of the 
perfect self-disclosure of consciousness. Just because some facts about my experience 
are not infallibly knowable it does not follow that I cannot have non-inferential 
 
 
 
50 McDowell refers to a number of overlapping dualisms that stand in the way of a relational account of 
perception: Schema-Content, Form-Matter, Subjective-Objective, Inner-Outer (McDowell 1998c, pp. 
408-409).  
51 Here we see the connection between bald naturalism and a full-blown externalist conception of 
epistemology. They both claim that notions, such as that of knowledge, that work within the space of 
reasons, can be made intelligible solely in terms that do not themselves serve to place things in the space 
of reasons.    
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knowledge about what I see. All that follows is that my experience is subject to error, 
and that is common sense and does not pose a sceptical threat. The only reason why we 
think we need to re-establish our knowledge of the world on the basis of something 
infallibly knowable is because we take what we are presented with in experience always 
to fall short of the facts of the world. With a disjunctivist account we can maintain that I 
can know that I see that P and that that this knowledge can, though it is fallible, justify 
my belief that P.  
 The fundamental hindrance for the disjunctivist account is the idea that 
there must be a sharp boundary between the mind and its environment. According to 
Scientistic Naturalism, the subjective occurrences must be identifiable in strictly 
scientific terms if we are to make it intelligible that they can causally interact with the 
physical world. Such a scientistic monism excludes the possibility that genuine 
perception could be essentially object-involving. If we follow the argument from Mind 
and World and work with a relaxed naturalism that does not restrict nature to what is 
within the scope of natural science, we can accommodate a disjunctive account of 
appearances and a relational account of genuine perception. We can regard the mind and 
the world as interpenetrating one another in perception (cf. McDowell 1998a, p. 241). 
Perception begins with the objects of the world and there is no telling where perception 
ends and the purely physical world begins.  
What disjunctivism is supposed to make possible is an acknowledgement 
of perception as both a natural and a subjective occurrence without the consequences 
that it must, qua natural event, be localized within the head of the person and the 
consequence that it must, qua subjective experience, be transparent for the subject 
herself. The mind is not self-enclosed because it can penetrate the world and let the 
world figure in the content of perception. The mind is not perfectly self-disclosed 
because it is penetrated by the world and the world is not exhausted by the subject’s 
perspective on it. The possibility of mistaking a hallucination for a perception is the 
possibility of being in error about the subjective nature of one’s conscious experience. 
To recognize the possibility of such a deception is not to radicalize Cartesian 
scepticism. To acknowledge the possibility of perfect hallucinations is simply another 
way of expressing the fact that perception is imperfect. Because perception is of objects 
that transcend the experience of perceiving, it is in principle always possible that an 
isolated perceptual experience can be revealed later as erroneous. The Cartesian idea 
that the subject has an epistemic authority concerning how things appear to her can be 
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maintained. Instead of taking the authority to cover the full extent of the subjective 
nature of one’s experience we can recognize it as covering two fundamentally different 
kinds of appearances.52   
To be sure there are more questions arising here, concerning both the 
relation between the events described by natural science and the subjective occurrences, 
and concerning the rationalizing causal relation claimed to exist between my perception 
and the worldly facts perceived. Some of these I shall address briefly in the next 
chapter, where I investigate the possibility of a disjunctivism concerning intentional 
bodily actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
52 A good place to look for a fleshed-out account of first-person authority which I take to be compatible 
with disjunctivism could be Moran’s Authority and Estrangement (2001). 
 
 
 
81
                                                
CHAPTER 3   
DISJUNCTIVISM CONCERNING ACTION 
 
3.1 The idea of disjunctivism concerning intentional bodily action 
Parallel to a causal theory of perception which tries to analyse perception in terms of an 
explanatory prior idea of veridicality-neutral experience and an appropriate causal 
connection to the perceived object, we find theories of action that try to analyse action 
as a result of the causal relation between two elements that are themselves independent 
of one another. On the one side we have a mental item of the agent (a trying, volition, 
intention etc.) and on the other side we have the movements of the body of the agent. It 
is when these two elements stand in the appropriate causal relation that we can talk of 
an intentional action. What such a conjunctivist theory decides to identify as the 
intentional action can now vary.  
One option is to consider the intentional action as identical to bodily 
movements appropriately caused by a mental item: the Standard Causal Account. 
Another option is to regard a mental trying whenever it has the proper causal effects as 
constituting the intentional action: Volitionism. The third of the standard options is to 
conceive of the intentional action as a complex of both a mental and a physical element 
and so identify the action with the two components when appropriately linked causally: 
the Complex Theory. In the literature we find all three proposals present.53 In the 
following I shall refer to the kind of bodily movements that, according to all three 
proposals, are essential for the performance of intentional bodily movements as 
voluntary movement. The three different theories respectively regard the relationship 
between movement and action as one of identity, as a relation between cause and effect, 
and finally, in the case of the Complex Theory, as a part-whole relationship (cf. 
Hornsby 1998, p. 96). What the three proposals share is the idea that the mental side and 
the bodily side of an action can exist independently of one another and are only 
externally related as cause and effect. This means that we find an analogy to the 
common kind assumption concerning perceptual experience both concerning the mental 
and concerning the physical element of an action.  
 
 
 
53 Davidson is a prominent proponent of a version of the Standard Causal Account. The early Hornsby 
(1980), O’Shaughnessy (1973) and A. D. Smith (1988) have presented versions of Volitionism. McGinn 
(1982) and Searle (1983) argue for versions of The Complex Theory.  
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Concerning the mental side, the non-disjunctivist claims that the trying or 
the intention in action of the agent are of fundamentally the same kind whether the 
agent actually engages in any bodily activity or not. Here we find the analogy between 
the case of a perfect hallucination and the case of total failure of acting. 
Concerning the physical side of the action, the non-disjunctivist claims 
that the bodily movement which is essential for the carrying out of an intentional bodily 
action is of a kind that is not fundamentally different from a movement of the agent’s 
body that occurs without being a movement on behalf of the agent. The non-
disjunctivist claims that we can understand what it means that a movement is the 
movement of an agent by appealing to an agency-neutral concept of bodily movements 
and further by appealing to the notion of a trying or an intention that causes the bodily 
movement in the appropriate manner. O’Shaughnessy formulates the basic non-
disjunctivist assumptions in the following manner:  
 
Thus, in normally raising an arm, two distinct events simultaneously 
happen: one active and psychological, a trying event; the other a 
merely physical event of a kind that might instead have been caused 
by no more than a shove, an arm-rising event. (O’Shaughnessy 1973, 
p. 374). 
 
Because the non-disjunctivist accounts of action involve these two common kind 
assumptions, we have from the outset two ways of formulating a disjunctivist account 
of intentional action. On the one hand, we could say that whenever there is a trying, 
such a trying is either an intentional bodily action or it is a mere trying. On the other 
hand, we could say that whenever the body of person moves, this movement is either an 
intentional bodily action or it is a mere movement. The first approach is taken by Bill 
Brewer. The second approach is pursued by Adrian Haddock in his critique of 
Hornsby’s theory of action. Brewer formulates the disjunction concerning an agent’s 
willing of movement of a limb (‘l-movement’) as follows: 
 
The basic idea in our connection, would be that cases of A’s willing l-
movement also fall into two psychologically distinct classes, and 
should not be thought of simply as different worldly embeddings of 
the very same w-type mental state. They are either cases of A’s 
actively moving, or merely her failed attempts of l-movement. 
(Brewer 1993, p. 306). 
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Here is how Haddock formulates the disjunctivism concerning movements of a person’s 
body: 
 
This ambition will be thwarted if we take the idea of bodily movement 
disjunctively, such that the fact that Jane’s body moves is constituted 
either by the fact that Jane moves her body (a physical action) or by 
the fact that Jane’s body merely moves (a mere movement and 
therefore not an action). (Haddock 2005, p. 163). 
 
Both Brewer and Haddock develop their disjunctivist account of action in analogy to the 
disjunctivism found in theories of perception, in particular the disjunctivism of 
McDowell. Haddock refers to McDowell’s suggestive remarks in Mind and World 
about a problem of agency paralleling the transcendental problem of perception. The 
positive proposal McDowell makes is, according to Haddock, ‘an account according to 
which “certain bodily goings-on” are physical actions and not merely their effects’ 
(Haddock 2005, p. 161). In fact what McDowell writes is that ‘certain bodily goings-on 
are our spontaneity in action, not just effects of it’ (MW, p. 91). The problem 
concerning perception was to see how spontaneity, understood as the conceptual 
capacities that enable us to think, could be anything but externally related to the 
operations of our sensibility (MW, p. 89). The problem concerning agency is to come to 
see how spontaneity, now understood as the conceptual capacities that allow us to form 
intentions, can be intrinsically involved in movements of the body and not just ‘pictured 
as initiating bodily goings-on from within, and taken on that ground to be recognizable 
as intentions or volitions’ (MW, p. 90). So when McDowell talks about ‘spontaneity in 
action’ it seems reasonable to take that as synonymous with ‘intention in action’ and so 
to take McDowell’s suggestion to be that we should not conceive of ‘intention in action’ 
as merely causally related to bodily movements but rather as inextricably implicated in 
the bodily movement itself. As such McDowell’s suggestion seems to imply a kind of 
movement-disjunctivism such as that developed by Haddock, as well as a disjunctivism 
of intention in action similar to what Brewer proposes concerning willing.  
If we conceive of the notion of bodily movements as referring to a 
fundamental kind and so think we can and should conceive of all bodily movements as 
on a par, we can seem to be driven towards a conception of tryings as inner items. 
Similarly it can seem that once we accept that tryings are independent of any movement 
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we are forced to accept that the bodily movements must be independent of the tryings 
and so buy into the common kind assumption concerning movements. Both of these 
seeming implications have been rejected as more than seeming. A way of combining a 
disjunctivism of trying with a non-disjunctivism of movement has been proposed by A. 
D. Smith. Jennifer Hornsby has argued for a position combining a uniform conception 
of tryings with a disjunctivism of movements. If we can make sense of these 
combinations it follows that accepting a uniform conception of bodily movement is 
neither sufficient nor necessary for accepting a uniform conception of trying.  I shall 
return to these questions of mutual implication in section 3.6 and 3.7 below. 
 
3.2 The idea of a disjunctivism of bodily movement 
Let us begin by looking at movement-disjunctivism. What can seem peculiar about such 
a disjunctivism of movement is that it is the bodily movement that is the analogue of the 
perceptual experience and it is the agent who is the analogue of the mind-independent 
object of perception. Parallel to the argument that a relational account of perception can 
capture the naïve realistic phenomenology of perception we find the argument that we 
need a disjunctivism of movement to capture the phenomenology of voluntary 
movement. In perception it seems as if we are presented with an object in propria 
persona and so directly experience the object. Similarly we experience moving our 
body directly, that is, without us having to perform any action in order to get our body 
moving. I am, so to speak, present in propria persona, in the movement of my body 
when I move. Just as for the disjunctivist of perception certain kinds of experiences are 
essentially object-involving, so for the disjunctivist of movement certain kinds of 
movements are seen as essentially involving an agent. 
 The assumption that the disjunctivist rejects is that the bodily movements 
that occur when we perform bodily actions are agency-neutral. The assumption rejected 
is that such bodily movements are of a kind that might have occurred even if no 
voluntary movement had taken place and so no intentional bodily action had been 
performed. One expression of such an assumption is found in O’Shaughnessy’s concept 
of ‘act-neutral physical events’ (O’Shaughnessy 1973, p. 374). The assumption is also 
expressed by A. D. Smith when he says that ‘“mere” events and movements are two a 
penny’ (Smith 1988, p. 402) and that such movements are of a kind that could be 
‘brought about with a decerebrated frog and an electric wire’ (Smith 1988, p. 414). 
Searle refers to experiments run by Wilder Penfield in which the motor cortex of the 
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patient is stimulated so as to cause his hand to move, and argues that in such cases ‘we 
have a bodily movement which may be exactly the same as the bodily movement in an 
intentional action’ (Searle 1983, p.89).54  
The strongest version of such a uniformism of movement would claim that 
numerically the same movement as any action-related movement could occur even if no 
action had taken place. A weaker version is implied in the quote above, where Searle 
declares that for any action-related movement a qualitatively identical movement could 
occur. For Searle such objective indistinguishability serves as an argument in favour of 
an agency-neutral conception of movements, just as the subjective indistinguishability is 
used to establish the veridicality-neutrality of perceptual experience. Searle’s complex 
theory of action views a bodily action as a complex of an intention and a movement 
caused by the intention, and regards the movement as something in itself independent of 
the intention. What is implied in this view is that the bodily movement caused by the 
intention is of the same fundamental kind as a movement that could occur without it 
being action-related. In itself, however, such objective, qualitative identity, if it turned 
out to be the case, would not ensure the agency-neutrality of both movements, unless it 
has already been decided that all essential aspects of a bodily movement can be captured 
by the scientific mode of description. The conception of the body which is presupposed 
by the common kind assumption is the mirror image of the Cartesian picture of the mind 
as self-transparent. It is the idea of the body as a machine that can be understood 
without any evocation of terms that presuppose a subject of experience (cf. Hornsby 
1997, p. 101).  
Even if it turned out that there are certain constant empirical features of 
voluntary movements which distinguish them from other movements of the body, this 
would not be crucial evidence against the common kind assumption concerning 
movements. All the common kind assumption need amount to is that the facts that 
constitute bodily movements are facts that are in themselves agency-neutral. The fact 
that such distinguishing features of an instance of a movement could be taken as 
evidence for the occurrence of an action would not affect the idea that the most 
fundamental description of the movement is made in psychologically neutral terms. 
Such movements would be considered movements of fundamentally the same kind as 
 
 
 
54 For a survey of recent authors who ascribe to the idea of agency-neutral movements see Grünbaum 
(2008b, p. 246, n. 4). 
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the movements resulting from muscle spasms, triggering of reflexes, from the blow of a 
heavy gale as well as movements of the body which occur as the intended consequences 
of one’s actions, such as the going up of one’s paralysed left arm, resulting from one’s 
lifting it with one’s right arm. The movements of the body are taken to be physical 
events of a kind that are on a par with other physical events, such as earthquakes or the 
falling of a tree. All such events can be understood by placing them within the realm of 
law, where events cause events according to nomological laws.  
Just as I am describing a fact neutral between being a veridical perception 
and being a hallucination, according to the common factor view of perception, when I 
say of a psychological event that it is a perceptual appearance, then I am supposedly 
identifying an agency-neutral fact when I say of a physical event that it is a movement 
of a person’s body. This identification is not just neutral in the sense that the specifying 
description given leaves it open whether an action occurred or not, but in the sense that 
the fact it identifies is alleged to be independent of whether the movement is voluntary 
or not. In this picture, the movements can only be externally related to the mind. The 
full consequence of this is that it must be claimed intelligible that, given any agency-
involving movement, a movement of fundamentally the same kind and with intrinsically 
the same objective qualities could have occurred even if the body had been nobody’s 
body. Hornsby sums up the common kind assumption nicely when she writes: ‘Bodily 
movements then come to be assimilated to items which might be there even if there 
were no persons whose bodies they were movements of’ (Hornsby 1998, p. 392). The 
reciprocal idea concerning perceptual appearances would be the idea that such 
appearances become items which might be as they are even if there is no external reality 
which they can make manifest.   
It seems to be a truism to claim that every time I move my body there is a 
movement of my body. So from the fact that I raise my arm we can infer that there is a 
rising of my arm. We can put the general claim as follows: From any description of a 
bodily movement using the transitive verb ‘X moves Y’ follows a description using the 
intransitive verb ‘X’s Y moves’, where X stands for a person and Y for a body part 
(Hornsby 1980, ch. 2). What the non-disjunctivist claims is that the intransitive 
statement is made true by a fact that is independent of the fact that makes the transitive 
statement true. This means that the basic metaphysical question for a theory of action 
becomes how we are to relate the event identified by the transitive statement, i.e., the 
action, with the event identified by the intransitive statement, i.e., the bodily movement 
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(cf. Ruben 2007, p. 231). Another way of putting this is to say that the non-disjunctivist 
wants to give a positive answer to the question Wittgenstein posed: ‘What is left over if 
I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?’ (Wittgenstein 
1984, § 621). With regard to perception, the common kind assumption leads to an 
acknowledgement that it makes sense to ask: ‘What is left of my perception if I subtract 
the fact that there is an actual object which I am seeing?’ (cf. Searle 1983, p. 87). The 
sense-data theorist and the intentionalist give different answers to this question whereby 
they try to explain what the highest common factor of perceptual appearances consists 
in and how such appearances manage to make the world present to me when they 
amount to veridical perception. Similarly the conjunctivist operates with the idea of an 
independent fact of bodily movement to which we need to add something for that 
movement to become a manifestation of my agency.   
The response of the disjunctivist, in both the case of perception and the 
case of action, would be that that these attempts of adding up from a neutral starting 
point are futile, and that, when we realize the heterogeneous nature of the phenomena 
once thought to be uniform, the intellectual urgency of these specific questions fades 
away. 
The disjunctivist of bodily movements will claim that when I move my 
body and this moving of my body is not done by performing some other action, as when 
I move my paralysed left arm with my right arm, then the most basic description of this 
movement is the intransitive agency-involving one: He moves his arm. It will still be 
maintained that from this statement we can infer that a movement of the body took 
place (cf. Ruben 2007, p. 241); only the inferred statement is not taken to be true in 
virtue of an agency-neutral movement. Instead the inferred statement is to be 
understood disjunctively: Whenever there is a movement of an agent’s body either the 
person moves her body or there is a mere movement of the body (cf. Haddock 2005, p. 
163, Ruben 2007, p. 238). 
  
3.3 A dual conception of bodily movement 
But can it really be that when I simply move my body there is no event of a bodily 
movement that can be explained by natural science? Certainly there is no necessary 
implication of a mere movement, understood as a movement that is involuntary or non-
voluntary, but isn’t every voluntary movement an event that can be conceived of as a 
non-psychological event within a natural scientific framework? At least it seems that, 
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whenever I move, there is something happening which we could also call a movement 
and which can be investigated by natural science. If this is the case, then the analogy to 
a disjunctivism of perception is imperfect on this point. The exclusiveness of the 
disjunction concerning movements is not of quite the same nature as that concerning 
perception.  
In both Haddock’s and Ruben’s versions of a disjunctivism of movements, 
the disjunction is considered to be between, on the one side, movements which are basic 
bodily actions, and, on the other side, mere movements, and it is thought that every time 
we have the one kind it is not possible that we can at the same have a movement of the 
other kind. Haddock says that: ‘Sometimes people move their bodies (they engage in 
physical action), and at other times their bodies move but they do not move them (their 
bodies merely move)’ (Haddock 2005, p. 163). Ruben writes: ‘When Nora moves her 
hand (and not by doing something else), there is in one sense no such event as her 
hand’s moving that occurs. All there is is the action.’ (Ruben 2007, p. 236).  
There is a different way of understanding a disjunctivism of movements, 
however. This is not by claiming the mutual exclusion of the happening of two kinds of 
events, parallel to the idea of a mutual exclusion of two kinds of experiences, one a 
genuine perception and the other a hallucination, but rather by a claim about both the 
mutual irreducibility and the lack of identity between two kinds of events. On this view, 
expressed by Hornsby, the core claim of the disjunctivist is considered to be the thought 
that there is autonomy of two different ways of individuating events (Hornsby 1997, p. 
107).55 The idea is not that every time you pick out an event of the agency-involving 
type it is impossible that an event of the agency-neutral kind occurred simultaneously, 
but rather that by picking out an event of the first kind you are never simultaneously 
picking out a specific event or series of events of the second kind. In short, what is 
denied is a scientific monism of events, which claims the identity of all subjectivity-
involving events, such as perceptions and actions, with events described in natural 
 
 
 
55 Ruben also formulates his disjunctivism in terms of events (Ruben 2007, p. 237), but he only, at least 
explicitly, takes the kind of bodily movements which he identifies with basic actions as being of a 
fundamentally different kind from all other events, whereas for Hornsby, as we shall see, actions are just 
one amongst many phenomena of the kind that must also include perceptual episodes, episodes of 
memory and all the other goings-on we understand by placing them in the space of reason. Haddock 
seems to miss this part of Hornsby’s theory when he presents her thought that actions are events as the 
thought that they are events in Davidson’s sense and so occupy a distinct region of space-time (Haddock 
2005, p. 158). The Davidsonian individuation would require that, for instance, the event of me saying 
‘event’ must have as distinct location, such as the location my tongue and other speech organs occupied 
during my vocalization, and this is what Hornsby resists.            
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scientific terms. Given this understanding we might still express the disjunctivism by 
saying that, whenever there is movement of an agent’s body, either the person moves 
her body or there is a mere movement of the body. This is not to be read as saying that 
whenever a limb movement of the one kind occurs it is impossible that a movement of 
the same limb but of the other kind occurs. Instead it must be understood as a rather 
awkward expression of the idea that whenever we identify a movement this movement 
will be of either one or the other kind.  
 Hornsby regards the division between two kinds of bodily events as an 
instance of the more general division McDowell makes between what is situated in the 
space of reasons and that which is placed in the realm of science (cf. Hornsby 1998, p. 
397, n. 38): ‘Conceiving bodily movements disjunctively, one draws a line between the 
movements that occur when and because people have reason to do things and the 
movements of a neutral ontology’ (Hornsby 1997, pp. 106-107). Both Ruben and 
Haddock, as well as Hornsby, would agree that when I move my body while carrying 
out an intentional, bodily action, such movements are of a different kind than the 
movements of my body that occur if my arm is lifted by a strong wind or the jerk of my 
body that can happen just before I fall asleep or if I lift my paralysed arm. But Haddock 
and Ruben also seem committed to saying that when I perform an intentional action, 
such as waving at a friend, then no movement of my arm of the kind which takes place 
in the contrasting cases occurs. There is only one kind of movement-event taking place 
when I move my hand. We can now ask whether this movement can be given, for 
instance, a neuro-physiological explanation. If the answer is yes, then that very event is 
not an event of a fundamentally different kind than the jerk of my body before sleeping, 
as they can both be identified with events explained in terms that do not presuppose a 
subject of experience. If the answer is no, then we are forced to introduce an asymmetry 
between movements involved in intentional actions and other movements which seem 
purely ideological, as there is no reason why movements of my body should suddenly 
transcend any neuro-physiological understanding just because I start moving. As 
Merleau-Ponty writes, opposing a similar division of labour between a physiological 
and a rational explanation: ‘Un geste de tous les jours ne contient-il pas une série de 
contractions musculaire et d’innervation? Il est donc impossible de limiter l’explication 
physiologique.’ (PP, p. 143). So either we have to give up the disjunctivist account of 
movements or we have to accept a mysterious kind of movements that elude any kind of 
scientific elucidation.  
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The alternative disjunctivist route that I propose consists in saying that 
when I perform an intentional, bodily action, there are not one but two kinds of 
movements taking place. There is the kind of movement that takes place because the 
agent does something for a reason, which we can understand as something that 
contributes to the achieving of a goal of the agent, and thereby understand as 
rationalized. Furthermore there is the kind of movement that can be understood in 
natural scientific terms, which different sciences such as bio-mechanics or neuro-
physiology would individuate according to their specific theoretical framework. These 
fundamentally different kinds of events each have their irreducible form of intelligibility 
and the items on the one side of the line cannot be identified with items at the other side 
of the line. This is, I take it, what is involved in Hornsby’s disjunctivism of movements. 
She comes very close to explicitly stating that whenever I move there are at least two 
movements taking place when she says that a non-disjunctivist assumption often 
underlies physicalist doctrine, in the form of the assumption that ‘there is, as it were, 
just one bodily movement when there is an action’ (Hornsby 1997, p. 107). To say that 
more than one movement of my arm takes place whenever I move my arm might sound 
strange, but the idea is that these movements are of two different kinds. This does not 
imply the absurd idea that the same arm can both move in one direction and at the same 
time and in the same manner move in another direction. When we identify a movement 
of the body as caused by a certain brain event, we are not talking about a movement of a 
kind that essentially involves a living human being, but about movements of the kind 
that can be produced in a decapitated frog with an electric wire.  
Returning to the analogy between action and perception, we can see a new 
dimension of the analogy. The distinction between the two kinds of movement 
occurring when there is an intentional bodily action can be seen as parallel to the two 
kinds of perceptual intake one can talk about whenever a subject perceives. On the one 
side we have the fact that is made manifest to the subject, for instance, the fact that there 
is a red cube in front of the subject. On the other side we can investigate the input at a 
physical or physiological level and attempt to give a natural scientific explanation of 
vision. To say that a person sees that there is a red cube in front of him is to understand 
the phenomenon as placed within the space of reasons. To talk about there being a 
certain brain activity caused by certain stimuli is to talk about phenomena that are 
understood as located in the realm of science. Part of the motivation for the common 
kind assumption concerning perception is exactly that the intake of perception is only 
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considered as events that belong to the sphere of science, which naturally leads to a 
placing of the experience in the brain. It is argued that, if keeping the immediate input 
constant can result in subjectively indistinguishable experiences, then the experiences 
must be independent of any more distant causes. There is a common kind assumption 
concerning the perceptual intake analogue to the common kind assumption concerning 
the output of mind in the shape of bodily movements. The common kind assumption 
concerning perceptual input is the result of the combination of Thesis 1, Experiential 
Naturalism, and Thesis 3, Scientistic Naturalism, of the pentalemma of Mind and 
World. Both of these common kind assumptions can be seen as motivated by the idea 
that the intake and the outcome of the mind must be natural phenomena and 
consequently describable in natural scientific terms. In the case of perception we can 
combine a disjunctivism of appearances with a dual conception of perceptual intake. In 
the case of bodily action I have argued that it makes more sense to talk about a dual 
conception of movement than to talk about a disjunctivism of movement. It is still an 
open question whether we can make sense of the idea of a disjunctivism of trying or 
willing in the case of actions.  
In the cases of both disjunctivism of perception and the dual conception of 
movements, these proposals imply a denial of Scientistic Naturalism, i.e., of the need to 
identify the natural with what can be identified in natural scientific terms. Consequently 
these positions also reject Davidsonian anomalous monism. More specifically they deny 
the second premise of Davidson’s argument, which McDowell calls the fourth dogma of 
Empiricism, namely the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality 
(McDowell 1998g, p. 340). As argued by Hornsby, we find good reasons for denying 
the scientific monism of events implied in this conception of causality in two of 
Davidson’s other theses (Hornsby 1997, pp. 137-140). If we accept the Davidsonian 
idea that that reason-giving explanation is causal explanation and accept the anomalism 
of the mental, then we have good reasons for rejecting a scientific monism of events. A 
reason-giving explanation is irreducible to a purely causal explanation because it makes, 
for instance, intentional actions intelligible by regarding them as at least to some extent 
governed by norms of rationality. We explain intentional actions by citing 
psychological items in the light of which we can see how acting in the way explained 
would have struck the agent as in some way rational (cf. McDowell 1998e, p. 66). Why 
should we believe that the perceptions, the beliefs, the desires and other mental items 
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we might refer to in such explanations are identical to events or states that can be 
identified in purely natural scientific terms? 
 Given that the reason-giving explanation is irreducible to any purely 
causal explanation, the fact that the explanation in question is recognized as causal does 
not provide a reason for a scientific monism. What justifies an acceptance of a reason-
giving explanation is that it reveals a rational pattern in the behaviour. This contrasts 
with what, according to Davidson, justifies acceptance of a singular merely causal 
statement, namely an appeal to generalizations that can serve as evidence for the 
existence of a causal law covering the case at hand. An example of such a generalization 
is: “Windows are fragile, and fragile things tend to break when struck hard enough, 
other conditions being right” (Davidson 1980a, p. 16). In so far as what is distinctive 
about reason-giving explanations is that they explain by appeal to rational norms, in 
contrast to an appeal to knowledge of what tends to happen, the analogy between the 
window case and the case of intentional action seems to break down. Instead of thinking 
that the cases explained by reasons must, just like the window case, be cases that under 
another description fall under a nomological law, it seems more reasonable to conclude 
that the reason-giving explanations are explanations of occurrences that are of a 
fundamentally different kind than the events of natural science. What we get is a general 
dual conception of events.56  
There are still many issues that need to be resolved in order to evaluate the 
full scope of such a dual conception of events.57 One issue is how to specify the non-
Humean notion of causality at play in the dual conception version of the idea that 
reason-giving explanations are causal explanations. Hornsby argues that what we rely 
on in such explanations is a network of empirical interdependencies that are recorded in 
counterfactuals such as, “If she had not wanted X she would not have done Y” 
(Hornsby 1997, pp. 135, 242, n. 5). Such a conception opens up the possibility that 
factors such as “X did not believe that P” can enter into the causal explanation, though 
 
 
 
56McDowell, just like Hornsby, regards it as a prejudice that citing causes can only be explanatory by 
exploiting the possibility that the effects of such causes can also be given a merely causal, nomological 
explanation (McDowell 1998g, p. 335). He further argues that Davidson’s dissolution of the dualism of 
schema and content undermines the reasons for thinking that singular causal relations are unperceivable 
and that we therefore need to understand all causality in terms of regularity (McDowell 1998g, p. 340).       
57 Brewer discusses which notion of supervenience could be combined with what he terms Hornsby’s 
conceptual realism, a realism he takes to reinforce his own disjunctivism of willing (Brewer 1993, p. 
311).  
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they are not identifiable as particulars and the conception seems compatible with a 
general interventionist account of causality (cf. Woodward 2003).  
Another issue is why the dual conception does not inherit the difficulties 
of a Cartesian dualism of substances and is consequently faced with the problem of 
making the first premise of Davidson’s argument for his monism intelligible, i.e., the 
Principle of Causal Interaction between the mental and the physical. A first step in an 
answer to such a concern would be to point out that a distinction between two 
fundamentally different kinds of events does not amount to a dualism of substances (cf. 
Hornsby 1997, p. 76; McDowell 1998g, p. 339). We might still hold on to a version of 
materialism and claim that thinking and acting persons do not consist of anything but 
matter, though they can participate in occurrences that cannot be explained by natural 
science.  
To be sure, the introduction of a dual conception of events does not 
eliminate all motivation for philosophical pondering about how a conception of rational 
agency is compatible with the conception of nature expressed by science. It does 
however strike me as having the advantage of avoiding some fundamental problems that 
arise if we assume Scientistic Naturalism. Putting these further issues aside, I shall now 
turn to a more specific analysis of the way the common kind assumption concerning 
movement risks leading us into a philosophical deadlock of a kind similar to the one 
McDowell found in the unsettling oscillation between Coherentism and the Myth of the 
Given.     
 
3.4 The Standard Causal Account: An alien body 
I think there are good reasons supporting a strong suspicion that, as long as we take an 
agency-neutral notion of bodily movements as our basic notion of bodily movements, 
we end up with an alienating picture of ourselves as agents because we will picture 
ourselves as alienated from our bodies. To support this suspicion, let me begin by 
looking at the Standard Causal account. Such an account will typically identify the 
action with a bodily movement and claim that a movement is an action due to it being 
caused in the right way by a belief-desire pair, an intention or some other mental item (I 
shall term it ‘intention’ in what follows). Whichever intentional bodily action I perform, 
what I actually do merely amounts to moving my body and after that, as Davidson puts 
it, the rest is up to nature (Davidson 1980, p. 59). Nature is here understood as chains of 
causal events placed in the realm of science and the action as just one event amongst 
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others in this realm. The basic problem with this picture is that it seems to undermine 
the very idea of the agent having a capacity to move her body.    
The motivation for identifying our actions with our movements seems to 
be that only these bodily movements are ones that I can perform without first doing 
something else, which in turn causes a further event over which I have no direct control. 
After the performance of my movements, the outcome is so to speak out of my hands. If 
I am sawing down a tree, just as I can only indirectly make the tree fall by sawing the 
trunk, I can only indirectly make the saw move by moving my body appropriately. My 
causal power to move my body, however, must on this conception consist in the causal 
power of my intentions, which to have such powers must be identified with an item that 
can be described in non-intentional terms. The assumption here is that for the intention 
to be causally efficacious it must be possible to redescribe it in natural-scientific terms, 
because only such descriptions are revelatory of the causal nexus amongst the 
phenomena qua natural phenomena (cf. McDowell 2006a, p. 69). The intention is under 
this assumption likely to be identified with a brain event of some kind. As it is assumed 
that a bodily movement qualifies as an action due to its having a mental cause of the 
right kind in the right way and that the bodily movement is intrinsically agency-neutral, 
the intentions presumably are be identified with the brain event that causes the bodily 
movement. But taking the perspective of natural science, the brain-event and the bodily 
movement are, of course, not directly causally linked, it is only due to events in between 
the brain event and the bodily movement that we can succeed in making the arm move.  
The question is now in what sense I can still be claimed to possess a 
capacity to move my arm. If the reason the scope of my action was in the first place 
narrowed down to my bodily movement was that what lies beyond this boundary is 
dependent on happenings that are beyond my control then we might ask if this is not 
also true of my bodily movements. Just like the falling of the tree, my bodily 
movements are caused by some events further upstream the causal flux, say, muscle 
contractions and these in turn by some brain event, so if the most basic action is the one 
we can perform without first making another event happen, it cannot after all be 
identified with our bodily movements. In this picture, my power as an agent must reside 
in the causal power of my intention qua brain event, because all causation must be 
explicable by natural science. The consequence is that my actual power is limited to 
bringing about the most proximate effect of the brain-event, identified as my intention; 
after that the rest is up to nature. This is an alienating picture of how we relate to our 
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own bodies because we have introduced basic actions which I basically do not know 
how to perform. My true sphere of influence is restricted to the immediate environment 
of my brain, which, to use an expression of Hornsby’s, is not the world we know and 
inhabit as agents (Hornsby 2004b, p. 177). I cannot normally make the brain events 
required for the raising of my arm happen except by exactly raising my arm. Unlike the 
case of cutting down the tree, where it makes sense to say that I intend to make the tree 
fall, because I know how to saw the trunk, there is in this picture no capacity of mine 
that I can point to which can make sense of my intention to move my body. If I cannot 
directly move my arm, I must be ascribed knowledge of how to perform a more  basic 
action by means of which I can achieve my aim of moving my arm, otherwise we 
cannot make it intelligible that I can, though indirectly, still intentionally move my arm. 
Such knowledge is exactly what I don’t have, and don’t need to have, of the most 
immediate consequence of certain brain events.  
The grounds for ascribing teleologically basic practical abilities by which 
it makes sense to see my movements as expressive of my agency qua rational agent has 
been undermined. My practical capacity to perform bodily action is divided into a 
rational capacity to intend and the causal efficacy of my intention working at a sub-
personal level over which I have no rational control. We have no means by which we 
can make it intelligible that my intention can actually lead me to get the thing in 
question done. What we are left with is a picture of how I move my body which is like 
the picture of someone who can make a tree fall just by intending it to fall; my body 
becomes an alien object that I can only move from a distance in a sort of telekinetic 
act.58 Even if we could make intelligible the possibility of a creature with a perceptual 
access to the world like ours but whose agency was completely disengaged from bodily 
capacities this would not help make our own embodied position in the world 
comprehensible.59 The point is not that the ascription of telekinetic powers is in itself 
 
 
 
58 This line of argument draws heavily on Hornsby’s way of arguing for the alienating character of the 
picture in question (Hornsby 1998, pp. 388-89, Hornsby 2004a, 2004b). Hornsby borrows the image of 
telekinetic powers from Bernhard Williams account of Descartes’ mind-body problem (Hornsby 1998, p. 
389). McDowell indicates a comparable line of argument against the functionalism of Loar, which drives 
the explanandum of psychological explanations inwards and “away from the agent’s involvement with the 
world” (McDowell 1998g, p. 333). Hornsby pursues a similar argument against a functionalist conception 
of the mental (1997, p. 114).       
59 McDowell seems to allude to the idea of such a creature, when he mentions the idea of an agent who 
has no concept of means by which something can get done, but only possesses the concept-schema 
‘bringing it about..’(McDowell 1998f, p. 170, n. 9). The allusion appears in the context of the discussion 
of the possibility of a completely passive yet rational wolf that I mentioned in the Introduction. 
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contradictory. The point is that if an account of how our motility can be both natural and 
what grounds the way we can perform intentional bodily actions ends up picturing our 
powers as agents as super-natural telekinetic powers then it has failed.  
In the paper in which Davidson claims that nothing stands in the way of 
saying that bodily movements are our most basic actions he in fact admits that such 
movements are not our basic action. Davidson argues that we are always aware of our 
bodily movements under some description. When tying my shoelaces for instance, I am 
aware of moving my fingers in the manner required for me to tie my shoelaces 
(Davidson 1980, p. 53). However he goes further and says that I intentionally do 
something in order to make my fingers move in the required manner. The brain events 
and muscle contractions that cause my finger movements are intentional under the 
description ‘doing with my body whatever it takes to move my fingers in the required 
way’ (cf. Davidson 1980, p. 50).  Such events would according to Davidson be identical 
to my moving my fingers (Davidson 1980, p. 54) and as a consequence we can say that 
it is my moving my fingers that cause the movements of my fingers and these 
movements are not after all my most basic action. This approach does not require that 
we know in any details how our fingers move or which events make them move as we 
can know them under a description that refers to them in terms of their effects.  
We may wonder whether the possibility of such ‘thin’ knowledge of 
precisely the relevant subpersonal events is overlooked in the argument above. To see 
why this is not the case we merely have to ask what good this knowledge could do the 
agent in her practical reasoning about the means to achieve her ends. The action 
described as ‘doing what it takes with my body to move my fingers’ is not under normal 
circumstances a description of an action that is basic from the agent’s point of view qua 
agent. It is not a teleological basic action. If however the ascription of such knowledge 
is to do us any good in making sense of the agent’s ability to move her body, then the 
more basic action cannot just be causally more basic. The action needs to be one the 
agent not only can know about when it takes place but one she knows how to perform. 
Again, the only way we can normally do whatever it takes to move our fingers is by 
moving our fingers. If it is to make sense that moving our fingers can be a teleologically 
basic action we need to possess the ability to move them. In the picture in question such 
an ability can only consist in the ability of our intentions to initiate a causal chain of 
which we normally have no specific knowledge and of which more knowledge would 
be of no practical use to us as agents. 
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3.5 Volitionism: An idle trying 
One diagnosis of the difficulties of the Standard Causal Account would be to say that 
the problem arises because we are attempting to identify our actions with items in the 
world that do not in themselves involve any agency, namely our bodily movements. 
Keeping the premise that such movements are agency-neutral, one answer to the 
difficulties would be to identify our actions with the mental item which sets in motion 
the causal chain instead of pursuing the unpromising attempt to track down the action as 
a specific link in the chain. This is the response of Volitionism or the so called Trying 
theories.60 It has been argued that such a theory is the logical conclusion of a search for 
the locus of agency that begins with the proposal that all we ever do is to move our 
bodies. In what follows I shall present one such argument as put forward by A. D. Smith 
(Smith 1988). 
The guiding intuition behind the claim of identity of movements and 
action is that when, for instance, I switch on the light, all I need to do is to move my 
finger in the appropriate way. The description of my action as a turning on of the light 
cannot be a description that captures an essential feature of what I do in that situation, 
since for all I do the light might as well not have come on. A power cut, for instance, 
might have prevented my action from being a turning on of the light. The guiding 
intuition can be spelled out as the assumption that in order for a description of an action 
to be of an essential feature of the event qua action the truth of the description must be 
independent of any conditions which are not entirely dependent on the activity of the 
agent (Smith 1988, p. 405).61 The search for an essential description of the action which 
is agency-revealing62, is tantamount to a search for the causally most basic description 
of an action. To see this we first have to gain a more precise understanding of the notion 
of causally basicness.  
We can define the causally most basic description of an action via the 
notion of an indicated event (cf. Smith 1988, p. 404). An indicated event is an event that 
 
 
 
60 I shall focus on the Trying-Theories in the following. The Trying-Theories belong to the group of 
theories sometimes referred to as New Volitionism. Since O’Shaughnessy’s paper Trying (as the mental 
“pineal gland”) from 1973 a number of writers have revived the volitional account, for an overview see 
Grünbaum (2008a).   
61 We need the formulation via double negation (“independent of factors not dependent on”) in order to 
avoid that dependence on physical events that are identical to or on which the intention supervenes will be 
included amongst the dependencies that rule out an action-characterization as essential. Such exclusion 
would leave us requiring a substance-dualism to substantiate any characterizations as essential.           
62 We need the term “Agency-revealing description” because if the action is identified with a certain 
physical event, there will also be essential descriptions not expressive of agency.  
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is both semantically indicated by an action description and agency-neutral. An example: 
‘She pushes the boat’ is a transitive action description that contains the indicated event 
characterized by the intransitive expression ‘the movement of the boat’. The truth of a 
statement about the happening of a semantically-indicated event is entailed by the action 
description containing the event, though not all statements that follow from such 
descriptions will be about the indicated events.63 We can now define a causally non-
basic description: 
 
Definition of causally non-basic action descriptions 
A description D of an action is non-basic if an only if there is some (true) description 
D1 of that action such the indicated event of D1 caused the indicated event of D 
 
The description ‘She pushes the boat’ is accordingly non-basic. The action of pushing 
can also be described by ‘She moves her body’ and this description contains the 
indicated event movements of her body which describes the event causing the event of 
the movements of the boat indicated by the action description ‘she pushes the boat’. We 
can now define a basic action description in terms of the foregoing definition: 
 
Definition of causally basic action descriptions 
A description D of an action is basic if and only if there is no such description D1.  
 
The search for an essential characterization of actions the truth of which is independent 
of any factors that are not entirely dependent on the activity of the agent can now be 
recognized as the search for a causally basic description. A non-basic description is a 
description in terms of causal consequences and as such it will always rely on the 
obtaining of certain further facts independent of the activity of the agent. My switching 
on of the light depends on the power supply. In general, all effects of what my action 
are in this picture, as Smith has it, ´”mere events” fully accounted for by the laws of 
                                                 
 
 
63 The term ‘semantical indication’ is used here in order to separate the kind of containment in question 
from logical implication (formal or material) (cf. Smith 1988, p. 404, n. 5, see also Enç 2003, p. 
9).Usually a non-basic action description will entail statements about more events than the one indicated 
in the description. I follow Hornsby and Smith in taking the notion to be sufficiently clear to make the 
relevant point (cf. Hornsby 1980, p. 70).      
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nature and antecedent conditions that can be understood purely physically’ (Smith 1988, 
p. 406).  
The drift we saw in Davidson’s agency-paper can now be seen as a first 
step in the interiorization of the essentially agency-involving event. The characterization 
‘doing with my body whatever it takes to make my fingers move’ cannot be maintained 
as a basic description if it is thought of as a description of certain cerebral events and 
muscle contractions. Just as a power failure might hinder the turning on of the light we 
can imagine a sudden, unanticipated paralysis which sets in just when the agent is about 
to move her finger and cuts of the efferent signals. The logical consequence is that there 
must be a more basic description, which could be given the admittedly odd phrasing,   ‘I 
did what I could to do with my body whatever it takes to make my finger move’. The 
claim of the Trying-theorist is now that a better phrasing of a description which is 
causally basic is simply to say: ‘I tried to move my finger’. The trying-theorist will 
claim that such a description has no semantically indicated event, because it does not 
follow from the statement that there was a movement of my finger. According to the 
definitions above we have found the causally most basic description and thereby located 
an event that is essentially agency-involving. We now have the conclusion that the 
mental trying that initiates the bodily movement is the event which should be identified 
as our action With Smith’s radicalized version of Davidson’s thesis the conclusion 
sounds: ‘all we ever do is try, the rest is up to nature’ (Smith 1988, p. 421).  
 This interiorization of the action cannot, however, overcome the 
fundamental difficulty of the Standard Causal Account which was the incompatibility 
between what the actual power of the agent amounts to in this picture and the 
ascriptions of intentions. In the account of the Trying theory, the power of the agent is 
no longer to be identified with the causal power of the intention or the trying, because 
even this power relies on something which is beyond the activity of the agent. In this 
picture, the agent still has no hold on the ability of her body to move. By placing the 
realm of agency within the realm of the mental, the Trying theorist argues that she can 
avoid a reduction of agency to a causal relation between two in themselves passive 
occurrences. There is a question about whether the arguments for the isolation of the 
realm of agency commit the theory to the claim that in all actions we are trying to move 
our body. But even if the Trying theory is entitled to hold on to the idea that what we try 
can be something which is at a distance from our bodily movements, the basic problem 
remains. If we ascribe tryings to the agent with the content  ‘to push the boat’, such a 
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trying cannot make sense unless the agent actually has a capacity to push, but such a 
bodily capacity of the agent is not to be found anywhere in this picture. The agent is 
merely ascribed the capacity to try, and whether this mental trying actually results in the 
intended result is entirely up to the world. With regard to the success or failure of our 
tryings, we are left out of the picture.  
The interiorization of the agent’s practical capacities can be seen as the 
ultimate consequence of the idea that we need to eliminate any reliance on luck and 
have to establish our agency in a sphere under our absolute control. An idea which, as 
McDowell points out, is parallel to the idea that in order to achieve a cognitive contact 
with the world we need a starting point which we can establish ‘by our own unaided 
resources, without needing the world to do us favours’ (McDowell 1998c, p. 396). The 
paradoxical consequence is that even the most minimal success in the shape of a single 
causal consequence of what we do will be nothing but a stroke of luck.  
How are we to make it intelligible that we have the ability to perform 
bodily intentional actions, if all we have as agents is what we might call a mere capacity 
(cf. Brewer 1993, p. 308), the exercise of which is completely independent of any actual 
success? The situation is similar to the situation of a conjunctivist position concerning 
perception, which claims that the exercise of the ability to know how things appear to 
one can be made intelligible independently of any reference to a possible exercise of a 
capacity to tell how things actually are by having a perceptual appearance. The Trying-
Theory must claim that what makes a mere trying a possible way of achieving 
something in the world is its conjunction with the merely causal capacities of the body. 
The trying is conceived as autonomous in relation to any actual bodily movements and 
the movements are conceived as essentially agency-neutral occurrences. Now it can 
either be said that a trying is only an intentional action in case it is minimally successful 
or it can be said that all tryings constitute intentional actions. The consequence of the 
first position is that no action is essentially an action as it could have been a mere trying 
(cf. Smith 1988, p. 413). The consequence of the latter position is that an intentional 
bodily action such as raising one’s arm does not essentially involve any movements of 
one’s arm, i.e. numerically the same action could have occurred without being 
accompanied by the movement (cf. Smith 1988, p. 421, n. 22). Independently of which 
position is chosen the basic problem is the same. The problem is that we are supposed to 
construct something that is recognizable as basic practical capacities out of the 
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conjunction of mere tryings and mere causal relations between parts of the body as 
understood by natural science.  
The problem is to understand how my trying to do a specific thing can turn 
out to actually make that thing happen, if the trying is only externally related to the parts 
of my body that physically surround my brain. There is nothing in my trying qua trying, 
i.e. in the content of the trying that can help explain how it can set exactly the needed 
neuro-physiological processes in motion. If we accept the thesis of the Anomalism of 
the Mental, then there can be no psycho-physical laws which we can rely on in order to 
build up our confidence in our capacity to get things done by trying. Even if such laws 
were possible they would not usually be available to the agent. The agent’s 
teleologically basic practical concepts and her means-end knowledge would be removed 
from what really constitutes her practical capacities and it would from her perspective 
be purely accidental that her basic tryings could make what she strives for happen.  
Of course we normally do experience things to go our way again and 
again when it comes to our teleologically most basic actions. However, the problem is 
how we can, within the framework in question, make it intelligible that such successful 
intentional bodily actions are even possible. From within this theoretical perspective we 
seem to be forced to declare that in acting we simply rely on pure luck, alternatively we 
might appeal to some benevolent super-natural power that in ways unknown to us 
ensures our successes.  
As Hornsby points out Hume raised an apposite question concerning the 
consequences of what is in effect a scientific monism of bodily movements (Hornsby 
2004b, p. 176): 
 
How indeed can we be conscious of a power to move our limbs when 
we have no such power, but only that to move certain animal spirits 
which, though they produce at last the motion of limbs, yet operate in 
such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension? (Hume 1748/ 
2000, §7, pt. I). 
 
Here the basic problem of the agency-neutral conception of bodily motility is 
pinpointed. The problem is that we take the power to move out of the hands of the agent 
when we think it can be left up to science to explain the motility that is a necessary 
ingredient in our concept of bodily actions. If we cannot make sense of our possession 
of basic practical capacities as bodily we risk undermining the very idea that we can try 
or intend to perform bodily actions. We have violated the intuitive constraint on 
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ascriptions of intention that I formulated as Minimal Pragmatism. In Hornsby’s words 
we have created a picture of ourselves as alienated from our bodies in a way that is 
unthinkable (Hornsby 2004b, p. 174)   
It does not make sense to say that someone intentionally won the lottery. If 
asked what I am doing I might say that I am trying to win the lottery again, but this only 
makes sense because I can intentionally buy a ticket. Something that happens entirely 
by chance cannot be something I can intend to do or something I can try to do in the 
sense of the Trying-Theory (cf. Smith 1988, p. 411). In the picture of the Trying-Theory 
it seems that exactly because all we have as agents are mere capacities we must rely 
entirely on luck when it comes to the execution of actions. The consequence is that the 
residual idea that at least we can try becomes obscure. If it is not intelligible how at least 
sometimes trying can be our getting something done in the world we seem to loose track 
of ourselves as even possible agents in the world.  
The Trying-Theory’s withdrawel of the locus of agency from any actual 
consequences runs parallel with the interiorization of belief justification that 
Coherentism takes to be the correct response to the revelation of the Myth of the Given. 
In the case of Coherentism the world is left out of the picture when it comes to the 
justification of our beliefs, because it is realized that no merely causal ancestor of our 
belief can serve as anything but exculpation. In the case of the Trying Theory the agent 
is left out of the picture when it comes to anything that happens beyond his inner trying, 
because it is realized that merely having a mental item as a causal ancestor is not 
enough to make the bodily movement anything but a mere happening.  On this picture 
our tryings will remain in Anscombe’s happy phrasing ‘a bombination in a vacuum’ 
(Anscombe 2000, p. 52), an idling analogue to the spinning in the void of Coherentism. 
For the proponent of the Standard Causal Account this will be taken as evidence that we 
need to identify the action with something external to the mental item in order to secure 
the power of the agent to make something happen in the world, but as we have already 
seen, the prospects of such relocation do not seem any more promising.     
 The point of the critique above is not just that we have an actual power to 
make things happen in the world which is denied by the Trying theory, just as the point 
of the critique of Coherentism is not that we are denied a justification via perception 
which we actually have. The point is that if we do not allow for the possibility of such a 
bodily power, we undermine the very idea of ourselves as intentional, bodily agents; we 
lose our grip on the notion of intending or willing something. At this fundamental level, 
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the critique of both the Standard Causal Account and the Trying theory is the same, just 
as is the case with the critique of Coherentism and the Myth of the Given. In the picture 
of perceptual intake that shapes the debate between the Myth of the Given and 
Coherentism, our perception can, as McDowell, agreeing with Dennett, puts it, at best 
be a sort of premonition (MW, p. 12, 1998h, p. 342). At best, because even to talk about 
a premonition requires that we can make sense of the idea that the premonition has 
representational content, and this is precisely what McDowell is contesting. By analogy 
McDowell says that our intentions can at best be an intending directed at our bodies as 
from a distance; at best, because really we are losing our grip on the very notion of 
willing once the body is put at a distance from our intentions (MW, p. 91).      
 I have tried to spell out the way the common kind assumption concerning 
movements undermines the very idea of bodily agency by exposing it as leaving us at 
the most with a picture of the agent as possessing a sort of telekinetic ability to move 
her body. To do so I have tried to show how a dialectic between the Standard Causal 
Account and Trying theory is the result of the common kind assumption.64 So far I have 
only marginally discussed the other side of the dual common kind assumption 
concerning action, namely the common kind assumption concerning the mental item 
involved in bodily actions. Therefore it is still an open question to what extent the kind 
of movement-disjunctivism I have been putting forward is committed to what has been 
called a disjunctivism of tryings, and furthermore if a disjunctivism of tryings is 
committed to a dual conception of bodily movements. 
 
3.6 A disjunctivism of trying 
The two common kind assumptions concerning actions serve to support one another, but 
so far I have left it an open question to what extent an undermining of the one 
necessarily leads to the collapse of the other. In fact we do find authors arguing in 
favour of a kind of disjunctivism of trying combined with the common kind assumption 
concerning movement. Further we shall see that Hornsby, after her rejection of such a 
common kind assumption, maintains that we need a uniform conception of trying. I 
have already argued against a Trying Theory based on the common kind assumption 
 
 
 
64 I have not touched upon why a Complex Theory of Action, which identifies the action with a complex 
of both a mental and bodily event, should meet similar difficulties given the common kind assumption 
concerning movements. To come closer to establishing the thesis that it is in fact the common kind 
assumption which is the source of the problem, such a discussion would be needed.    
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concerning movement, and I shall argue that the attempt to supplement such theories 
with a kind of disjunctivism of trying cannot compensate for the fundamental problems 
of such theories. Furthermore I shall argue that Hornsby’s attempt to distance her dual 
conception of movement from a disjunctivism of trying is not convincing and that even 
if we accept her arguments we still have reasons to uphold a disjunctivism of trying. In 
sum I argue that the dual conception of movements supports an embodied account of 
minimally successful tryings and thereby what we can call a disjunctive account of 
trying. 
 As we saw above, an Argument from Sudden Paralysis functions as an 
analogue to the Argument from Hallucination in the attempt to show that our tryings 
can be isolated as inner autonomous mental events. The argument begins with the claim 
that in such cases of total failure we must admit that the agent is still trying to move his 
hand, just as the Argument from Hallucination starts out by establishing that in the case 
of an indistinguishable hallucinatory experience such an experience must be counted as 
a perceptual appearance. In order to establish that we can correctly describe all instances 
of intentional actions as instances of tryings, the Trying Theory needs a further 
argument, which is often given in the shape of a certain Gricean argument.  
Under many circumstances, it would seem odd for an agent to answer an 
Anscombian ‘Why?’ question with ‘I am trying to X’. Such an answer seems 
appropriate in cases where we are not certain that we can succeed but not in cases where 
we can skilfully and without any particular effort perform a habitual action, such as 
tying our shoelaces. The Gricean argument is an argument to the effect that we are 
entitled to the claim that all intentional actions can be re-described in terms of trying, 
and furthermore that such descriptions refer to facts the obtaining of which is 
independent of whether an utterance of the description would be pragmatically 
inappropriate.65 In short the argument is the following. In all cases of intentional action 
we can imagine a spectator who has reasons to believe that the agent will not succeed 
and for whom it is therefore perfectly appropriate to state that the agent is going to or is 
already trying to X. The claim is now that, even in cases where the spectator is wrong in 
her predictions and the action is carried out without any trouble, she can still maintain 
 
 
 
65 The argument is found in Grice (1989 [1967], ch. 1). Similar arguments are found in several authors 
including O’Shaughnessy (1973), Hornsby (1980, ch. 3), McGinn (1982, ch. 5) and Smith (1988, p. 410). 
For a survey of further literature dealing with the argument see Grünbaum (2008, p. 69, n. 1). 
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that at least she knew that the agent would try to X. It is further claimed that what the 
spectator possessed was true knowledge about the agent that could be possessed even by 
a spectator or the agent herself who did not have any doubts concerning the agent’s 
execution or her intention. Trying-statements are claimed to be parallel with statements 
like, ‘The Prime Minister is not high on drugs today’. Such a statement does carry the 
pragmatic implication that the prime minister is sometimes high on drugs, but even if he 
never is, the statement would still be true.  
The Gricean argument only establishes that in each case where an agent is 
intentionally X-ing we can truthfully say that the agent is trying to X. As such the 
argument does not carry the metaphysical weight that the Trying Theory attempts to lift, 
namely that what we identify in each case is a movement-independent inner mental 
event (cf. Grünbaum 2008a, p. 69). The Gricean argument is the counterpart of an 
argument to the effect that even in cases of veridical perception it makes sense to say 
that the perceiver has an appearance of things being thus and so, though the perceiver 
might not herself doubt that she is actually seeing that things are thus and so. 
Recognition of such omni-applicability of appearance descriptions is nothing but 
recognition of the fact that perception is not flawless. Similarly the corresponding the 
Gricean argument trades on the fact that we only have limited powers as agents and 
therefore can never ultimately free ourselves of any risk of failure. The fact that in each 
case of success it is conceivable that we could have failed does not show that what we 
actually did only amounts to what we would have done had we failed. To reach such a 
conclusion we need to assume an agency-neutral conception of the bodily movements 
involved in the minimally successful trying in order to drive back the trying into the 
brain. As we saw above, Smith’s version of the Argument from Total Failure is 
explicitly worked out under the presumption that movements are agency-neutral. Given 
the cogency of the Gricean argument and the Common Kind Assumption, the Argument 
from Sudden Paralysis could appear to take us some distance towards establishing the 
conclusion that all we ever do is try and that such trying is independent of any bodily 
movement.    
However, the Argument from Sudden Paralysis cannot, in contrast to the 
Argument from Hallucination, be based on the idea of subjective indistinguishability, 
which in the case of trying should exist between the ordinary trying and the trying of the 
unsuspecting subject who is overcome with sudden paralysis the instant she tries. As 
Smith admits, the agent who is paralysed will not try in the same way an un-paralysed 
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person would have tried as she will immediately become aware of her unusual situation 
(Smith 1988, p. 407). If the trying which supposedly causes our bodily movements 
when we are intentionally acting is identified with the mental occurrence isolated in the 
case of sudden paralysis, the Trying Theory would leave the agent absurdly superfluous 
during the actual carrying out of the movement. The agent would only be able to control 
the movement by intervening with a new trying on the basis of her proprioceptive or 
exteroceptive feedback concerning the course of the movement. Such a picture of our 
intentional bodily actions seems incapable of capturing the phenomenology of 
performing teleologically basic actions, such as grasping a cup, in which we have a 
continuous sense of agency during the performance.66   
Smith suggests that the Argument of Sudden Paralysis can be 
supplemented by extending the thought experiment. In the extended scenario, the 
manipulative neuro-scientist not only hinders the actual movement, she also stimulates 
the brain of the agent directly so that the subject will enjoy the same kind of feedback 
she would have enjoyed had she actually moved her hand (cf. Smith 1988, p. 408).67 
We can take the idea one step further and at least pretend that we can make sense of the 
scenario where our brain is placed in a vat and hooked up so as to give us the 
impression of perceiving and acting in a world indistinguishable from our present world 
(cf. Dokic 1993, p. 258). It is at this point that the possibility of version Volitionism 
shows up, which tries to accommodate the idea that our most basic tryings must be 
world-involving. I shall present two such attempts and argue that they remain trapped in 
what we might call the Myth of the Fiat, i.e., the idea that we can make sense of the 
mind’s capacity to intend, try or will without any reference to a rational, bodily capacity 
to move.  
 
 
 
66 Grünbaum argues that the Argument from Total Failure is in even worse trouble as it cannot, in the 
case of paralysis, give content to a distinction between idle trying wishing, such as a “basic trying” to 
make one’s ear point in the direction of a sound, and effectively trying to move but with no effect. 
Consequently the theory loses any grip on the notion of trying as this notion was supposed to be based on 
the intelligibility of the trying in the case of the paralysis (Grünbaum 2008a, pp. 69-73). I think this is 
correct and that it expresses the fact that we cannot make sense of the idea of a trying without 
presupposing a capacity to move that is inherently bodily, if we try to do so Minimal Pragmatism is 
undermined. 
67 Apart from such thought experiments, some authors refer to the case of Landry’s patient, described by 
James in order to establish the movement independence of the trying (Hornsby 1980, pp. 40-44, Hornsby 
1998, p. 398) and to show the intention in action/experience of acting (Searle 1983, p. 89). I take 
Grünbaum to have shown that this use of the pathological case is highly dubious and stands in direct 
opposition to the use James himself makes of it (cf. Grünbaum 2006, pp. 61-67, 2008a, pp.74-79). 
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Smith makes the suggestion that we could directly transfer the idea of 
object-dependent content of demonstrative thoughts and to regard tryings as 
demonstratively directed towards the relevant body parts. The idea would be that tryings 
might involve a de re or singular reference to relevant parts of the body; hence tryings 
qua subjective experiences would be object-involving (Smith 1988, pp. 419-420). The 
upshot of this thesis would be that a trying to lift my left arm in the absence of the arm 
would be of a fundamentally different kind than a normal trying as it would be of a kind 
that does not essentially depend on the existence of the arm targeted by the trying. The 
volitional life of the imagined brain in a vat would merely appear to involve a body, 
hence it would be of a fundamentally different kind than the practical life of a normal 
person. In this picture we would need a disjunctive account of tryings in order to 
accommodate the possibility of the brain in a vat scenario.  
Smith presents this relational account of trying in order to show that his 
Trying Theory can repudiate the accusation of inheriting unacceptable features of 
Cartesianism. I think the fundamental problem of a Cartesian theory of action is the 
problem I displayed above, i.e., the need to project a telekinetic power into the mind 
because the natural motility of the body is prevented from entering the precincts of our 
rational practical capacity. It is the Cartesian conception of the body that is the real 
hurdle and this is not overcome by forming tryings in the image of the relational 
account of perception. Precisely because the active nature of a bodily action is said to 
devolve wholly from the mental trying (cf. Smith 1988, p. 418) and never from any 
intrinsically bodily capacity it is of no help to make the content of the trying depend on 
the existence of body parts. On the contrary, it simply underlines the fundamental 
problem of making it intelligible how a body that can be merely causally affected can 
nevertheless obey the fiat of the mind spoken in conceptual terms. The relational 
account does not make the tie between the agent and its body more intimate than a 
captain is tied to his ship; if the ship sinks the captain goes down with it or he ceases to 
be the captain. All the relational account secures is that a trying can have the body in 
view, in the same way we can have a matchbox in view, but the fact that it is possible to 
stare at an object does not explain how we can move it.68 It is still assumed that we can 
 
 
 
68 The fact the relational account of trying still faces what I have diagnosed as the transcendental problem 
of agency confirms that this problem is a self-standing problem vis-à-vis the transcendental problem of 
perception. 
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make the essence of the active part of our mind intelligible independently of any 
reference to an ability to actually move. Our practical capacity to try is supposed to be 
dependent only on the existence of a body that the agent might never move though she 
is given the impression that she does so. By conjoining such a capacity with a body as 
inanimate as that of decerebrated frog we are supposed to make it intelligible how 
intentional bodily action is possible. I fail to see how this could work without magic. 
The fact that it is possible to paralyse an agent by intervening at a neurological level 
does not mean that the power of the agent must be found at an earlier stage in the causal 
chain that was interrupted. It merely goes to show that our power as agents depends on 
empirical contingencies and that we are not omnipotent. 
Because of the alleged possibility of a brain in a vat with a subjective, 
volitional life, Dokic argues that the content of our body-directed tryings cannot depend 
on any particular body. He maintains that a trying is a mode of experience that depends 
on the existence of some exterior physical reality, because we cannot make sense of the 
mind as producing the kinaesthetic and exteroceptive sensations without any causal 
intermediary, i.e., without any feedback mechanism (Dokic 1992, p. 256). He further 
argues that the tryings of such a disembodied brain would not constitute intentional 
actions because the causal consequences would not be intentional under any 
descriptions. Nevertheless the agent is said to voluntarily produce some change in 
exterior reality and the trying is said to have a definite subjective contour and a 
determinate content (Dokic 1992, pp. 259-260). I think this picture of our tryings faces 
much the same problem as does the idea of a concept of perceptual appearances that are 
supposed to be only externally related to reality. 
Dokic asks if his view does not contradict the commonly recognized 
supposition according to which the content of the will is limited to what the agent is 
capable of doing. In other words, can the account accommodate Minimal Pragmatism? 
Dokic’s tentative answer is that it might be sufficient that there be some possible world 
in which the brain in the vat would have the capacity to raise the arm for it to be 
recognizable as a subject that can try to raise the arm (Dokic 1993, p. 260). I don’t think 
this will work. We are trying to imagine what it is to have the capacity to move one’s 
arm by saying that we can understand what that means by appeal to the capacity to have 
the capacity to move a body, what Dokic terms a second-order capacity. This seems 
merely to distract us from the real problem, which is to make sense of our actual 
capacity to move. We are trying to reconstruct our conception of our capacity to 
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perform bodily actions via the notion of a capacity that is imagined to be in its agency-
involving essence independent of any actual capacity to move and via the notion of an 
agency-neutral body. So long as this is our starting point I think we will presuppose 
what we are trying to explain because we can only make sense of our trying to move in 
terms of what we do, when we actually do move. 
 Both Smith’s and Dokic, in their proposals for a conception of trying as 
world-involving, assume that all our bodily actions have their most basic description at 
the bodily level. Our basic trying is always a trying to move our body. This does not sit 
well with how we actually perform our intentional bodily actions. When I am typing, 
my attention is directed towards the screen and what I write. From my perspective the 
most basic action I perform is to write whatever I write and not to move my fingers so 
as to write the sentence I want to write. As Anscombe said, the description of what I am 
doing with which I am most familiar, is most often at a distance from the details of my 
movements (Anscombe 2000, p. 54). I do not need to employ any means-end 
knowledge in order to type a specific word or sentence, because I possess the acquired 
skill of typing.  
When the Trying Theory identifies our most basic actions as body-specific 
tryings this is no coincidence. Given the agency-neutral conception of bodily 
movements it becomes hard to conceive how the trying should be able to leap over the 
body and simply make things happen in the world. To compensate for the fact that the 
agent is distanced from its own bodily motility, the body must be moved closer to the 
subject, but the move comes too late. If we give up the common kind assumption 
concerning movements we will be able see how it is possible that our teleologically 
most basic actions can be at a distance from the details of our bodily movements. Once 
this is allowed we also lose the motivation for the interiorization of our tryings. Instead 
we can see how a relational view of tryings more congenial with the relational view of 
perception is available. In fact such a relational view is hinted at when McDowell 
writes:  
 
If seen objects (say) are not on the far side of an ‘input’ interface 
between mind and world, there is, to say the least, no point in trying to 
represent objects acted on – which may, of course, be the same objects 
– as lying on the far side of an ‘output’ interface. (McDowell 1998g, 
p. 358)   
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We can employ the idea of the perceptually-based de re demonstrative reference and 
take the content of our tryings to be object-dependent and the tryings to be object-
involving. We can now accommodate the fact that in most of our doings we are not 
directed towards our own body but towards objects in our environment. We rarely, as in 
the thought experiments of the Trying Theory, simply try to move our body. Such 
actions performed in abstraction from the environment for the most part become 
relevant if we have experienced a breakdown in our capacity to move and need to test it 
or to rehabilitate our strength, or possibly if we participate in neuro-physiological 
experiments.  
On the basis of a dual conception of movements we can propose that we 
think of certain bodily activities as constitutive of one’s trying. When I reach out for my 
coffee cup, this action is not seen as a coming together of two notionally separable 
events; my trying to grasp the cup plus the bodily movement this trying sets in motion. 
There might be no previous mental event, there is simply my reaching out for the coffee 
as a bodily activity, and if we decide to use the term ‘trying’, then this bodily activity is 
nothing but my trying to grasp the cup. To describe what I do when I reach out as a 
trying to grasp the cup is to describe the bodily activity with an emphasis on the 
subjective, striving nature of the bodily occurrences.  
We are now in a position where we can fully acknowledge that in order to 
make sense of a person as a person who can be said to try to lift her arm we need to see 
her as having the bodily capacity to move her arm upwards. Because we are not 
restricted by the agency-neutral conception of the physical body we do not need to 
regard our bodily motility as separate from our rational capacity to form intention and to 
try to do something. Instead we can regard our motility as constitutive of our power as 
rational agents and we can regard our motility as shaped by our practical concepts. If we 
regard our motility as permeated with practical concepts we can regard our tryings as 
ways of engaging in the actual performance of teleologically basic actions. It is this 
conception of motility as permeated with teleologically basic capacities of a practical, 
conceptual nature which is the thesis of embodied conceptualism concerning bodily 
agency, i.e. the thesis I introduced as Thesis (C) in the introduction. We can now, with 
Hornsby, say that that the notion of movements that are only intelligible within the 
space of reasons, which forms the basic idea of the dual conception of movement, is the 
concept of the kind of movements that occur when we are trying to do something:  
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A movement, one might say, is something that occurs in any normal 
case of an unparalyzed person who tries to do something that requires 
her to move her body. (Hornsby 1997, p. 101). 
 
The account is of course circular in the sense that it is claimed that we can only make 
sense of our capacity to try by reference to our bodily capacity to move in the ways 
required in order to achieve what we are trying to do achieve. Further it is claimed that 
we can only make sense of our motility and our movements by reference to our capacity 
to form intentions and perform the teleologically basic actions that we, following the 
Gricean argument, might also describe as tryings. The interdependence revealed by the 
circularity is like the interdependence between our capacity to rationally form empirical 
beliefs and our capacity to have the world presented to us through our sensibility that is 
our ability to have appearances with conceptual content. The hope is that the need to 
give a reductive analysis is no longer urgent once we see that the idea of such an 
analysis rests on the assumption that movements must be agency-neutral and that this 
assumption makes it very hard to reclaim our notion of ourselves as bodily agents in the 
world. 
If we accept the idea of a trying that occurs in the case of sudden paralysis 
or even in the brain in a vat scenario we can now see how a disjunctivism of tryings 
congenial with the disjunctivism of appearances is possible. We now have a 
disjunctivism of trying which states that whenever there is a trying it is either an idle 
trying, in which the agent is not involved in any moving of her body or it is an 
embodied trying, which can be more or less successful but which essentially involves 
the agent actively moving. In contrast to the disjunctivism of Smith this disjunctivism 
implies a dual conception of movement. What constitutes the embodied nature of the 
tryings is not just the presence of the body as an object of demonstrative reference; 
rather it is the bodily activity itself which is regarded as constitutive for the trying.69 We 
may say that the trying is expressed in the bodily movement just like the meaning of a 
sentence is expressed in the spoken words. If we conceive bodily movements as 
essentially agency-neutral they cannot constitute expressive behaviour anymore than 
 
 
 
69 A similar disjunctivism of trying has been argued by Brewer (1993), Hurley (1998, see p. 272) and 
Grünbaum (2006, see p. 70). Dokic considers the idea but dismisses it in his 1992 paper (see p. 259). In a 
later paper he argues for a conception of bodily movements as essentially agency-involving and suggest 
that such a conception is compatible with a disjunctivist account of trying (Dokic 2003, p. 335, n. 11). In 
his critique of the internalism of Trying-Theories Gjelsvik in effect proposes a disjunctivist account of 
trying (Gjelsvik 1990, p. 50, n. 15). 
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can the behaviour of the planets on the sky (cf. McDowell 1998b, p. 393). If we can 
conceive of bodily movements as essentially agency-involving, we can regard our 
tryings as expressed in the movements. When I try to grasp a cup my trying is expressed 
in the movement and we can say that it is the movement of my hand that is directed 
towards the cup and not some inner mental trying. To put it with an image borrowed 
from Merleau-Ponty: the hands of a mature human being are like an ‘exterior brain of 
the human’ (PP, 365).70  
 
3.7 The anomaly of Hornsby’s account 
We have seen how an undermining of the common kind assumption concerning bodily 
movements can pave the way for a disjunctive conception of tryings, and that such a 
disjunctivism, in contrast to that of Smith, seems to imply the dual conception of 
movement. Hornsby, however, argues that her disjunctive conception of movements, 
what I term a dual conception, does not imply a disjunctivism of trying. In a response to 
Brewer’s disjunctivism of willing, she argues that a general disjunctive conception of 
tryings seems implausible (Hornsby 1998, p. 399). She argues that we cannot in general 
take the distinction between successful tryings and unsuccessful tryings to be a 
distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of items. She uses the following 
example: If a typist is trying to type ‘£’, but because of a reassignment of the keys 
instead types ‘@’ then on a general disjunctivist account one would be forced to say 
that her moving her finger is of a fundamentally different kind than it would have been 
if no reassignment had taken place. The moving of her finger is in both cases her trying 
to type ‘£’, and it seems more than natural to think that the two tryings are of the same 
kind whatever the outcome. Such a case, however, does not as such count against 
Brewer’s version of the Trying disjunctivism. The successful and the unsuccessful 
moving of the hand will both count as cases of trying or willing that fall under the 
second disjunct of my formulation of the Trying disjunctivism above. In both cases we 
are dealing with tryings that essentially are cases of actively moving. The contrast in 
Brewer’s disjunctivism as well as the one I formulated above is not between successful 
and unsuccessful tryings in general but between those that are cases of actively moving 
 
 
 
70 Merleau-Ponty attributes the image to Kant. It would take further work to show that the notion of 
expression can be helpful in articulating how embodied conceptualism can make bodily agency 
intelligible. A useful starting point for such work could be Taylor’s ‘Action as an expression of trying’ 
(1979). 
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and those that are complete failures to lift even a finger: ‘Willing bodily movement is 
either actively moving or trying and failing’. (Brewer 1993, p. 311). 
 I think Brewer’s formulation of disjunctivism indicates the real force of 
Hornsby’s argument. The description ‘trying and failing’ of course covers also the case 
of typing ‘@’ instead of ‘£’. Hornsby is not here providing a counterexample but 
attempts to drive the trying disjunctivist ad absurdum. The premise of her argument is 
that we have a perfectly sensible and uniform conception of what it means that a trying 
is successful or unsuccessful: A trying to do something is successful if it results in an 
event the occurrence of which suffices for the thing’s having been done and it is 
unsuccessful if it does not (cf. Hornsby 1997, p. 96, see also Hornsby 1980, p. 44). 
Given such a uniform conception, what one says about the nature of a trying that fails 
ought to carry over to all failed tryings, and the absurd result is that, for instance, my 
trying to score in basketball would have to wait for the ball to finish its journey to the 
hoop for the determination as to which fundamental kind of trying it was (cf. Grünbaum 
2006, p. 71). This shows that it is not advisable to take the determinables of the 
determinate ‘trying’ or ‘willing’ to be on the one hand ‘actively moving’ and on the 
other hand ‘trying and failing’, because actively moving can be trying and failing. I 
think, however, that we can capture a disjunctive contrast if, as I did above, we use the 
term ‘idle trying’ instead of the term ‘trying and failing’ to characterize a possible case 
where a subject tries to do something but fails because she does not even make a single 
movement.  
Hornsby maintains the two main theses of her early book, namely that all 
intentional actions are tryings and that when tryings are actions they cause bodily 
movements. She does, however, go back on her early claim that the trying takes place 
on the inside of the body (cf. Hornsby 1998, p. 389, n. 29) and she further argues that 
the movements may ‘participate in all of the colours of the actions that cause them’ 
(Hornsby 1997, p. 101). The last claim is what leads her to her disjunctivism of 
movement, which she claims is independent of a disjunctivism of trying.  It is not easy 
to see how such position could be coherent.71 It appears as if Hornsby faces the 
 
 
 
71 Dokic comments that it is less than clear how Hornsby can maintain her movement disjunctivism if 
tryings can exist exactly as they are in the absence of acting (Dokic 2003, p. 337, n. 337). Haddock sees 
Hornsby’s causal account as committed to the idea that the powers of our bodies are wholly distinct from 
our powers as agents, and thinks that her disjunctivism of movements cannot overcome this problem 
(Haddock 2005, p. 169, n. 8).  
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following dilemma. Either Hornsby must say, as she seems to imply in Actions (1980), 
that no trying is essentially an action, and so every instance of an intentional action 
could just as well not have been an action (cf. Hornsby 1980, p. 43), or, because she 
allows for instances of tryings that are completely inert, she will need to make a 
distinction between tryings that are essentially movement-involving and tryings that are 
not. The latter option amounts to a disjunctivism of trying. The former option seems to 
imply the idea that we can make sense of our trying to X, and so our causal powers as 
agents, independently of any reference to a bodily capacity to move so as to achieve 
what we are trying to achieve. Thus it seems to imply a denial of Minimal Pragmatism 
and to imply a commitment to what I called the Myth of Fiat. Hornsby is clear that she 
does not take her position to bear such a commitment: 
 
And bodily movements need not be denied a special status in relation 
to agency. For we may think that our ability to make bodily 
movements is constitutive of our having the power that we have as 
agents – to initiate series of events containing some we want. 
(Hornsby 1997, p. 132) 
 
Hornsby stresses that we can only make sense of a person’s trying to raise her arm if we 
presuppose that she has the teleologically basic capacity to raise her arm at will: 
 
Possession of the relevant capacity is presupposed to an agent’s trying 
to raise her arm. The capacity is not exercised by someone whose arm 
makes movements against her will – as in anarchic hand syndrome; it 
is thwarted when someone is impeded in raising her arm; and it is 
destroyed if an arm is paralyzed. We can only latch onto the facts 
about someone who intentionally raises her arm when we allow her to 
be capable of raising it. (Hornsby 2004b, p. 179). 
 
It might be that we can intervene and by a sudden paralysis hinder someone in raising 
her arm and still claim that in such a case she could have been trying to raise her arm. 
But this is only because we understand her as having a capacity to raise her arm, the 
exercise of which we thwart by a more sophisticated means than if we simply held 
down her arm by force. If a person is gradually losing her capacity to raise her arm she 
might also keep trying to raise it above her head even after she has lost the strength to 
do so, but we can hardly make sense of her as still trying years after her arm has become 
completely paralysed.  
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Hornsby claims that she can accommodate the necessary connection 
between a teleologically basic trying to X and the teleologically basic capacity to X and 
still claim that when we perform intentional bodily actions a particular trying causes 
bodily movement and that a trying of the same fundamental kind could have occurred 
had there been no movement. I am not sure what to make of this idea. A great deal 
hinges on the notion of causality in Hornsby’s account. She refers to Lewis’ concept of 
piecemeal causation where what is caused is conceived as a part of the cause and so 
suggests that the bodily movements are parts of the intentional actions, which she 
otherwise identifies as the trying that causes the movement (Hornsby 1997, p. 132). 
This could seem to imply a kind of disjunctivism of trying, namely a disjunction 
between the tryings that have movements as parts and those that do not have 
movements as parts. 
In any case I take the fundamental idea of a necessary link between our 
bodily capacity to move and our trying to perform bodily actions and the consequent 
need to regard our motility as imbued with intentionality to be the most important 
element of Hornsby’s account. Whether we can still understand the relationship between 
tryings and bodily movements as a rationalizing causal rational relation in analogy to 
the rational causal relation between a fact and an appearance in genuine veridical 
perception is a further issue.72 I would still maintain that the formulation of a 
disjunctivism of tryings in terms of disjunction between idle tryings and embodied 
tryings provides the means for recognizing the necessary link between tryings and 
bodily capacities and that it can serve as a way of blocking arguments that appeal to the 
possibility of brains in a vat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 We can draw an analogy between mere appearances and mere movements by saying that both kinds of 
occurrences are understood as caused by mere causes. On Hornsby’s picture this analogy transfers to 
genuine perception and subjectively ‘tainted’ movements as they are both said to have rationalizing 
causes. 
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CHAPTER 4   
AGENCY IN RATIONAL AND NON-RATIONAL ANIMALS 
 
4.1 Embodied conceptualism and the status of non-linguistic animals 
Here is how Hornsby diagnoses the predicament which I have argued we need a 
disjunctivism of movements to escape: 
 
The problem, as I have said, arises from supposing that the bodily 
movements that there are when there are actions might be located in a 
world bereft of beings who do things for reasons – a world where so-
called ‘mere movements of bodies’ belong. (Hornsby 1998, p. 393) 
 
But what does it mean that a being does things for reasons? Does it require that the 
subject is able to take a reason as a reason, and so has the reflective capacity to step 
back and ask whether a putative reason for action should be assumed as one’s own? In 
other words, is the kind of agency for which I have argued we need a dual conception of 
bodily movements restricted to linguistic animals such as mature human beings? The 
answer implied by McDowell’s way of posing the problem of agency seems to be yes. 
McDowell proposed that we need to conceive of the bodily goings-on essential for the 
carrying out of intentional bodily actions as ‘actualizations of our active nature in which 
conceptual capacities are inextricably implicated’ (MW, p. 90). One worry is that this 
reduces non-linguistic animals including human infants to pure robots with no more 
agency than a thermostat, since a precondition for agency seems to be initiation into 
language. A further worry is that unless we recognize that our ability to move is of the 
same kind as that of other, non-linguistic animals we will end up mystifying our own 
motility. The counter proposal would be that we need to recognize an element of non-
conceptual intentionality at the motor level that is shared between us and other animals. 
These worries mirror objections that McDowell’s conceptualism has met in the area of 
perception. 
 The two parallel objections regarding perception are as follows. First it has 
been argued that we should recognize the actual presence of non-conceptual content in 
the mental life of non-linguistic animals and that McDowell’s conceptualism is unable 
to do so (Wright 1998, 2002, Smith 2002, pp. 106-107). Second it has been argued that 
because we share perceptual capacities with other animals, and such animals have non-
conceptual content, we further need to acknowledge the presence of non-conceptual 
content in the perception of mature human beings (Bouveresse 1996, p. 40, Peacocke 
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2001, p. 614, Smith 2002, ch. 3, Bernstein 2002, p. 225). The two arguments can be put 
together so as to form an apparent dilemma facing the conceptualist. Either you 
recognize the non-conceptual content of non-linguistic animals, in which case you will 
need to recognize that because we share perceptual abilities with other animals we must 
share non-conceptual content too, or you deny that we share any content with other 
animals, in which case you will be forced to deny other animals any perceptual 
intentionality.   
 I would find it disastrous for conceptualism if it really were doomed to 
deny non-linguistic animals any kind of perception or agency. In this chapter I will 
argue that the human chauvinism of conceptualism does not necessarily have such 
implausible and intolerable consequences. I will do so by first examining the two 
arguments concerning perception. The defence against these two objections will leave 
intact a third attack, which I will address in turn. In section 4.8 I will return to the issue 
of agency in order to show how the defence against the arguments concerning 
perception can be applied to the parallel objections concerning agency.   
One of the authors who have argued that McDowell’s conceptualism 
cannot accommodate a basic level of non-conceptual practical intentionality is Hubert 
Dreyfus. In his critique Dreyfus draws on the work of Merleau-Ponty. In the last section 
of this chapter I turn to the works of Merleau-Ponty and argue that his conception of the 
relation between linguistic and non-linguistic animals does not rely on the idea of non-
conceptual content share by mature human beings and other animals. This section 
serves as the beginning of my discussion of the relation between Merleau-Ponty and the 
embodied conceptualism that I aim at developing. The remaining three chapters of this 
thesis are devoted to a discussion of the possible impact a confrontation with the works 
of Merleau-Ponty could have on embodied conceptualism.  
                                   
 4.2 Conceptual versus non-conceptual content 
To enable us to see what is at stake in this debate let us first define conceptual and non-
conceptual content. Both parties to the debate usually agree on a strong notion of 
conceptual capacities which link possession of concepts to the possibility of justification 
and consequently to language. The Priority Principle, which states a constitutive relation 
between linguistic and conceptual abilities, is common ground.  We can now define 
conceptual content as content that cannot be ascribed to a creature unless that creature 
possesses the concepts involved in specifying the content (cf. Bermúdez 1998a, p. 301, 
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n. 1). In turn we can define non-conceptual content as content that we can ascribe to a 
creature even if the creature does not possess any of the concepts needed for specifying 
the content. Both conceptual and non-conceptual content are taken to be 
representational content in the sense that the content represents the world as being in a 
certain way. To specify the content of an experience is then to specify how the state 
represents the world which is how the world needs to be for it to be as it is represented, 
i.e., the correctness conditions of the content.  
For instance, if we say of a cat, which we observe, that it is fleeing from a 
dog through a hole in a fence, and we say of the cat that it sees the hole as way of 
escaping, then we might say that the cat’s perception had non-conceptual content, which 
we as theorists, using our conceptual capacities can express by saying ‘That hole is slip-
throughable’. Here we ascribe a certain representation of its environment to the cat, 
which might turn out to be correct or incorrect according to how the world is. That we 
take the content to be non-conceptual implies that the cat need not possess the concept 
of a hole or any other concepts used in our specification in order for it to have a 
perception of the kind it actually has. In fact given the Priority Principle it cannot 
possess any concepts since it does not possess language. 
 
4.3 Blind animals  
Let us now look at the first of the two arguments against conceptualism mentioned 
above. The objection is that the conceptualism of McDowell has the undesired 
consequence that we come to deny that non-linguistic animals can have perception, in 
the sense of sensuous experiences that display any kind of intentionality. In Mind and 
World, McDowell insists that his conceptualism does not reduce the life of non-
linguistic animals either to mere movements of affectless automata or to a stream of 
non-intentional sensations (cf. MW, pp. 64, 69, 114-123, 182-183). Despite such 
reassurances I do not think Mind and World read in isolation succeeds in making it clear 
how a conceptualist can make sense of other animals as directed towards the same 
world as us. In Mind and World McDowell works with Gadamer’s distinction between a 
human mode of living in a world (Welt) and an animal mode of inhabiting an 
environment (Umwelt) (MW, p. 115). It is in this context that McDowell denies that 
non-linguistic animals can have any experience of objective reality (MW, p. 114) or any 
awareness of an inner or an outer world (MW, p. 119). Furthermore he rejects the idea 
that we can ascribe non-conceptual representations of the environment to non-linguistic 
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animals at what is sometimes called the animal level as opposed to the sub-animal 
level:73 ‘I am rejecting a picture of a mere animal’s perceptual sensitivity to its 
environment: a picture in which the senses yield content that is less than conceptual but 
already such as to represent the world’ (MW, p. 121). The reason for this rejection is 
that such a picture would be yet another version of the Myth of the Given. What can be 
given for the animal is taken to be something which can also be given in our perception, 
only we are fortunate enough to be able to express the content by putting it into words 
(MW, pp. 122-123).74 These negative characterizations of the non-linguistic animal 
make it hard to see how we can uphold a conception of non-linguistic animal as in any 
way perceptually relating to the world. At least part of the problem resides in Mind and 
World’s undifferentiated conception of the region of discourse which is contrasted with 
the logical space of reasons and simply named the realm of law. As we saw earlier, 
since the publication of Mind and World, McDowell has adopted a more liberal account 
of contrastive logical space of science because he finds the conception in terms of 
nomological laws unsatisfactory monolithic. In some places this is done with reference 
to the need to find room for non-human animals: 
 
I agree with Taylor that there is something between spontaneity in 
what he calls ‘the strong Kantian sense, turning crucially on 
conceptual, reflective thought’, on the one hand and conformity to 
Galilean law, on the other. We need this middle ground for thinking 
about non-human animals. (McDowell 2002a, p. 283). 
 
Indeed the combination of a rejection of non-conceptual content at an animal level and 
the notion of the realm of law as paradigmatically represented by the physical sciences’ 
understanding of meaningless movements of planets, does seem to undermine the 
 
 
 
73 The terms ‘animal’ and ‘sub-animal’ serve to generalize the distinction, originally made by Dennett, 
between the personal level and the sub-personal level. The personal level is the level of content accessible 
to the subject and the sub-personal level is the level of content that is only accessible through the third-
personal stance of cognitive science.  
74 McDowell underlines that he has no quarrel with the use of the notion of non-conceptual content at the 
sub-animal level investigated by cognitive science (MW, p. 55, p. 121). Thus it can seem exaggerated to 
claim, as does Bermúdez, that McDowell is ‘opposed to the very idea of nonconceptual content’ 
(Bermúdez 2007, p. 57). The claim however is reasonable if the idea of non-conceptual content is taken to 
be incompatible with McDowell’s suggestion that ascription of sub-personal non-conceptual content, 
though immensely useful, must be considered as ‘as if’ content (cf. McDowell 1998h, p. 351). 
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possibility of acknowledging non-human animals as experientially related to the 
world.75   
 
4.4 Animals in touch with the world 
In Mind and World the only positive description of mere animals is in terms of sensory 
sensitivities that enable the animal to respond to the environment in a way appropriate 
to certain given biological needs (MW, p. 122).76 However, in later writings, McDowell 
gives more flesh to the idea of the less than fully-fledged subjectivity of mere animals. 
He operates with a distinction between responsiveness to reasons and responsiveness to 
reasons as such (McDowell 2006c, p.1, McDowell 2006a, p. 325). Mere animals can be 
said to act for a reason whereas only rational animals can respond to a reason as a 
reason. When we, for instance, say about an animal that it is fleeing, we are making its 
behaviour intelligible in the light of a reason for its flight. Fleeing is responding to 
something which is a reason, namely danger or at least what is taken to be danger (cf. 
McDowell 2006d, p. 2). Here McDowell allows for intentional-explanations of animal 
behaviour and for them to be able to take something as a danger. That an animal can 
perceive something as a danger implies that it can be mistaken in how it takes things to 
be, and this seems to imply ascribing representational content in some broad sense. In 
the debate with Dreyfus he describes what we share with animals as responsiveness to 
affordances. Both a cat and a human, when engaged in getting from one place to 
another, can be expected to respond to the affordance constituted by a hole in a wall big 
enough to go through, by passing through the opening (McDowell 2007a, p. 343). Such 
descriptions can be true of both us and other animals, only there is more to the truth 
about our behaviour because the competence we exercise in going through a hole is, 
according McDowell, permeated with conceptual capacities (cf. McDowell 2007a, pp. 
344-345). He writes: ‘Affordances are no longer merely input to a human animal’s 
natural motivational tendencies; now they are data for her rationality, not only her 
practical rationality but her theoretical rationality as well’ (McDowell 2007a, p. 344). It 
 
 
 
75 Another way in which Mind and World is problematically monolithic is revealed by Smith when he 
notes that the appeal to Gadamer’s and Heidegger’s distinction between Welt and Umwelt in itself does 
not secure a sufficiently rich notion of the life of higher animals as it is meant to apply to all living 
organisms, including unicellular organisms (Smith 2002, p. 103).  
76 To be fair, in the ‘Afterword’, McDowell does explicitly state that it is ‘perfectly all right’ by 
his lights, if anyone wishes to talk about the world-directedness of non-linguistic animals, as long 
as such talk is detached from spontaneity in the Kantian sense (MW, p. 183). 
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is in this context that McDowell uses the metaphor of form and matter to distinguish the 
perceptual experiences of non-linguistic animals from that of mature humans. Our 
experiences can have content that is ‘materially identical’ with that of other animals, but 
in our case the content takes on a conceptual form which transforms the character of the 
experience (McDowell 2007a, p. 348). A cat can see ‘that a hole is big enough for it to 
go through’ just as we can, but our perception comes in a distinctive conceptual form 
(McDowell 2007a, p. 351 n. 29). In fact already in his paper, ‘The content of Perceptual 
Experience’ (1998h) McDowell makes use of a notion of content at the animal level. In 
his critique of Dennett’s theory of perception, McDowell talks about a frogs’ ‘froggy 
involvement with content’ parallel to the personal involvement with conceptual content 
of a rational animal (McDowell 1998h, p. 347). Here McDowell underlines the need to 
hold on to content-involving truths in biology, which are not reducible to content at the 
sub-animal level, on pain of losing all grip on the idea that for instance a frog is in direct 
touch with its environment (McDowell 1998h, pp. 349-350). One possible description 
of the content of a frog’s perception could be ‘that there is a bug-like object at such and 
such a position’ (McDowell 1998h, p. 351). Ascribing such content to the frog naturally 
does not mean ascribing, for instance, the concept of an object or any other concept in 
the demanding sense, so it must in some sense be ascribing non-conceptual content. In a 
more recent response to Brandom, McDowell emphasizes that ascription of knowledge 
to non-human animals is not just ascription of reliable responsive dispositions, which 
would not differentiate such knowledge from the response of iron, rusting in the 
presence of moisture (McDowell 2002b, p. 104, McDowell 2006c, p. 5). Using 
Wittgenstein’s and Anscombe’s example of a non-human intentional action, he states 
that a cat’s awareness of the prey it stalks must be said to be a genuine case of 
awareness of something, and so, we may add, a genuine case of intentionality 
(Wittgenstein 1984, §647,  Anscombe 2000, p. 86,  see also McDowell 1998i, p. 411).   
 
4.5 The coherence of McDowell’s position    
Now the second argument mentioned above enters the scene. If it is allowed that we can 
ascribe non-conceptual content to non-linguistic animals and so that we share a 
perceptual sensitivity with such animals, are we not forced to admit that our perceptions 
share an element of non-conceptual content with that of animals? This animal-likeness 
argument only goes through if it is assumed that perceptual sensitivity can only be a 
common feature due to having identical content, which must in that case be non-
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conceptual in both cases. But the fact that the general term ‘perceptually sensitive’ 
applies to both humans and mere animals does not rule out that there are truths about 
our perception which transcend what is the case for mere animals. Mere animal 
perception and the perception of rational animals can be seen as two species of one 
genus: perceptual experience.77 If this suggestion is to be successful in blocking the 
inference from commonality to identity of content and keep animals in contact with the 
world, it must be shown that the introduction of what McDowell calls materially 
identical content between human and non-human perception can avoid the pitfall he 
argues the usual notion of non-conceptual content falls into. In other words it must be 
shown that we can coherently both reject a certain notion of non-conceptual content and 
endorse a notion of material content or matter also at the animal level.               
McDowell claims that the distinction between form and matter allows him 
to avoid that talk of such non-conceptual material content falls victim to the Myth of the 
Private Ostensive Definition (McDowell 2007a, p. 351). What is the pitfall a notion of 
material content needs to navigate? The problematic conception of non-conceptual 
content is one that involves the thought that starting out from our perception it must be 
possible to isolate what such perception has in common with animal perception by, as it 
were, stripping off their specifically human garments (cf. MW, p. 64). Such an idea 
involves the dualism of schema and content, where the schema is our conceptual 
framing of a content which is considered to be itself independent of the 
conceptualization. This dualism forces us to regard the way we give meaning to our 
concepts as a private act of ostensive definition. McDowell reads Wittgenstein’s attack 
on the idea of such private ostensive definitions as an attack on the Myth of the Given 
(MW, p. 19). The basic problem with such a model is that what is thought to provide 
justification for my correct use of the concept I putatively installed through my 
ostensive definition is the given-ness of something which is already given prior to any 
conceptualization. This is the Myth of the Given: A bare presence which is beyond any 
possible critical assessment is supposed nevertheless to provide me with justification, 
but such justification can at the most amount to a blind faith. Why is the form-matter 
distinction not just another version of the schema-content dualism? In contrast to the 
 
 
 
77 This is what McDowell suggests regarding the notion of feeling pain, which is not taken to be 
equivocal but simply covers two species (McDowell 2002, p. 288). This does not imply a disjunctivism of 
perceptions and sensations structurally similar to the disjunctivism of perceptual appearances, since the 
relation genus-species is not equivalent to the relation determinable-determinate.   
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schema-content dualism the form-matter distinction does not imply that the matter can 
exist without any form. To use an image: when the craftsman starts out with a lump of 
clay it already has a certain form which he transforms into the shape of a plate. From the 
plate there is no way to go back to the shape of the original lump by stripping the form 
that was created by the craftsman. The implication of the metaphor of form and matter 
seems to be that we must say that the perception of animals also has a form only in 
contrast to ours, a form that is not constituted by conceptual capacities. We might also 
think of the differences between different forms of art, where in spite of the difference 
in form we can nevertheless recognize the matter of two works of art as the same.   
 
4.6 The return of the dilemma  
One might still wonder if the recognition of responsiveness to reasons at the animal 
level does not undermine the sui generis nature of human cognition and action because 
it opens up the logical space of reasons to non-linguistic animals.78 It can seem as if 
McDowell is faced with a new version of the dilemma I formulated at the beginning of 
this chapter: Either he admits that animals really do act for reasons and the sui generis 
nature of humans must be forsaken or he holds onto the sui generis nature of humans 
with the cost that reason-explanations of animals are the products of a merely 
instrumental intentional stance, from which we ascribe ‘as if’-content not significantly 
different from the ascription of non-conceptual content at the sub-animal level.       
McDowell recognizes the need to answer this dilemma in his exchange 
with Davidson on this matter: 
 
We need a positive line about our ways of understanding brutes, and it 
is not satisfying to suggest that crediting them with intelligent 
engagements with their environment is just convenience, called for 
only by the fact that we lack detailed knowledge about their internal 
control machinery. (McDowell 2003, p. 676). 
  
To see why this dilemma is not binding we need first to pin down some characteristics, 
crucial in this context, of the space-of-reasons kind of intelligibility. What is distinct 
about the intelligibility of the space of reasons is that it requires that the subjects 
 
 
 
78 Another way to raise the question I deal with here is to ask why we should believe there to be two 
fundamentally different kinds of second nature, as there must be according to McDowell since he also 
employs the term ‘second nature’ about the acquired skills of, for instance, a trained dog. (cf. McDowell 
2000, p.98, 2006a, p. 236). 
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themselves can be seen as aspiring to conform to rational norms (McDowell 2006a, pp. 
218, 236). When we say of the cat that it chases the bird because it sees a prey and is 
hungry, we are not making the behaviour intelligible as intentional because of the 
ability of the cat to assess the putative reason for its behaviour. If we ask why the 
animal has this goal there is a sense of such a question which does not find a foothold 
here.  In the animal case, we can answer such a question about the goal by reference to 
the biological needs of the animal. We can understand their behaviour as goal-oriented 
and at the same time regard the control of those goals over the behaviour of the animal 
as an outcome of biological forces (cf. MW, p. 115). This contrasts with the case of 
rational animals where we can make sense of an intentional action or a perception by 
placing them in the space of reasons which implies that we conceive of the subject as 
aspiring to conform to rational norms. If we start explaining the reason why a person 
did something in terms of biological needs that control the goal-setting of the person, 
then we have left the space of reason and we are no longer regarding the action as the 
action of a rational agent with autonomy. The crucial difference is the way the appeal to 
norms of rationality is essential for the space-of-reason intelligibility. This does not 
reduce other animals to mere machines, they have an ability to be self-moving and 
respond to reasons, but because they do not have the ability to stop and ask themselves 
whether a putative reason is a good reason, we cannot see them as aspiring to live up to 
rational norms. 
 This is admittedly is not a full answer to the challenge, as I have still said 
very little positively about the way we make animal behaviour intelligible. What I have 
said I think is sufficient to make it at least plausible that the conceptualist is not forced 
to say that animals can have no perceptual contact with the world.    
 There are many further questions in this area, which I have not addressed 
here. To mention just one: Isn’t there a specific problem for the conceptualist 
concerning sensations such as pain? According to McDowell, in rational animals pain is 
a limit case of an intentional awareness of a fact, because the fact is constitutively 
dependent on the awareness. This can seem to rob mere animals of any pain or pleasure 
since without conceptual awareness it seems there is nothing left to be aware of (cf. 
MW, pp. 22, 120).79 An answer to this concern could begin by pointing to the contrast 
 
 
 
79 Wright (1998, 2002) pursues this line of criticism in his exchanges with (cf. McDowell 1998i, p. 429, 
McDowell 2002, p. 288). 
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between our notion of a mere appearance and our concept of feeling pain, consisting in 
the fact that the latter concept in no way forces us to think that conceptual capacities are 
essential for the concept to apply. 80   
  
4.7 Intentionality überhaupt 
With this much said we may ask why all of this should not give renewed force to the 
motivation behind the appeal to non-conceptual content in an understanding of how our 
conceptual intentionality is possible at all? This worry is distinct from the two initial 
objections presented in the form of a dilemma above. This new line of criticism has 
been pursued by A. D. Smith. 
Smith accuses McDowell of supposing that the intentionality of our 
perception has a ‘wholly different basis’ than does the intentionality of other animals 
(Smith 2002, p. 107) and argues that this creates a problem independent of whether or 
not our perceptual experience is permeated with concepts: 
 
Even if every human perception were shot through with concepts, so 
that any ‘stripping’ would falsify the phenomenology, it still wouldn’t 
be this conceptual dimension that explains how we are able to 
perceive physical objects at all. (Smith 2002, p. 107). 
 
This criticism seems to me to be off target. McDowell is not claiming that the 
intentionality of non-linguistic animals is utterly irrelevant for the transcendental 
question of how perceptual intentionality is possible at all. He states precisely that if it 
were not because we were able to see our capacity to have facts perceptually manifested 
to us as a transformation ‘of a prior responsiveness to objective reality’, this would just 
add to our transcendental anxieties (McDowell 1998i, p. 412). In other words, if 
McDowell’s conceptualism in fact had the consequence that he would be forced to deny 
that animals have perception of objects, this would not just go against all common 
sense, it would also, according to himself, add to the mystification of our special 
openness to the world.81 As we saw in Chapter One, McDowell’s disjunctive 
 
 
 
80 McDowell further stresses that there is no need to suppose that an implication of conceptual capacities 
is ‘an element in the very idea of awareness’ (McDowell 2006c, p. 6).                       
81 In earlier works McDowell states that in his picture the initiation into language appears as 
mysterious: ‘There is certainly a mysterious transition in my view of language acquisition (“Light 
Dawns”)’ (McDowell, 1998d, p. 334). He also states that: ‘What is needed is an understanding of 
how content, explicitly conceived as inaccessible except “from inside”, can be comprehended as a 
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conception of perception and his conceptualism are targeted against two connected but 
separable threats to our conception of ourselves as beings that can have thoughts about 
the world. The threat which is at the forefront in Mind and World is the one that stems 
from the difficulty of seeing our perceptual intake as both providing a rational constraint 
on our beliefs and as a natural phenomena. It is for the purpose of debunking this 
specific threat that no help is found in the appeal to the intentionality of non-conceptual 
animals (cf. McDowell 1998i p. 412). At the animal level, no counterpart to this 
problem is found because the problem is one that concerns the possibility of intentional 
experiences that purport to be of an objective reality. The problem only arises because 
the freedom implied in our conception of the cognition and action of rational animals 
can seem to rule out such freedom as a part of nature. There is also a broader threat to 
intentionality which does reach all the way to the animal level, namely the one that 
comes from thinking about cognition and action as merely a product of one part of an 
organism telling another part of the organism. This is the problem McDowell takes up 
in his critique of Dennett’s theory of perception. 
McDowell argues that we cannot make sense of animals being in perceptual 
contact with the world in terms of some part of the animal having access to another part 
of the animal. This is a problem which attaches to intentionality as such and not 
specifically to conceptual intentionality: 
 
Moving to personal dealings with content, such as the conscious 
perceptual experiences of adult human beings, makes all kinds of 
differences. But there is not reason to suppose that it makes any 
difference on this point: Our dealings with content, in our consciously 
enjoyed perceptual experience, are no more a matter of access to our 
own interiors than a frog’s dealings with content are. (McDowell 
1998h, p. 356). 
 
The basic problem with a model like Dennett’s is that the animal’s perceptual contact 
with its environment is reduced to some part of its brain receiving perceptual input from 
another part. If this is what the frog’s access to the environment consists in, however, 
 
 
 
precipitate of simpler modes of activity and awareness than those in which it figures.’ (McDowell 
1987, p. 74). Mind and World can be seen as an attempt to exorcise at least a certain version of 
such a felt need, cf. McDowell (MW, p. 125): ‘This transformation [from mere animal to thinker 
and intentional agent] risks looking mysterious’. The metaphor of dawn breaking, which 
McDowell repeatedly makes use of, is found in Wittgenstein’s ‘On Certainty’ §141 (cf. 
McDowell 2003, p. 679).   
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then the frog is really only in contact with itself, in a sort of brain-introspection. Even 
talking about the frog’s access is going too far, since what we have is just one part of 
the brain that receives input from another part, and unless the frog is identified with a 
department of the brain it cannot on that basis be said to have any access to anything. 
The problem is that if we start out with talking about sub-animal information-processing 
we will never catch the frog and we will never be able to make sense of the frog as a 
living animal perceptually sensitive to its environment.82 This problem is general since 
such an input-output, sandwich model is exactly a model which spans all creatures with 
brains. Furthermore the problem is not confined to perception. The consequence of the 
model is that the visible behaviour of the animal is regarded as movements which are no 
different in kind from the leg movements of a decapitated frog. There is no longer any 
self-moving animal to be found, there is merely some brain events, which might or 
might not be identified with mental events with a subjective character, causing some 
movements of a body. These general problems concerning perception and agency arise 
because the mental occurrences are to be located in an inner part of the animal, which 
receives input that is not essentially object-involving and which produces movements 
that are not essentially agency-involving.  The basic problem is the scientific monism 
that identifies all events with scientifically understood events narrowly construed.83 
With this picture in place the animal as an organism living in an environment is lost 
from sight.  
 The part of this general problem that concerns perception is not identical 
with the problem which McDowell tackles with the disjunctive conception of 
perception. The disjunctive conception of perception serves to undercut the inference 
from the subjective indistinguishability of hallucination and genuine perception to the 
common kind assumption. The basic reason why an interface consisting in a highest 
common factor of mere appearance is problematic is, according to McDowell, that it 
leaves us unable to see how such appearance can even purport to be of the objective 
world. This problem does not exist at the animal level since the perception of a non-
 
 
 
82 It is as this point that McDowell refers to Gibson’s theory of perception as restoring the connection to 
the world via a direct perception of affordances (McDowell 1998h, p. 355). This reference indicates that 
McDowell considers the perception of animals to be something with its own form that can be further 
investigated by a science that does not limit itself to the sub-animal level.   
83 Merleau-Ponty points out that though behaviourism starts out from the healthy idea that we should 
study the public ‘stream of activity’ of the organism, it has often ended by placing the behaviour inside 
the nervous system exactly because of a materialistic prejudice (SC, p. 2, n.2) 
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linguistic creature cannot purport to be of the world. The idea of a mere appearance has 
no grip when we are thinking of non-linguistic animals, because it only makes sense in 
a context where we can ascribe the ability to make an explicit distinction between how 
things seem to one and how things are in reality. The ability to make such a distinction 
in turn requires that the subject has the capacity to suspend the belief in what is seen and 
to ask itself whether how things appear to it is a good reason to take things to be as they 
seem.84 The result is that we do not seem to require a disjunctivism of perception 
concerning mere animals, but merely what I have called a disjunctivism of perceptual 
intake (see Chapter Two (2.3)). This is what we find in the distinction between non-
conceptual content at the sub-animal level, the mere input, and the material content 
available to the animal level in its environment.85 In the case of rational animals we 
need to say more, both because of the possibility of a perfect hallucination and because 
the material content of the animal level cannot fill the role of a rational constraint on our 
beliefs. We need to conceive of the cognitive intake in perception as not falling short of 
the facts, i.e., a disjunctivism of appearances, and we need to see the facts themselves as 
rationally constraining the subject, i.e., a conceptualism of perception.    
 The concern about the possibility of agency which I was addressing in the 
previous chapter through the introduction of a disjunctivism of movement and a 
disjunctivism of tryings can now more clearly be seen as a specific concern about 
rational agency. The worry was about how we can make sense of some action as being 
the teleologically most basic action, and had its source in the idea that bodily 
movements must be conceived of as agency-neutral. This is attached to the notion of 
rational agency, since the teleological notion of basic actions is here taken as referring 
to a capacity of the agent to carry out such actions as intentional actions and without 
doing anything else in order to do so. That such actions are intentional is understood in 
terms of the agent’s non-observational knowledge of the teleologically most basic 
 
 
 
84 The idea is not that such a suspension can come out of the blue through a libertas indifferentia. This 
would imply that trusting one’s senses is in general something one chooses, but as McDowell writes: 
‘One does not choose to accept that things are the way one’s experience plainly reveals that they are’ 
(McDowell 2006c, p.9).  
85 McDowell argues that if our perception is a matter of access to sub-personal content then the same 
must go for the mere animal which ‘seems merely ludicrous’ (McDowell 1998i, p. 348). I take this as a 
kind of reductio of Dennett’s picture of human perception. Understood thus, the argument rests on the 
idea that it is in a way even more obvious in the non-human animal case that perception is not a kind 
introspection. A reason for this could be that the idea of mere appearances has no grip when a creature 
has no language.  
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action and her capacity to reflect on her action and ask whether she has a good reason to 
perform it. These are requirements which are specific for rational agency. 
We have seen that there is a more general concern about the possibility of 
agency at all, which stems from a departmentalization of the animal that tends to erase 
the animal as a living being in an environment from the picture. To counter such 
dissolution of the animal into a series of events which simply happens we need to see 
the animal’s behaviour as something over and above the level of neuro-physiological 
and mechanical events. We can say that just as we need a certain disjunctivism of 
movements to account for human agency, we also need a kind of disjunctivism of 
movements at the animal level, in order to recognize the behaviour as consisting in the 
self-moving of the animal and not just in a series of in themselves agency-neutral 
events.86      
 The distinction I made above, between a disjunctivism of appearances and 
a disjunctivism of perceptual input, has the further advantage that it helps explain how 
McDowell can deny that there is any ‘fully subjective fact’ about what the colour vision 
of a cat is like (MW, p. 122). This is not a denial of a first-‘person’ perspective of the 
cat, if what is meant by a first-person perspective on the world is thought of as a 
necessarily embodied perspective and hence the perspective of a certain self-moving 
animal on its actual environment. What seems to be implied is a denial of the possibility 
of such a perspective without that perspective being in any contact with the environment 
of the animal, as it would be claimed possible if it was claimed that a bat brain in a vat 
could have a subjective life indistinguishable from the subjective life of a flying bat. For 
it to make sense to talk about such an indistinguishable life would involve the idea of a 
fact about how things appear to the bat, which requires us to see the bat’s experience as 
something which could be given to a rational animal. The idea of such a ‘fully 
subjective fact’ about the way things are within the consciousness of the mere animal 
rests on a layer model of our own perceptual experience. The thought that just as there 
is a fact about the way things appear to me, so there is a fact about the way things 
 
 
 
86 (A) As Taylor notes, behaviourism exploits the ambiguity of the notion of behaviour between either 
‘colourless’ movements, or actions coloured by their meaning, to gain some intuitive support (cf. Taylor 
1964, pp. 55-56, n.1). 
   (B) To what extent we can also talk of a disjunctivism of trying at the animal level is an open question.   
If such disjunctivism is taken to amount to a denial of the possible existence of any genuine tryings that 
are not embodied in any bodily behaviour, an analogue to the trying-disjunctivism could make sense at 
the animal level.    
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appear to the animals, involves the idea that the way things appear to me must be at a 
certain level independent of what distinguishes me from the non-linguistic animal, i.e., 
conceptual capacities. This is the idea that we can reach the naked ‘subjective fact’ of 
the appearance of the non-linguistic experience by stripping our perception of its 
conceptual garments and thereby reaching a lowest common factor between it and the 
perception of a cat. But such a factorizing model will succumb to the Myth of the 
Given. 
 
4.8 The two objections concerning agency  
The fact that the conceptualist can make room for the idea that there is a possible 
general threat to agency, distinct from the specific threat to rational agency discussed in 
the previous chapter, indicates that conceptualism does not imply an impossibility of 
recognizing animal behaviour as expressing agency. This already goes some way 
towards answering the two initial worries concerning agency with which I opened this 
chapter and which mirrored the two objections concerning a conceptualism of 
perception I have been discussing above. 
The first objection concerning action is that the conceptualist is forced to 
deny mere animals any agency. In the foregoing I have argued that the conceptualist can 
substantiate the following two distinctions. First, there is a distinction between the 
material content of the animal level and the same material content in a conceptual form 
at the personal level. Second, there is a distinction between responsiveness to reasons 
and responsiveness to reasons as such. In so far as I have succeeded in making these 
distinctions plausible I have also responded to the first objection concerning action. The 
responsiveness to reasons, though not as such, is exactly what the conceptualist will 
claim can legitimately be used in our understanding of animal behaviour.  
The second objection concerning agency argues that we must share our 
basic motility with other animals and that therefore it cannot be a capacity that is 
conceptual throughout. We find a version of this argument coined in terms of our bodily 
coping activities in Dreyfus’ 2005 APA Presidential Address: 
 
Premise (1) Concepts are necessarily linguistic.  
Premise (2) Non-linguistic animals are capable of the same kind of coping activity 
that we are involved in.    
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Conclusion: Our coping activity, being of the same kind as that of animals, cannot 
be constituted by conceptual capacities. (Cf. Dreyfus 2005, p. 12, n. 38). 
 
A ready answer to this quick argument is implicit in the response to the animal-likeness 
argument discussed above. In the APA address, Dreyfus’ claim is that when we are 
absorbed in bodily coping activity at an expert level, for instance as a car driver, we are 
simply responding like other animals to the affordances we perceive and there is neither 
conceptual content in our perception nor in the bodily response. McDowell’s answer is 
to point out that he can acknowledge that we share responsiveness to affordances with 
other animals but deny that a description in those terms is the whole truth about our 
responsiveness (McDowell 2007a, p. 343). In our case, McDowell claims, 
responsiveness to affordances takes a conceptual form.  
 I conclude that conceptualism can lay to rest the two concerns raised in 
beginning of this chapter and thus, so far, maintain that intentional bodily action in the 
case of mature humans is permeated with conceptual capacities and do so without 
thereby robbing mere animals of agency.  
 
4.9 Merleau-Ponty and McDowell on human nature  
In the second round of the Dreyfus-McDowell, debate Dreyfus concedes that the 
animal-likeness argument does not work (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 354). As Dreyfus points 
out, both the philosophers he takes to support his arguments, Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty, would be opposed to sameness even at the level of bodily coping activities 
between humans and other animals. This is implied already in the fact that both authors 
make use of a distinction between world and environment to distinguish humans from 
other animals (Welt and Umgebung/ univers and milieu, Heidegger 1983, p.30; SC, p. 
190). Merleau-Ponty’s opposition to the animal-likeness argument is unequivocally 
expressed when he approvingly quotes Herder87: ‘Si l’homme avait les sens d’un 
animal, il n’aurait pas de raison’ (SC, p. 196). This quote can be read as a pendant to 
Wittgenstein’s remark about the lion who we would not understand if it could speak, 
that is, if it could it would no longer be a lion. Inversely, if a man could have the senses 
of a lion he would no longer be a man.  
 
 
 
87 Merleau-Ponty quotes Herder from Goldstein’s DerAufbau des Organismus. McDowell also counts 
Herder, mediated by Charles Taylor, as an ally (cf. McDowell 1997, p.75). 
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In the passage of La structure du comportement where the quote from 
Herder appears, Merleau-Ponty puts his view in terms that seem in some respects to be 
congenial with McDowell’s conception and in other respects to put a distance between 
the two: 
 
On ne peut pas parler du corps et de la vie en général, mais seulement 
du corps animal et de la vie animal, du corps humain et de la vie 
humaine, … L’esprit n’est pas une différence spécifique qui viendrait 
s’ajouter à l’être vital ou psychique pour en fair un homme. L’homme 
n’est pas un animal raisonnable. (SC, p. 196). 
 
Here Merleau-Ponty, just like McDowell, underlines the lack of literal commonality 
between mere animals and human beings. For McDowell this equals emphasizing the 
special nature of humans as rational animals and this point is, word for word, 
contradicted by Merleau-Ponty. But the context of the literal contradiction shows that 
Merleau-Ponty’s point is that human beings cannot be conceived of in a factorizing 
way, with a lowest common factor shared with animals on top of which rationality is 
added. This view is of course shared by McDowell. Merleau-Ponty’s claim that we 
cannot talk about the body and life in general cannot mean that the terms are as 
equivocal as Merleau-Ponty’s phrasing taken in isolation would suggest. Such a reading 
would suggest that Merleau-Ponty would deny that we can in one sentence say of both 
an animal and human that they are alive and by that be expressing a truth that does not 
need any disambiguation in order to be understood. It would also mean that Merleau-
Ponty’s use of such terms as phenomenal body and motor intentionality would be 
equivocal between animals and humans in a way his own use of the terms in no way 
suggests.88  A better reading is to say that the claim is that an animal life/body and a 
human life/body, though being species of one genus, are also instantiations of that genus 
of fundamentally different forms. This reading is supported by what follows in the 
passage quoted above: 
 
 
 
 
88 In La structure du comportement, Merleau-Ponty argues that already biology must refer to the 
‘phenomenal body’ as a centre for action of the organism as a whole (SC, p. 195). The idea of motor 
intentionality is introduced with reference to the biologist Buytendijk, with reference to experiments with 
both animals and humans, and Merleau-Ponty also talks of the corps propre, the ‘lived body’, in general 
terms (SC, p. 30). Buytendijk uses the term Bewegungsentwurf, which Merleau-Ponty in Phénoménologie 
de la perception translates as ‘intentionalité motrice’, i.e., motor intentionality (PP, p. 128).      
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L’esprit n’est rien ou c’est une transformation réelle et non pas idéelle 
de l’homme. Parce qu’il n’est pas une nouvelle sorte d’être, mais une 
nouvelle forme d’unité, il ne peut reposer sur lui-même. (SC, p. 196). 
 
Here Merleau-Ponty is expressing what, in McDowell’s terms, can be called a 
‘substantial continuity across the divide’ between animals and humans (McDowell 
2006c, p. 13). Like McDowell, Merleau-Ponty underscores that the mind is not a free-
floating entity which mysteriously enters nature from the outside, but is rather the result 
of a transformation within nature which leaves nothing in the life of humans untouched:   
‘L’apparition de la raison et de l’esprit ne laisse pas intacte en lui une sphére des 
instincts fermée sur soi’ (SC, p. 196). A similar thought is expressed by McDowell 
when he writes: ‘The facts of our animality are present in our habitation of the space of 
reasons in the transfigured form that comes with acquiring conceptual capacities’ 
(McDowell 2002, p. 299). 
 McDowell’s emphasis on the ‘substantial continuity’ sometimes comes 
out as if contradicting the idea of a thorough transformation: 
 
And in some respects, the lives of mature human beings simply match 
the lives of mere animals; it would be absurd to suppose that Bildung 
effects a transfiguration, so to speak, of everything that happens in a 
human life. (MW, p. 183). 
 
In a footnote to this passage, McDowell specifies that it is in aspects of mature human 
life which are themselves shaped by Bildung that ‘unassimilated residues’ of the 
evolution of those very same aspects out of mere nature can show up. Hence the thought 
is not that we can find a ‘sphere of instincts’ intact below the rational mind, but rather 
that our instincts do not, absurdly, become extinct when rationality moves in (cf. 
McDowell 1998f, p. 190). This is also explains why McDowell says that in a mature 
human being perception is ‘no longer merely input to a human animal’s natural 
motivational tendencies’ (McDowell 2007a, p. 344). The natural tendency to seek for 
food when we are hungry does not vanish when we are initiated into language, but we 
gain the potential to step back and ask if this hunger is a good reason for us to eat now, 
as it might not be, for instance, if we are fasting. McDowell remarks that to talk of 
‘unassimilated residues’ is one way of putting a central thought of Freud. This remark 
seems consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Freud’s unconscious not as a 
primitive causal factor, but rather as a matter of an ambivalence of the immediate 
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consciousness. It is an ambivalence that is the result of a lack of integration rather than a 
result of something from the merely animal level intruding on consciousness from the 
outside (SC, pp. 193-194). 
 In spite of these affinities between McDowell and Merleau-Ponty, it is far 
from obvious that Merleau-Ponty’s description of an immanent meaning in our bodily 
behaviour is compatible with McDowell’s conceptualism. A number of authors have 
argued that the contrary is the case and that we can build a strong case against 
conceptualism by exploiting Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. I now come to the second 
part of this thesis which will be devoted to a defence of embodied conceptualism in the 
face of a range of objections inspired by the work of Merleau-Ponty. I shall first deal 
with objections concerning a conceptualist account of perception and then turn to 
challenges to an embodied conceptualism concerning bodily agency.  
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PART TWO   
EMBODIED CONCEPTUALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF MERLEAU-
PONTY 
 
 
 
 
La description de l’agir rencontre des obstacles extrêmes qui risquent 
de la réduire plutôt à un discours sur les difficultés de la description.  
Ricoeur  
   
 
 
Puisque nous vivons cette situation, il doit y avoir moyen de 
l’expliciter. 
 Merleau-Ponty  
 
 
 
Hier liegt nicht eine bloß äußerliche Analogie vor, sondern radikale 
Gemeinsamkeit. 
Husserl 
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CHAPTER 5   
MERLEAU-PONTY ON THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION 
 
5.1 Merleau-Ponty’s problem of perception 
5.1.1 The dichotomic structure of the problem   
According to Merleau-Ponty the fundamental problem of perception is the problem of 
recognizing perception as an original way of knowing the world: 
 
Le cartésianisme comme le kantisme aurait pleinement vu le problème 
de la perception qui consiste en ce qu’elle est une connaissance 
originaire.  (PP, p. 53). 
 
At heart, however, the problem is not an epistemological problem. The problem is, on 
Merleau-Ponty’s view, a transcendental and phenomenological problem. The problem is 
transcendental in the sense that it is a problem of how we can at all make objectivity 
intelligible: 
 
[…] et la perception comme connaisance du present est le phénomène 
central qui rend possible l’unité du Je et avec elle l’idée de 
l’objectivité et de la vérité. (PP, p. 55). 
 
The transcendental problem of perception is the problem of making it intelligible how 
perception can constitute the openness to the world that makes thoughts with empirical 
content possible. We find a variant of Minimal Empiricism in Merleau-Ponty’s work 
when he states that we must be able to describe perception as the phenomenon that first 
gives us access to truth and thereby once and for all grounds our notion of truth (PP, xi). 
Merleau-Ponty maps out a dialectic oscillation between the thesis of Empiricism and the 
anti-thesis of Intellectualism as the symptoms of an adherence to the framework of what 
he terms ‘Objective Thought’.  
Empiricism rests on a scientific monism which takes the world to consist 
in the totality of spatio-temporal events standing in merely causal relations (PP, p. 50). 
Its fundamental mistake is the attempt to insert perception in nature as just one among 
such merely causally related events (SC, p. 208). Rationality is reduced to a lucky 
chance of nature (hasard heureux) and it becomes unintelligible how the norms of 
rationality could have any objective validity and how perception could be world-
disclosing (PP. p. 73, Merleau-Ponty 1969a, p. 2).  Intellectualism conceives of the 
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world as a system of absolutely true thoughts, i.e. as the object of an infinite number of 
true judgements (PP, p. 50, SC, p. 229, n.1). The fundamental mistake of Intellectualism 
is that it assumes the determinate universe of science as the only true world (PP, p. 50). 
The result of surrendering the empirical world to natural science is the need to place 
meaning and norms of rationality in a sphere of truths that transcends the chain of cause 
and effect and the accompanying need to introduce the idea of a transcendental acosmic 
subject (Merleau-Ponty 1969a, p. 7, PP, p. 32). This is what Merleau-Ponty calls 
logicism and what McDowell terms rampant Platonism (MW, p. 92). The problem of 
intellectualism is, borrowing a phrase from McDowell, how we human beings can be 
thought capable of latching onto the inhuman meaning structures. The crux is the 
bastard notion of the empirical self (PP, p. 68); a self that qua empirical must be entirely 
inside nature but qua self must be entirely outside nature.   
Empiricism and Empiricism are said both to operate within the framework 
of Objective Thought. Objective Thought is characterized by a metaphysical 
presumption which Merleau-Ponty calls the prejudice of determinate being (PP, p. 62, 
n. 2). Though Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly identify the prejudice of the 
determinacy of being with Scientistic Naturalism, it is clear that the prejudice is part and 
parcel of the idea that what exists is what science can determinate, taking the 
mathematical laws of physics as paradigmatic (PP, pp. 57, 66).  
 Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Empiricism and of Intellectualism is primarily 
a phenomenological critique. He criticizes the views on perception implied in the two 
positions for not being true to the way the world is actually presented to us in 
perception. As I mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 2 phenomenological 
observations are also part of the motivation for the relational account of perception. 
McDowell criticizes the common factor view of perception for making ‘the most 
conspicuous phenomenological fact there is’ unintelligible, namely the fact that 
perceptual experiences purport to be of the world (McDowell 1998a, p. 243). This was 
what I called the deeper version of Minimal Empiricism, which states that in order for it 
to be intelligible that perceptual appearances can purport to be of the world, we need to 
see the world itself as being directly manifest in the appearance. The first version of 
Minimal Empiricism was the idea that in order to make the empirical content of beliefs 
intelligible we need to see perception as the place where the world can prove us wrong. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that we find normative relations at an even deeper level of 
perception than the level of conceptual content. He further argues that without 
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recognition of such a perception-specific configuration of meaning we will not be able 
to make intentionality as such intelligible. This idea we can identify as the idea of a 
Minimal Empiricism at a level of perception that is deeper than the level of perceptual 
appearances with object-dependent conceptual content.    
 
5.1.2 The shortcomings of Empiricism and Intellectualism 
Merleau-Ponty primarily criticizes Empiricism and Intellectualism for not being able to 
account for the specific kind of meaning-structure characteristic of our perceptual 
experiences. Examples of such meaning structures are the figure-ground relation 
investigated by Gestalt psychology and the relation between a perceived object and the 
perspectival profiles through which the object is perceived explored by Husserl (SC, p. 
201). The focus on the specific kind of meaning-configurations we experience in 
perception marks a distinct difference to McDowell’s approach. For Merleau-Ponty the 
transcendental problem of perception is first and foremost a phenomenological problem.  
The problem facing Empiricism is that the experience of what we can 
isolate in perception is dependent on the perceptual context and we therefore cannot 
make sense of the idea of isolated sense data as the building blocks of perception. 
Empiricism is faced with a dilemma. Either it claims that the pure impressions are 
imperceptible or it turns to a wholly behaviorist conception of the project of an 
objective science of subjectivity (PP, p. 18).89 The first option makes the idea of pure 
impressions unthinkable (impassable) (PP, p. 10). The second option faces the problem 
Merleau-Ponty discusses in his first book: the observation of behaviour depends on the 
inseparable link between the Gestalt-organization of the observed behaviour and the 
Gestalt-organization of the perception of behaviour. The unbreakable link makes it 
impossible to feign ignorance of consciousness in favour of a purely objective 
representation of behaviour (SC, p. 199).90 Empiricism fails to make the inherent 
 
 
 
89 Quine’s naturalization of epistemology is an example of the behaviouristic turn of Empiricism. Quine 
claims to go beyond the discussion on whether sense-data or Gestalt has epistemic priority by replacing 
the concept of sense-data with the concept of observational sentences, i.e. sentences with a constant 
causal connection between stimuli and judgments manifest in behaviour (Quine 1969, p. 76).    
90 The structure of the argument is similar to McDowell’s arguments against a Dummettian full-blooded 
Theory of Meaning: the idea of a full-blooded Theory of Meaning involves the absurd idea of an observer 
who from a position in ‘cosmic exile’ reconstructs a Theory of Meaning solely by observation of the 
behaviour of the speakers. The observer of the expressivity-neutral behaviour must either rely on her own 
private understanding and we get a Psychologism of meaning or she must rely on a previous 
intersubjective understanding, but if the Theory of Meaning is to be full-blooded this cannot be 
presupposed and we get Behaviourism (cf. McDowell 1987).     
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meaning-structure of perception intelligible because it starts out with the idea of pure 
sensations. The Myth of the Given is the myth of the possibility of a bare presence with 
no conceptual content having a rational bearing on beliefs. What Merleau-Ponty calls 
the Myth of Sensations is the myth of the possibility of pure sensations with no internal 
structure or meaning nevertheless coming together and providing us with the perceptual 
experiences we actually enjoy (SC, p. 179).   
Intellectualism attempts to amend the empiricist model by introducing an 
autonomous faculty of judgment which is said to synthesize the given manifold in 
representations with conceptual content. As such intellectualism feeds on the reductio 
ad absurdum of Empiricism, just like Coherentism in McDowell’s analysis is an 
intelligible response to the disclosure of the idea of the Given as a myth (PP, p. 40). The 
idea of Coherentism figures in the dialectics of Merleau-Ponty as well. He criticizes 
Intellectualism for constructing a picture of perception that obliterates the common 
sense distinction between perceiving and judging (PP, pp. 58, 64). It is precisely the 
effacement of such a distinction which Coherentism embraces. Most often 
Intellectualism is represented by Cartesianism and a Kantian Criticism. Cartesianism 
takes consciousness to be a completely self-disclosed sphere, which therefore must be 
of a different nature than the sensuous input, the hylé, which in turn must be a material 
thing. The consequence is that it becomes unthinkable how the mind can ever meet the 
material world (PP, p. 278). Criticism is a Kantian version of Intellectualism that denies 
that our judgements are caused by the objective world’s impingements on our bodies, 
but maintains that we need a transcendental notion of sensuous content to supplement 
the idea of the conceptual scheme provided by the transcendental subject (SC, p. 216, 
PP, p. 319, n. 1). Here the total dismissal of the dualism of scheme and content figures 
indirectly as the absurd position from which Criticism recoils. The motivation behind 
Criticism is the thought that without the ideal if not real separability of conceptual form 
and perceptual material we would lack the resources needed to recognize that the world 
we experience is not of our making through and through. The result is that it inherits the 
problem of making sense of the meaning-structures inherent in perception. 
Intellectualism begins with the idea of blind intuitions and therefore its compensatory 
attempt ends in empty concepts (PP, p. 41). 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the dialectic movement between of 
Empiricism and Intellectualism bears striking similarities to McDowell’s analysis of the 
oscillation between the Myth of the Given and the recoil positions of Kantian 
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transcendental idealism and Coherentism. The two authors differ, however, in their 
responses to the exposed dilemmas. Merleau-Ponty urges that we can only escape the 
dialectic predicament if we can bring ourselves in a position to recognize that the 
sensible signs and their meaning are not even ideally separable (PP, p. 48). McDowell 
urges that we will only be able to dismount the restless seesaw if we can get a firm grip 
on the thought that receptivity does not make even a notionally separable contribution to 
the co-operation of receptivity and spontaneity that constitutes a perceptual experience 
(MW, p. 9). What McDowell refers to here is of course not the idea that in order to 
avoid the Myth of the Given we must deny any distinction between perception and 
judgment, that would be a recoil into Coherentism. The idea he rejects is the idea of 
pure sensations, i.e. sensations that are intelligible in separation from the involvement of 
conceptual capacities in perception. Merleau-Ponty’s argues that once we reject the idea 
of pure sensations we become able to make a phenomenologically sound distinction 
between passivity and spontaneity because we no longer find ourselves compelled to 
introduce a synthetic activity of Kantian understanding (entendement/Verstand) in order 
to account for sui generis perceptual meaning (PP, p. 65). He claims that in perception 
we find an original kind of meaning and a unique kind of unity, i.e. the unity of the 
singular object in its bodily presence (présence charnelle, PP, p. 127). If we try to make 
sense of perceptual meaning by appeal to the conceptual capacities that constitute our 
spontaneity we will, according to Merleau-Ponty, commit a fallacy inversely 
proportional to the naturalistic fallacy. We will infer how perception is from how it 
ought to be: the content of perception must be conceptual otherwise it will not be able to 
make our conceptual knowledge possible (PP, p. 48). The critical question for 
McDowell’s conceptualism is whether it commits such a fallacy and thereby irrevocably 
distorts the phenomenology of perception eventually making objectivity as such 
inconceivable.  
 
5.2 McDowell’s new version of conceptualism  
5.2.1 The idea of intuitional content 
In a recent paper McDowell has changed his view on perception on two points 
(McDowell 2008, p. 3). I shall focus on the second of these changes and term the new 
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conception of perceptual content embodied conceptualism.91 I will try to demonstrate 
that this change can be understood as motivated by a recognition of a kind of deep 
Minimal Empiricism, comparable to the one suggested by Merleau-Ponty.    
The second of the assumptions McDowell now thinks he was wrong to 
make is the assumption that the content of perception is propositional. He still urges that 
the content of perception is conceptual through and through but he thinks he was 
mistaken to conceive of it as also propositional. It is not propositional because 
propositional content is discursive whereas what McDowell now calls intuitional 
content is not. To say that propositional content is discursive is a way of expressing the 
thought that when a subject has an experience with propositional content he ‘puts 
significances together’, i.e. the subject’s conceptual capacities are exercised in a 
synthetic activity that brings them together so as to give unity to the proposition. When 
I think the demonstrative thought, ‘That is an ice cube’, I synthesize a demonstrative 
concept and the concept of an ice cube in a predicative judgement. The same concepts 
can be used in other judgements such as, ‘An ice cube can melt’ or, ‘That was not an ice 
cube after all’. The fact that we can only understand a propositional attitude in terms of 
a discursive activity that gives unity to the content does not mean that such activity is 
carried out as a voluntary activity of the subject. To suggest so would be to introduce 
the Mythology of Activity that Husserl warns against when he introduces the term 
intentional act as a term equivalent to that of an intentional experience (Husserl 1992b, 
p. 393). The term ‘discursive activity’ reflects the fact that we can only understand a 
subject’s understanding of a propositional content in terms of her possession of the 
concepts which contribute to the meaning of the proposition, but which could also 
contribute to the meaning of an infinity of other propositions comprehensible to the 
subject.  
In contrast to propositional content the content of perception is not 
discursive. That the intuitional content is not discursive is shown by the fact that the 
content of an experience typically exceeds the grasp of the actual discursive conceptual 
 
 
 
91 As will be evident from what follows the change I focus on has already found inchoate expression in 
earlier of McDowell’s writings. The first change McDowell makes is that he no longer thinks that all 
perceptually based non-inferential knowledge must be knowledge with a content that is given in the 
perception on which it is based. He accepts Charles Travis’ point that we can non-inferentially know that 
for instance a bird is a cardinal, though what is given in perception as such is no different from what 
could be given to a person who lacks the concept of a cardinal. Contrary to Travis he insists that 
perception has content proper. This might be more of a settling of a previously open question than a 
change of mind (cf. McDowell 2002a, p. 280).      
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capacities of the perceiver (2007a, p. 347, 2008, p. 6). I might be presented with an ice 
cube that is purplish, but I don’t possess the concept ‘purplish’ and in fact I have never 
seen a colour like the one I see just now. This does not show that the content of my 
perception is non-conceptual. I can introduce a new discursive conceptual capacity 
which has a content just as specific as the content of my visual experience via a 
demonstrative reference: ‘the ice cube is coloured thus’ (MW, p. 57, 2006c, p. 7). What 
it does show is that we cannot understand the content of perception as a content that 
depends on my actual discursive conceptual repertoire. That the perceptually given is 
nevertheless given in a conceptual form is reflected in the fact that to enjoy the 
experience is to be rationally entitled to a belief with for instance the content that the ice 
cube is coloured thus. Such a demonstratively based belief makes an aspect of the very 
content of perception the content of a proposition. The content of the demonstrative is 
dependent on the actual content of perception, but the content of perception is not 
dependent on an actual discursive conceptual capacity. For the intuitional content to be 
conceptual content it is enough that the subject could make it the content of 
demonstratively based concept (McDowell 2008, p. 8).  
 
5.2.2 Objectifying and non-objectifying modes of perception 
In order to make an aspect of the perceptually given the content of a discursive 
conceptual capacity we need to ‘carve’ it out from the perceptually given (McDowell 
2007a, p. 347, 2008, p. 7).92  The metaphor of ‘carving out’ might seem to suggest that 
we begin with an unorganized given on which we bring our conceptual tool to work. 
That would be the Myth of the Given. What is registered by the metaphor is a 
distinction between ‘having something in view’ and the kind of attending to aspects of 
what one has in view which is needed in order to make the aspects of the content the 
content of a judgment (McDowell 2008, p. 4).93 Even in the case where I do possess the 
concept needed to express the content of my perception in thought I still need to carve it 
 
 
 
92 In the rest of this chapter I try to develop the ideas proposed by McDowell in ‘Avoiding the Myth of 
the Given’ (2008). I am not claiming that the position I develop under the name of embodied 
conceptualism is necessarily something McDowell is committed to.  
93 The distinction has been present in McDowell’s work long before he came to the conclusion that it has 
negative consequences for the idea that perceptual content is propositional. In the Woodbridge lectures it 
figures as a distinction between the intuitional content of a perceptual experience and the ‘specific way’ a 
subject can direct a demonstrative ‘at the ostensible layout of the ostensibly seen environment’ 
(McDowell 1998j, p. 459). McDowell does not use the word ‘attending’ as synonym for ‘carving out’ and 
as I shall try to show there are good reasons to be careful when using the term.  
 
 
 
143
                                                
out in order for my thought to be a thought about the particular object or property 
(McDowell 2008, p. 7).  
I think we can express at least one aspect of the distinction McDowell 
makes between ‘having in view’ or ‘intuiting’ and ‘carving out’ by exploiting Husserl’s 
distinction between having something in the minds eye (im geistigen Auge Haben) and 
grasping that something (Erfassen) (Husserl 1992a, §38). 94  The distinction is not a 
distinction between what appears as the background and what appears as a figure on the 
background or between what is in the periphery and what my gaze is focused on. I can 
have my gaze fixed on an object without grasping the object, i.e. without carving out 
any features of the object and consequently without demonstratively referring to the 
object. I can be absorbed in thought and while thinking my eyes can take a stroll. My 
gaze wanders purposeless from one object to another, the objects appear as figures on a 
background and glide back into the background as my gaze moves from the flowers in 
the window  to the chimney on a rooftop and further until I simply look into the open 
sky with no objects figuring in my view. Such Gestaltung or configuration of objects on 
a background is not a product of my grasping the object.  
Husserl stresses that the grasping is not another intentional experience but 
a modification of an intentional experience which is already directed towards an object. 
It is such modification which makes conceptual apprehending and predication of the 
object possible (Husserl 1992a, p. 77). According to Husserl it is essential for all 
intentional experiences that merely have an object in eye (im blick des geistigen 
Gerichtetsein) that they can undergo such a modification and be turned into a grasping 
or a taking notice (bemerken/auf-etwas-achten). With Husserl we can term the two 
modes of intentionality a non-objectifying and an objectifying mode of intentionality. 
Through the objectification we make the full intentional object, i.e. the content of the 
experience, present as an object that can serve as the substratum of conceptual 
apprehending and predication.  
When I say we can at least capture an aspect of the distinction McDowell 
makes by exploiting Husserl’s distinction it is because ‘having something in view’ for 
McDowell does not only cover the experiences of objects that Husserl characterizes as 
an actually lived through experience. Presumably the term also covers the way objects 
 
 
 
94 The distinction does not pertain to perception alone, but is a perfectly general distinction which also 
pertains to our inner life.  
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are given in what Husserl calls the outer horizon of the object to which we are for the 
moment attending. Such objects in the outer horizon are given in what Husserl calls 
non-actual (inaktuelle) intentional experiences. The objects given in the horizon are 
equally given in a non-objectifying mode of awareness and it is this broad notion of a 
non-objectifying mode of presentation which I take to be equivalent with McDowell’s 
idea of having something in view, i.e. an experience with intuitional content. Merleau-
Ponty, following Husserl, says that perceiving an object is either having the object in 
the margin of the visual field and having the capacity to fixate it or it is actually 
responding to the solicitation of the objects by fixating them (PP, p. 81). As Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty stresses that the objects in the margin are given as potential objects for 
my actual intentional life. Both the object in the margin and the object as fixated can be 
presented in a non-objectifying mode of experiencing. Not only is fixating an object in 
perceptual experience not sufficient for carving out aspects of the intuitional content, I 
think we need to acknowledge that it is not even necessary.  I can be attending to objects 
in the periphery of my visual field while having my gaze fixated on an object. Such 
attending will not allow me to exploit the full content of what is given in the horizon of 
the object I fixate, but it will allow me to carve out some aspects and exploit these in 
judgements. The distinction between an object’s givenness in an actual act of fixating 
and an objects givenness as a potential object in the horizon is orthogonal to the 
distinction between an objectifying and a non-objectifying mode of experiencing.  
Several of McDowell’s phenomenologically inclined critics have argued 
that what is given in the margin must be given in a non-conceptual way. In response 
McDowell urges that the issue of whether something is focally given or not is irrelevant 
to the question of whether the content is conceptual or not (McDowell 2002a, p. 283, p. 
278). What matters is whether a feature is available to serve as rational input to one’s 
doxastic rationality (McDowell 2006d, p. 133). The intuitional content ‘embodies an 
immediate potential’ for exploitation in judgements ((McDowell 2008, p. 9). The 
potential need not be actualised in order for the content to constitute a rational 
entitlement to a belief with a content that would express the intuitional content 
discursively. With the distinctions I made above we can say that the availability of 
intuitional content for thought is dependent on having the content given in a non-
objectified perceptual mode of appearance. Further we can say that having one’s gaze 
focused on an object is neither necessary nor sufficient for the actual carving out of 
intuitional content related to an object in view.  
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5.2.3 The dispute concerning the primacy of perception  
With the distinctions above we can formulate what I take to be the fundamental 
disagreement between McDowell’s embodied conceptualism and Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the transcendental problem of perception. Let me first state the main 
claims of Embodied conceptualism in order to contrast these with Merleau-Ponty’s view 
on perception.  
Embodied conceptualism claims that what is given in intuition is 
conceptual content. Intuitional content embodies an immediate potential for true 
thoughts about the sector of the world one has in view. According to embodied 
conceptualism Kant expressed a real insight when he said that the same function that 
gives unity to the representations of judgements also gives unity to the synthesis of 
various representations (McDowell 2008, p. 4). The same function gives unity to the 
discursive activity of joining concepts together in propositions and to the objects given 
in the intuition. To give a name to this function we can exploit Kant’s notion of 
spontaneity. Spontaneity is a name for the function that both allows for our free, 
responsible judgments and for our capacity to have the world in view in intuition. 
Spontaneity is a general term that covers both our practical and our theoretical 
rationality and as such it is a name for our capacity to respond to reasons as reasons and 
to critically asses the credentials of putative reasons. In order to explain the nature of 
intuitional content there is no way around an appeal to the perceiving subjects 
discursive conceptual capacities. Intuitional content is the content that could become the 
content of a possible true judgement made by the subject to whom the intuitional 
content is given.  
Merleau-Ponty argues that in order to accommodate Minimal Empiricism 
at its deepest level we need to uncover a primordial operation which is presupposed by 
all logical mediation among which he clearly includes any possible non-inferential 
perceptual judgements (PP, p. 52). The primordial operation is said to impregnate the 
sensible with meaning and perception is said to be a grasping of a meaning immanent in 
the sensible before any judgement (PP, pp. 43-44). The claim is that we must recognize 
the original meaning and intentionality of perception if we are to make it intelligible 
how intentionality understood as the ‘aboutness’ characteristic of our thinking is at all 
possible. As such this claim does not necessarily diverge from the claims of embodied 
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conceptualism. However, Merleau-Ponty goes further, and claims that we must 
recognize a primordial operation distinct from the synthetic operations of Kantian 
spontaneity in order to make the sui generis perceptual meaning intelligible (PP, p. 65). 
With a Husserlian expression Merleau-Ponty calls the intentionality of perception 
operating intentionality (fungierende Intentionalität, PP, pp. xiii, 478). Merleau-Ponty 
insists on the need to give prerogative to perceptual meaning in our attempt to tackle the 
transcendental problem of perception.95 In contrast embodied conceptualism insists on 
the need to regard the function operating in perception as ‘essentially a faculty for 
discursive activity, a power to judge’ (McDowell 2008a, p. 7). From the standpoint of 
Merleau-Ponty the commitment of embodied conceptualism will appear as a misleading 
prejudice: Embodied conceptualism is blind to the original meaning of perception. The 
original meaning of perception is not the meaning which is immediately available for 
thought. There is an original grasping of perceptual meaning which conditions the 
grasping McDowell calls a carving out. The perceptual field organizes itself in 
meaningful ways as we move our gaze around and as we move though our environment. 
It is this organization of the perceptual field in its intrinsic relation to our bodily 
movements which Merleau-Ponty claims must be understood on its own terms. The 
only alternative, he claims, is to understand it within the framework of Objective 
Thought and this will ultimately undermine our notion of truth and objectivity as such.   
I shall argue that such an objection raised from the view-point of Merleau-
Ponty expresses a genuine insight but that it is possible to accommodate this insight 
within embodied conceptualism. The insight is that perceptual meaning possesses a 
relative autonomy in relation to our beliefs and our judgements and that this relative 
autonomy is essential for perception as world-disclosing and consequently crucial to 
recognize in order to hold on to Minimal Empiricism. We need to recognize an internal 
normative organisation of the perceptual field as distinct from the normative 
organisation of our web of beliefs. I am inclined to believe that unless we can do this 
without compromising the idea that what is behind the configuration is the same 
function that provides the unity of judgements we will be unable to make sense of the 
 
 
 
95 This priority of perception also serves a methodological purpose. Merleau-Ponty sees, just like Husserl, 
a radical commonality between the mode of givenness that the phenomenological method is to provide 
and the perceptual mode of givenness (Merleau-Ponty 1989, pp. 67-68). Phénoménologie de la 
perception is to familiarize us with the new method developed through its application on a phenomenon 
that itself serves to elucidate the essence of the method (PP, p. 278).  
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carving out made possible by the configuration as world-disclosing. Carving out would 
end up in mere confusion. It would be like the ‘fumbling of blind finger-ends in an 
overcrowded pocket’ (Samuel Butler 2006 [1890]). 
 Before I turn to a discussion of some of Merleau-Ponty’s arguments for 
the need to assume  a primordial operation of perception I shall show how McDowell’s 
idea of intuitional content provide the resources for countering some substantial 
objections to conceptualism. 
 
5.3 Challenges to Embodied Conceptualism  
5.3.1 New answers to old objections 
The distinction between intuitional content and discursive content allows for a new 
answer to what Bermúdez has called the master argument against conceptualism 
(Bermúdez 2007, pp. 61-63). The argument proceeds as follows. Any account of 
perceptual content must be able to account for the possibility of a familiar sort of 
mistakes in which we have a colour presented in full view but nevertheless make false 
judgement about the colour we see. In order to account for the possession conditions for 
basic observational concepts such as colour concepts we must ascribe a discriminatory 
capacity to the subject. In order to possess the concept ‘red’ one must be able to 
discriminate between red and other colours when they are presented in perception. 
Conceptualism claims that the content of an experience which make it appropriate to 
apply the concept ‘red’ can only be specified by adverting to the very same concept 
whose application the experience makes appropriate. The content of the perception in 
which we exercise our discriminatory ability is already conceptual. If this is so the ‘slip 
of thought’ Bermúdez refers to can only be a mere verbal mistake and not a mistake in 
judgment. If it was a mistake in judgment we would need to see the subject as both 
accepting that something is red and not accepting it as red at the same time and in the 
same respect. This we cannot say of any person and maintain that the person is sane. 
However, we do make such mistakes in full sanity and the mistakes can enter our 
reasoning and lead us to further false beliefs. Hence the conclusion of the master 
argument: Conceptualism is false.  
The conclusion does not follow on embodied conceptualism. We can 
distinguish between having something in view and grasping the propositional content 
made available in the intuitional content we have in view. McDowell adheres to Frege’s 
rationality constraint on senses. Senses, i.e. concepts, must be sufficiently fine-grained 
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to make sure that we need not describe rational subjects as for instance believing one 
thing and at the same time disbelieving the same thing (McDowell 2004, p. 100, MW, 
p. 180). If we assume that what is given in perception is already propositional content 
such content would involve Fregean senses. Even if we think, as McDowell does, that 
senses can be object-dependent when based on demonstrative reference this will not 
provide an answer to the master argument. With embodied conceptualism we can 
account for the possibility of the relevant mistakes because the requirement of general 
transparency of sameness and differences in content-elements of a rational mind pertain 
only to our thinking not to the content of our perception. Perceiving is not grasping 
thoughts because perception does not have propositional content. What we need in order 
to accommodate slip of thoughts is the distinction between carving out and applying a 
concept. Even if I am directed towards something with the colour red in the objectifying 
mode of carving out this is merely a preparation of the intuitional content for thought. 
Carving out is not transforming the intuitional content into propositional content; it is 
modifying the experience and changing the mode of givenness of intuitional content. I 
can be directed towards a red colour in an objectifying mode of experience and 
mistakenly apply the concept ‘green’. This is not an instance of momentary madness it 
is simply an instance of failing to make my thoughts appropriately responsible to the 
world. Such mistakes are in principle no different from the mistake in the tie shop I 
discussed in Chapter 1. In the example of the tie shop the lighting conditions are falsely 
believed to obscure the appearance of colours. In such a case, McDowell argued, we 
can, by virtue of the content of perception, have a rational entitlement to a belief we 
refuse because we think we have reason not to endorse it. I the case of Bermúdez’ slip 
of thought we are equally entitled to a belief only we fail to take advantage of our 
entitlement and this time for no reason at all. There may be excuses for such mistakes, 
one may be very tired or under a lot of stress, but the fact that there is no reason for the 
belief does not make it unintelligible as belief. Just as we may acquire true beliefs 
passively without ever making up our minds simply by travelling perceptually through 
space, we may also acquire false beliefs by actively making up our minds when the 
mistake is staring us in the face.   
The distinction between seeing that P and believing that P to which 
McDowell appealed in his debate with Davidson on the belief-independence of 
perceptual content is now made via the distinction between having something in view 
and actively forming a belief (McDowell 2008, p. 11). As we say in chapter 1 (section 
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1.5) it was in the debate with Davidson that McDowell used the example of the tie shop 
with lighting conditions that are falsely believed to obscure the appearance of colours. 
Stroud has argued that in such case we still have a belief about the appearance of the 
colour, which might better be called an endorsement or an acceptance (Stroud 2002). To 
this McDowell replied that we need an idea of perception as something in which there is 
no attitude of acceptance at all, but only an invitation to adopt such an attitude 
(McDowell 2002a, p. 279). The distinction between having something in view and 
grasping a thought which articulates aspects of the intuitional content is a contribution 
to the development of such an idea of a non-attitudinal perception. As long as the 
content of perception is assumed to be propositional it is difficult to see how there is 
room for the idea of a distinctive normative role for perception, which does not reduce it 
to the role played by an acceptance of a propositional content (cf. McDowell 2008, 
p.10). It will seem as if Davidson’s coherentism is the only available alternative to the 
Myth of the Given unless we turn to a full-blooded externalism of justification.  
Next I will argue that the introduction of intuitional content is not just 
phenomenologically adequate it is of paramount importance in order to avoid problems 
similar to the one’s McDowell diagnoses as the predicament of Coherentism.  
 
5.3.2 An argument against propositional conceptualism 
Merleau-Ponty argues that we will not be able to make sense of perception as our 
primary openness to the objects of the world if we assimilate perception to synthetic 
activity of the same kind as that of our judgements and predications (PP, p. IV, p. 24). 
Further he urges that if we miss out on perception we will not be able to make 
objectivity as such intelligible. McDowell now thinks it was a mistake to assume that 
perceptual content is propositional and he acknowledges the need for a sui generis level 
of perceptual content. We may ask whether it is not just a contingent, phenomenological 
feature that our perception does not have propositional content, presuming that this is 
how our perception actually is. Why should the conception of perception as object-
involving and concept-involving experiences with propositional content be debarred 
from making sense of the openness to the world required by Minimal Empiricism?  
As Merleau-Ponty observes, we often ‘dream up’ absent persons or 
imaginary objects during our wake life. Furthermore, we constantly experience 
reflections, creaking sounds and passing tactile stimuli, without ever doubting that they 
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belong to the world and not us. We may ask how this is possible if perceptual 
experience consists in the grasping of a Fregean thought just like thinking: 
 
Si la réalité de ma perception n’était fondée que sur la cohérence 
intrinsèque des ”répresentations”, elle devrait être toujours hésitante, 
et, livré à mes conjectures probables, je devrais à chaque moment 
défaire des synthèse illusioires et réintégrer au reel des phénomènes 
aberrants que j’en aurais d’abord exclus. (PP, p. v). 
 
The defender of propositional attitudes might answer that what makes perception a 
special kind of attitude is that it consists is a passive actualization of discursive 
capacities in sensuous awareness. Seeing a pink ice cube is a conceptual shaping of 
visual consciousness (cf. McDowell 1998j, pp. 442, 460). Furthermore, the defender 
might say, the actualization of such capacities is world-involving and not just some 
inner representation. The question, however, is what meaning such a position could 
possibly give to the idea that perceptual content is world-involving.  
On the propositional view the content of perception is dependent on the 
actualization of discursive capacities in propositional unities. We only have the 
capacities we have, consequently what can be given in perception is limited to the 
concepts we have. But this cannot be right since obviously what is given in perception 
can exceed my actual conceptual repertoire. We might appeal to the possibility of 
demonstrative reference in order to explain the richness of our experience. What is it we 
can point out in such demonstrative references? It must be something that is already 
given to us otherwise our pointing would be blind. If it is given it must on this picture 
be given by virtue of actual discursive capacities. Consequently a demonstrative 
reference can only be a way of pointing to an aspect of the propositional content that we 
are already saddled with. The only alternative is to appeal to a non-conceptual given 
which could provide the surplus meaning that can take us beyond the propositional 
content provided by the involuntary coming together of concepts on stock.96  
If this argument is cogent the propositional position as such is not 
attractive. It is not just that it cannot accommodate a contingent feature of the 
phenomenology of perception on such an account. Just as Coherentism it faces the 
 
 
 
96 It is a line of argument similar to the one above that leads Campbell to the conclusion that a relational 
view of perception must deny that the content of perception is propositional (Campbell 2002, p. 124). 
Campbell, however, further concludes that the perceptual relation to the object must therefore be non-
conceptual. The carving out is what Campbell refers to as attentional highlighting.   
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problem of making it intelligible how perception can be the place where we can let the 
world manifest itself to us.97 In fact once it dissociates itself from the Myth of the Given 
it seems to become indistinguishable from Coherentism. On such a picture we cannot 
make sense of perception as genuinely world-involving and we will be faced with the 
problems of the common factor view of perception, without the option of a 
disjunctivism of appearances. The world as the inexhaustible reservoir from which 
objects appear has been reduced to the infinity of true propositions comprehensible by 
the subject on the basis of her present conceptual repertoire (PP, p. 396). The world is a 
firm fabric (tissu solide) which cannot be recaptured by a web of beliefs once it is lost 
as phenomenon (PP, pp. V, XII). Without the possibility of perception substantiating the 
content of propositions they cannot be pictured as interpenetrating cogwheels; they are 
spinning in the void. 
I now return to the challenge posed by Merleau-Ponty’s elucidation of 
phenomena he takes to show the need to assume an operating intentionality irreducible 
to the workings of spontaneity. The crucial question will be whether embodied 
conceptualism can accommodate the phenomena that Merleau-Ponty argues we need to 
recognize if we are to establish a vantage point from where we can get an unimpeded 
view of our openness to the world.  
 
5.3.3 The challenge of real hallucination and the challenge of perceptual illusions 
Merleau-Ponty criticises both Empiricism and Intellectualism for not being able to 
account for the possibility of perceptual illusions and hallucinations as they occur in real 
life in contrast to the hallucinations of the philosopher’s imagination (PP, pp. 340-344, 
385-397). The general problem is that within the framework of Objective Thought such 
phenomena has to be explained either as a mix up at the level of input to the mind, i.e. 
as a purely causal deficiency or the mistake must be located in our judgements.  
According to the intellectualist, here represented by Cartesianism, the 
existence of consciousness coincides with consciousness of existence and there is no 
distinction between appearance and reality (PP, pp. 340, 387). All truths and nothing but 
 
 
 
97 McDowell doesn’t explicitly endorse this negative transcendental claim in his “Avoiding the Myth of 
the Given” (2008). When he claims that an experience typically exceeds the grasp of the actual discursive 
capacities of the perceiver, this does not imply that the negative transcendental claim is false (2007a, p. 
347, 2008, p. 6). What might be merely ‘typical’ is not that the content of perception is non-discursive, 
but that the non-discursively given exhausts our actual discursive conceptual repertoire.   
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the truths about consciousness must be revealed to consciousness itself. The 
consequence is that a hallucination, if it is a fundamental kind of experience, must be 
accessible through and through to the subject who undergoes the hallucination. On such 
a view it is excluded that my hallucinations are perceptions without objects and that my 
perceptions are veridical hallucinations (PP, p. 340). In other words, if hallucinations 
and illusions designate fundamental kinds of experiences we must provide a disjunctive 
analysis of appearances. But if hallucinations were accessible in the way Cartesianism 
claims our subjectivity is then they should immediately dissolve, in fact the very idea of 
a hallucination becomes unintelligible (PP, pp. 341, 387). We are in the hopeless 
predicament of trying to account for the possibility of misidentifying objects constituted 
by ourselves (PP, p. 388).      
The alternative is to take the object of a genuine perception to be 
immanent to consciousness, in the sense of a mind-dependent object. The immanence of 
the object in turn makes hallucinations and perceptions in principle indistinguishable 
from the subject’s point of view (PP, p. 340). The essence of hallucinations becomes a 
highest common factor shared with genuine perceptual experiences. If such 
indistinguishability is the nature of hallucinations we have made the experience of truth 
unintelligible (PP, p. 341). On this picture the truth or falsity of an experience cannot 
consist in a subjectively recognisable relation to an exterior reality, it must be readable 
from a veridicality-neutral ‘intrinsic denominator’ if it is to be recognisable at all (PP, p. 
387). Because all we have to go on is a highest common factor shared by genuine 
experiences and hallucinations we cannot make sense of the idea of ever having an 
experience that reveals the world. This is the problem I, when expounding McDowell’s 
disjunctivism, expressed by saying that if we start out with something less than factive 
experiences it is a hopeless enterprise to re-claim our right to trust any appearance 
(Chapter 2, section 2.6). We are caught between a rationalism that makes hallucination 
unthinkable and a scepticism that not only makes knowledge seem impossible, it 
dissolves into an absurdism which empties the very idea of an appearance for meaning 
(PP, pp. 341-342): 
 
Dire que, dans la conscience, apparence et réalité ne font qu’un ou 
dire qu’elles sont séparées, c’est rendre impossible la conscience de 
quoi que ce soit, meme à titre d’apparence. (PP, p. 342). 
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Minimal Empiricism is undermined as the transcendental problem of perception 
flourishes in the hands of Cartesianism.98  
Merleau-Ponty argues that the fact that the hallucinating person can 
recognize his hallucination as something different from a veridical perception but 
nevertheless cannot put it to rest as a mere imagination highlights an essential feature of 
the perceptual logos (PP, p. 419).99 What makes the mode appearance of the 
hallucination distinguishable from a veridical perception is that it does not appear as 
accessible to further perceptual exploration (PP, pp. 390-391). The hallucination is not 
experienced as played out on the same scene as the objects around us because it does 
not respond to our movements by revealing new aspects in line with our sensory 
anticipations. When I go closer to an object I experience the details of the object 
unfolding until I get so close that the object itself blocks my view. The continuous 
unfolding of the perceptual world contrasts with the hallucination which, Merleau-Ponty 
says, lacks the thickness of perceptual reality and carries an implicit and inarticulate 
meaning. Cartesianism cannot accommodate such ghostlike appearances. Either the 
hallucination is in its essence no different from a genuine perception and must be 
indistinguishable qua experience from a genuine perception or the hallucination is a sui 
generis ‘cogitatio’ and should loose its grip the moment it appears in the mind of the 
subject who suffers the hallucination. Merleau-Ponty concludes that the relation 
between appearance and reality must already be ambiguous in normal perception if we 
are to make sense of the possibility of hallucinations (PP, pp. 340, 388). Normal 
perception itself is implicit and presumptive (PP, p. 395).  
The fact that normal perception is inherently ambiguous is according to 
Merleau-Ponty revealed by the possibility of what Siewert has called ‘phenomenally 
corrigible illusion’ (Siewert 2005, p. 283). Such mistakes are distinct from the slips of 
the mind Bermúdez appealed to in the master argument. They are ‘slips of perception’ 
made before any judgement and they are corrected at the level of perception itself. Here 
is one description of such an illusion:  
 
 
 
 
 
98 There are ways a rationalist could try to get around the conclusion. For a conceptual analysis of how 
Empiricism and Rationalism could account for delusions see Campbell (2001). 
99 Some patients are known to argue against the reality of their ongoing hallucinations (cf. PP, p. 386).  
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Si, dans un chemin creux, je crois voir au loin une large pierre plate 
sur le sol, qui est en realité une tache de soleil, je ne peux pas dire que 
je voie jamais la pierre plate au sense où je verrai en approchant la 
tache de soleil. La pierre plate n’apparaît, come tous les lointains, que 
dans un champ à structure confuse où les connexions ne son pas 
encore nettement articulées. (PP, p. 343).   
 
I think such experiences are very common and once we start noticing them it is not rare 
we come across an example in experience.100 Sometimes such perceptual confusion is 
so puzzling that we do take notice but more often they are fleeting and we are on our 
way before we take any further notice. Puzzle pictures are striking exploitations of the 
possibility of such perceptual confusion.  
What do such illusions tell us about the nature of perceptual appearance? 
Such illusions share the feature of inarticulateness with hallucinations. In contrast to 
hallucinations, however, they dissolve through the process of perceptual exploration to 
which hallucinations are immune. They are inaccessible but the revelation of their 
inaccessibility for further perceptual investigation is tantamount to their disappearance. 
They are, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, crossed out and regarded as null and void (PP, p. 
344, 396).101 What is disturbed in the case of hallucinations is neither pure rationality 
nor the order of the pure impressions. What is disturbed is a trust in the world 
(confiance au monde, PP 343). It is a trust which cannot be reduced to confidence in a 
rationalizing hypothesis nor a blind trust in a mechanism of nature that ‘operate in such 
a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension’ (Hume 2000, §7, Pt. I). With another 
Husserlian term Merleau-Ponty calls it the original perceptual faith (la foi originaire de 
la perception, Ur-Doxa/Ur-Glaube (PP, pp. 50, 66, 365, 395). 
 
5.3.4 A response to the challenge of real hallucinations 
Does the fact that hallucinations and phenomenal corrigible illusion occur embarrass 
embodied conceptualism? It is not obvious that it does. Let me first consider the 
challenge of real hallucinations. 
Merleau-Ponty takes the real insight of rationalism to be the idea that there 
is an essential difference between hallucinations and veridical experiences (PP, p. 388). 
 
 
 
100 Merleau-Ponty offers numerous examples (cf. PP, 24, p. 344). Siewert (2005) provide a number of 
first hand experiences of such phenomenally corrigible illusions. 
101 The ‘crossing out’ metaphor stems from Husserl. For an exposition of Husserl’s descriptions and 
classification of different kinds of perceptual illusion see Kenaan (1999). 
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This is the insight of the disjunctive account of appearances as well. The possibility of a 
relational account of perception and an accompanying disjunctive analysis of 
appearances does not crystallize as an option in Merleau-Ponty’s lay out of the dialectic 
situation. McDowell’s disjunctive account of appearances is distinct from the Cartesian 
version which dissolves the notion of a hallucination in the clarity of the mind. With a 
relational account of experience we can deny that consciousness is unambiguously 
revealed to itself without falling into the arms of scepticism. The ambiguity is what is 
registered in the ambiguity of the term appearance and it is the reason why the notion 
needs a disjunctive analysis. There is room for an account that allows experience to 
embrace the world and makes the experience dependent on an actual relation to an 
exterior, mind-independent object. What this requires, according to embodied 
conceptualism, is that we can conceive of our spontaneity as inextricably involved in 
the presentation of the world in perception otherwise the relation will be merely causal.  
If the conceptual content of world-involving perception is claimed to be 
propositional the hallucinations do seem to confront conceptualism with an impasse. 
We would either have to place the disturbance at the level of input to the mind or at the 
level of propositional thought. If we place it at the level of input and take this input to 
be cognitively available to the subject then the input must be conceived as a non-
conceptual given, otherwise we would be unable to distinguish it from a disturbance of 
propositional thought. The result is a recoil into the Myth of the Given. Alternatively we 
place the disturbance at the level of propositional thought proper. Propositional 
conceptualism adheres to Frege’s Rationality Constraint on the ascription of 
understanding of concepts. How are we to make sense of the propositional attitude 
purported to be involved when the subject suffers a hallucination? If it is an attitude of 
doubt whether the given propositional content is the content of a perception it is hard to 
make sense of the anxiety it causes in the mind of the patient. Further if the patient does 
recognize that the content of the hallucination is not a true proposition about the real 
world and has a clear idea of what the real world is, i.e. the world perception gives 
access to, how are we to characterise the propositional attitude involved in 
hallucination? If the patient does not have an intact mind it could according to 
propositional conceptualism mean that the rationality constraint no longer applies. 
Accordingly it could be claimed that the patient both believe that the hallucinatory 
appearance is a perception and disbelief that such is the case. But this misses the 
phenomenon. The patient has not lost his mind completely. The hallucinating subject 
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can recognize that it is impossible that a rat can come out of the mouth and thereby re-
enter the stomach but the hallucinations are not susceptible to his reasoning (cf. PP, p. 
386). He is in an existential limbo.  
I think that with the distinction between intuitional content and discursive 
content embodied conceptualism at least does not make the phenomena of 
hallucinations obviously unintelligible. The intelligibility of such phenomena does 
require the possible disintegration of the normal frictionless co-operation of spontaneity 
and sensibility that makes the intuitional content immediately available for thought. As 
Merleau-Ponty pointed out in his critique of Coherentism we do not normally confuse 
the perceptual world with what comes from us. In the case of hallucination something 
must have happened at the level of spontaneity and not just at a purely neuro-
physiological level. If we think spontaneity as an a priori condition of perceptual 
experience invulnerable to the contingencies of the world it would not make sense to 
regard empirical hallucinations as disturbances of spontaneity. But within the picture 
presented by embodied conceptualism there is no reason to think of spontaneity as 
separate from ourselves as living human being vulnerable to our environment.  
The thinking subject is not an acosmic transcendental subject constituting 
the conditions of possibility of appearances. The subject is an embodied agent made of 
flesh and blood. This does not imply that the perceiving and acting subject can be 
understood by the sciences that investigate the neural processes of the brain and the 
physiology of the body. Such a corollary only follows if we assume a scientistic 
monism of events. We do not need two substances in order to have two fundamentally 
kind of natural occurrences. As McDowell puts it in his critique of Millikan: 
  
Sense and reference do hang together as he [Frege] takes them to; so 
much the worse for the thesis that intactness in a mind is independent 
of semantic rationality. The assumption [that intactness in a mind is 
dependent on semantic rationality] is not substantive. Millikan makes 
it look as if it is by insisting that “the intact” mind must be healthy 
machinery in the head. Rather to have an intact mind is to be 
semantically rational. (McDowell 2004, 101-102). 
 
Just because we cannot see our spontaneity as a super-mechanism made of some 
inconceivably rigid material it does not follow that we need to conceive of it as made up 
of the causal mechanisms of brain-activity as if the mind was a complicated calculating 
machine (cf. MW, p. 92, n. 6, PP, 22). The possibility of taking spontaneity to be 
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involved in the natural life of humans without reducing it to machinery in the head is 
precisely what is provided by the dual conception of events. Loosing one’s perceptual 
capacities may be indistinguishable from loosing one’s mind. When hallucinations are 
still partly distinguishable from veridical perception it is because one has only partly 
lost one’s mind; that is what makes the prospect terrifying. It is only if we think of the 
mind as separable from sensibility that it becomes and all or nothing: Either it is 
transparent to it self and no hallucinatory appearances hiding as perceptions are possible 
or perception is veridical hallucinations and everything goes dark inside.  
I am not claiming that this is giving a full explication of the phenomena in 
question. For that the description of the phenomena is to coarse-grained and the 
suggested possibility of accommodating it too abstract. What I claim is that, at least on 
the face of, embodied conceptualism does not face greater difficulties in making sense 
of the possibility of hallucination than does Merleau-Ponty’s appeal to a perceptual faith 
that comes before any judgement.102 In fact we may suggest that the normal frictionless 
co-operation of spontaneity and receptivity is what constitutes the phenomenon of 
perceptual faith. 
 
5.3.5 A response to the challenge of phenomenal corrigible illusions 
But doesn’t this answer to the challenge miss the point of Merleau-Ponty’s appeal to 
real hallucinations in contrast to the philosopher’s dream of a hallucination? We 
constantly encounter illusions which dissolve themselves and it is just as much to 
accommodate this phenomenon, which also help make hallucinations conceivable, that 
we need to acknowledge an inherent ambiguity of appearances.103 According to 
Merleau-Ponty all perceptual appearances are presumptive and carry with them their 
 
 
 
102 Tim Thornton explains why such phenomena as thought insertion and multiple personality disorder are 
difficult to make sense of on McDowell’s conception of personal identity, what he a calls an embodied 
narrative account using ‘narrative’ in a very broad sense. However, he thinks such an account fairs better 
than reductionist accounts because it at least can make sense of the real difficulty of providing intelligible 
phenomenological descriptions of such phenomena (Thornton 2004, p. 367). Since Thornton’s paper 
McDowell has argued that his account does not disallow the very idea of multiple personal agents 
embodied in a single human body. Further he thinks that there could be pathological cases where we 
ought to recognize multiple agents for reasons that cannot be separated from ethical considerations 
(McDowell 2006a, pp. 119).   
103 Merleau-Ponty speaks of understanding the faith in the hallucination via the perceptual faith of normal 
perception and vice versa. Such mutual elucidation is a constant feature of his methodology. The blind 
man’s cane is like an extension of his tactile sense and so function as the analogue of vision (PP, p. 167). 
Vision can be understood as a palpating tool and so as the analogue of the blind man’s cane (PP, pp. 179, 
257).  
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possible disjunction or exclusion from the world (disjunction possible, PP, p. 396). This 
possibility is, however, not a possible point of attack for scepticism. We can only make 
sense of the possibility of such illusory appearances because we do have experiences of 
revelations of the world, i.e. of the illusions being crossed out when they are revealed as 
not accessible the way the world is accessible in perception (PP, pp. 341, 396). The idea 
of perception as a grand illusion does not gain a foothold because it presupposes what it 
is supposed to demonstrate is impossible: that we actually see the world. It is in 
principle possible that doubt could be raised about any particular object of experience 
but there is a certitude surrounding the world in general (PP, pp. 344, 396).  
 The structure of this argument is familiar from McDowell’s response to 
scepticism. Scepticism only has an inescapable grip on our thinking if we can make 
sense of appearances while assuming that it is in principle impossible that such an 
appearance could directly reveal how things really are. But this assumption is not a 
genuine possibility of thought because the notion of an appearance is parasitic on the 
intelligibility of appearances as direct manifestation of the world in perception. 
Merleau-Ponty provides a phenomenological counterpart to McDowell’s negative 
transcendental argument. From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty, however, something 
is missing in McDowell’s argument: a return to the phenomena themselves. The 
disagreement surfaces when Merleau-Ponty argues that the level of perception he seeks 
to elucidate through phenomenological description is unavoidably beyond the scope of 
an approach which sees spontaneity at work already at the most primitive level or 
perception. I suspect that we can only account for the deepest layer of our perception if 
we can see it as penetrated by spontaneity.  
 The phenomenon of phenomenal corrigible illusions is but one amongst 
the many phenomena, including dreams, hallucinations, mythical thinking, the 
experiences of human infants and young children, to which Merleau-Ponty draws 
attention. The point is to make us aware of the ambiguity of appearances and to show 
that we only face the irresolvable antinomy of a transparent mind and an opaque world 
as long as we do not question the prejudice of determinate being. I think we may have 
resolved the antinomy if we can see our way to regarding genuine perception as a 
natural empirical phenomena with conceptual intuitional content.  
The phenomena Merleau-Ponty describes are to a large extent experiences 
of lack of self-transparency of the mind and the accompanying possibility of confusions 
of mind and world. A relational, conceptual conception of perception agrees that our 
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subjectivity is not self-disclosed. Furthermore it is stresses the contingency of our 
perception. We do need favours from the world in order to access it, and so we can say 
with Merleau-Ponty that the perceptually given is a gift of nature (PP, pp. 53, 147). 
Perception is not alone a co-operation of our own self-standing spontaneity and an 
internal mode of presentation of appearances we then call receptivity. Receptivity is the 
co-operation of our spontaneity and the world in perception. Sometimes the world is not 
immediately co-operative. Our perception can slip on the slopes of the world and so for 
a moment spontaneity is spinning in a void.  
In his description of the illusion of the flat stone on the path Merleau-
Ponty claims that we are not entitled to say that we don’t see the illusory flat stone in 
the same way as we see the patch of sunlight when the illusion dissolves. But this seems 
wrong. We do not see the flat stone because there is no flat stone there. We do see the 
patch of sunlight which is really there. Merleau-Ponty’s possible disjunction of 
perceptual appearances is the disjunction of appearances that purport to show us the 
world but are illusory and appearances that similarly purport to present the world and 
actually do so. Only in the latter case do we have genuine intuitional content that 
embodies a rational entitlement to true beliefs.  
But don’t we import the problems of propositional conceptualism with this 
talk of appearances as possessing content that can be illusory or genuine according to 
whether they represent the world as it really is? Is this not what Merleau-Ponty indicates 
when he writes as follows: ‘Ma perception ne porte pas sur un contenu de conscience: 
elle porte sur le cendrier lui-même’ (PP, p. 301). Let us take a closer look at how 
Merleau-Ponty describes the illusions. He writes: When walking on the path I see the 
illusory stone in the sense that my sensori-motor field gives the meaning ‘stone on the 
path’ to the bright patch (PP, p. 343). The sensori-motor meaning is reflected in the fact 
that I am already poised for the sensation of the smooth and solid surface under my foot 
(je m’apprête à sentir). The sense in which such perception is not distinguishable from 
non-illusory seeing is the sense in which everything seen from sufficiently far away is 
not poisedly articulated (nettement articulées). I think Merleau-Ponty is right to say that 
we have bodily anticipations of the sensible experiences and that such anticipation 
might be constitutive for the illusory appearances. Once on the way out of my apartment 
I suddenly checked my closing the door because I noticed the light was still on. I was 
already on the way into my bedroom to turn of the light when my project dissolved 
before I could take the first step. It was a bright patch of sunlight on the wall that had 
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appeared to me as ‘light on in the bedroom’. In such experiences it is not just a 
perception that is crossed out it is a practical project that is revealed as groundless.  
One reason as to why it is hard to recognize such perceptual illusions as 
conceptual is that they are so indeterminate and tend to dissolve when we look closer. 
However, when we articulate the meaning of such illusory appearances as ‘stone on the 
path’ or ‘light on in the bedroom’ we are articulating the meaning. We are not 
articulating it in a propositional form and according to embodied conceptualism we are 
right not to do so when we are trying to capture the phenomenon of intuitional content. 
The fact that the content is not propositional does not imply that it is non-conceptual. 
The very fact that we speak of a correction at the level of perception and of a crossing 
out of an appearance while replacing it with another indicates that there is a sense in 
which the experience was representational. The illusory experience represents the world 
in a misleading way and the dissolution and replacement with a veridical perception 
leads us back on track. There is, as Merleau-Ponty describes, a normativity of 
perceptual appearances which works with a certain relative autonomy in relation to the 
normative relations of the space of propositional thought. How are to make sense of this 
normativity? I think we can understand it as a matter of perception disclosing the world 
as it is or not doing so. Further, if we want to make sense of what it means that a 
perception is world-disclosing we can only do so by appealing to the true beliefs such a 
perception invites or, as McDowell also puts it, the beliefs afforded by the perception. 
What is the alternative advanced by Merleau-Ponty? 
 
5.4. Challenging phenomenological naturalism 
5.4.1 The initial worry  
Merleau-Ponty states that the explicit affirmation of a true proposition is more than just 
an immediate acceptance of undeniable evidence presented in perception. The 
judgement is the consequence of a rupture with the immediacy of perception and is to 
be understood as a correction of possible mistakes dependent on a previous 
interrogation and doubt (PP, p. 341). In an explicit judgement, it is said, we crystallize 
an infinite collection of motives, and consequently it is impossible to unfold all the 
reasons for an affirmation in their entirety (PP, pp. 342, 452). We get a picture of 
human beings as through and through sensuous beings whose perceptual interrogation 
and exploration of the world is the condition of possibility of judgements. Judgements 
involve a rupture with the immediacy of perceptual life that is originally motivated by 
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the resistance met in the perceptual unfolding of the world. On the one hand we have a 
perceptual ‘participation’ in the world and on the other hand we have the rupture of our 
‘complicity’ with the world in which critical thought is born (PP, pp. 342, 452). The two 
aspects of human existence Merleau-Ponty also speaks of as the irreflexive living 
through of perceptual experiences and the reflection or, as we might put it, the stepping 
back required for us to make judgements about what we perceive.  
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relation between sensibility and 
spontaneity does not figure explicitly in the intellectual landscape mapped out by 
McDowell. In McDowell’s topography we only find one possible way of denying 
Scientistic Naturalism, namely his own relaxed naturalism. Merleau-Ponty’s position, if 
attainable, provides an alternative way. Mike Martin has suggested that Merleau-Ponty 
embraces transcendental idealism and consequently denies Thesis 1 of the pentalemma 
from Chapter 1, i.e. Experiential Naturalism (Martin 2004, p. 43). It is true that 
Merleau-Ponty denies that we can conceive of perception as just one natural event 
among others, but when he does so he speaks of nature conceived as a flux of spatio-
temporal events that are merely causally related (SC, p. 208). Such a conception of 
nature is according to Merleau-Ponty a disfiguration of the true natural world, i.e. the 
world to which perception first gives access and from which the event of perception is 
received as a gift (PP, p. 33). Merleau-Ponty, just like McDowell, denies Scientistic 
Naturalism and urges the need to develop an alternative understanding nature. We can 
call his proposal phenomenological naturalism.  
The characterisation of phenomenological naturalism I just gave above 
raises the immediate worry that it is really a sophisticated version of the Myth of Given. 
The description of perception as immediate coincidence with the sensible, which does 
not yet involve our spontaneity makes it hard to see how perception could be what gives 
us access to the world we can make true judgements about. If spontaneity is separated 
from the primordial operation of perception which impregnates meaning on the 
sensible, the thinking mind seems to receive the meaning from outside itself as input 
that has already been shaped by the separately working operating intentionality. But if 
this is the position of the mind it is in principle in a position no different from the 
Cartesian mind which receives input worked over by the independent mechanisms of 
the material body. This is obviously a position Merleau-Ponty denies he puts us in and 
he is acutely aware of the risk of rendering the connection between sensibility and 
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spontaneity unintelligible. It is such an imminent danger he notes on the last page of his 
first work La structure du comportement (1942): 
 
Peut-on penser la conscience perceptive sans la supprimer comme 
mode original, peut-on en maintenir la specificité sans rendre 
impensable son rapport à la conscience intellectuel? (SC, p. 241). 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s proposal is that we need to conceive of the mind (l’esprit) as always to 
a certain degree perceptual. It is only if we can recognise that the mind is permeated 
with pre-objective perceptual meaning that we will be able to make sense of the 
possibility of making mistakes in our judgements and thereby of our judgements as 
more than the projections of our own mind into an empty space (PP, pp. 44, 55, n. 2 
(56)). The basic idea is that judgments must be understood as correction of possible 
mistakes made at the perceptual level. If the possible correctness of a subject’s belief 
was to be based solely on the normativity of the space of reasons then the subject 
would, according to Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, be in a position like Wittgenstein’s 
obsessive truth seeker who bought a hundred copies of the same newspaper to check if 
the first one was telling the truth. But can we make sense of the internal normativity of 
perception if perception is not already permeated with concepts? 
Merleau-Ponty argues that we need to make it intelligible how our 
judgemental capacities are born out of a ‘prior’ perceptual zone of subjectivity, i.e. we 
need what Husserl called a ‘genealogy of logic’ (PP, p. 55, n. 2 (56)). How is the 
primordial operation of perception supposed to make the possibility of true or false 
judgements intelligible? Merleau-Ponty argues that operating intentionality impregnates 
the sensible given with a form or a meaning and it is this form which makes possible the 
carving out necessary for perceptual judgements. Either this idea is the idea of two at 
least notionally separable items, the sensible and the configuration of the given (mis en 
forme), or it is not. If they are separable we get a new version of the Myth of the Given 
only we have relocated the problem from the normative relation between perception and 
beliefs to the normative relation between the ‘sensible chaos’ and the primordial 
configuration of meaning which is to constitute our experiences as world-disclosing 
(PP, p. 27). If this is the picture we seem to get a peculiar form of transcendental 
idealism with the Thing in it-self one step further away from the reach of our 
spontaneity. Merleau-Ponty rejects this option and insists that that we cannot even 
 
 
 
163
ideally separate the sensible signs and the meaning that is the outcome of operating 
intentionality (PP, p. 48). 
 If the two aspects of perception are inseparable it seems to open up the 
possibility of an intrinsic normativity of the primordial perceptual field which Merleau-
Ponty argues is essential for the normativity of the space of reasons. Now we are faced 
with a new dilemma. Either we say that the normativity is constituted independently of 
spontaneity or we say that such is not the case. If we choose the former option it 
becomes hard to see how we can regard our explicit judgements as even possibly 
candidates for justified beliefs about the world given in perception. If we choose the 
latter the position becomes virtually indistinguishable from embodied conceptualism.  
 
5.4.2 The ambiguity of Phenomenological Naturalism 
As I have already shown in chapter 4 it is evident from many places in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work that he acknowledges that we cannot make sense of our experience as independent 
of language and so as independent of our spontaneity (PP, pp. 388, 412). When he talks 
of our complicity or coincidence with the world in perception this should not lead us to 
think of perception as a pure coincidence between the sensing and the sensed in form of 
a private, blind and mute immediacy (PP, pp. 71, 388). If this was the nature of 
perception it would not even be made accessible to the subject undergoing the 
experience, because she would have to fixate it in thinking and would thereby 
necessarily disfigure the ineffable given (PP, p. 71). On such conditions Merleau-
Ponty’s problem of perception would be meaningless. There would be no need for 
phenomenological solution to the transcendental problem of perception because the 
problem would never occur. In fact if consciousness was originally such a pure 
coincidence it seems that there would be no possibility for reflection and no thinking 
would ever occur. However, it should be already clear that Merleau-Ponty still thinks 
the perceptual meaning has a primacy. It is the perceptual meaning which motivates our 
judgements and the perceptual meaning will always exceed the meaning fixated in a 
judgement. Merleau-Ponty makes his position clear in a text from 1952: 
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Nous ne cessons pas de vivre dans le monde de la perception, mais 
nous le dépassons par la pensée critique, au point d'oublier la 
contribution qu'il apporte à notre idée du vrai. Car, devant la pensée 
critique, il n'y a que des énoncés, qu'elle discute, accepte ou rejette ; 
elle a rompu avec l'évidence naïve des choses ; et quand elle affirme, 
c'est parce qu'elle ne trouve plus le moyen de nier. Si nécessaire que 
soit cette activité de contrôle, qui précise les critères et réclame à notre 
expérience ses titres de validité, elle ne rend pas compte de notre 
contact avec le monde perçu, qui est simplement devant nous, en deçà 
du vrai vérifié et du faux; elle ne définit pas même les démarches 
positives de la pensée, ni ses acquisitions les plus valables. (Merleau-
Ponty 1962 [1952], p. 402).104 
   
Here Merleau-Ponty refers to the world disclosed by perception as simply there beyond 
any verified truths or falsity. It is evident that the distinction between true and false he 
refers to is a distinction adherent to the level of critical thought, to the idea of a space of 
reason which we inhabit when we are asking for and giving reasons. The critical 
question is whether we can make sense of the normativity of the space of reasons on the 
basis of an idea of a more primitive contact with the world than the one provided by our 
conceptual capacities. I think Merleau-Ponty’s position has difficulties with achieving 
such an elucidation of the space of reasons because it is caught in an oscillation between 
the idea of a primordial givenness which is beyond any normativity and the idea of an 
internal coherence of experience as the origin of the normativity of the space of reasons. 
The idea of a givenness beyond the truth and falsity tends towards the Myth of the 
Given because it cannot put any normative constraints on the further development of the 
given. The idea an internal coherence of experience tends towards reducing the world to 
a collection of appearances, because it denies the object-dependence of genuine 
perception and therefore cannot make a principled distinction between veridical and 
non-veridical appearances. One way to bring out the dialectic predicament of Merleau-
Ponty’s position is to attend to the ambiguity we find in his explication of the Müller-
Lyer illusion. 
In the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion the false judgement that one line is 
longer than the other is said to be motivated by the new meaning that emerges when we 
attach the inward and outward hashes to two lines of equal length (PP, p. 45). The 
meaning is said to be inherent in the figure and not to be comprehensible via an appeal 
 
 
 
104 The text was part of Merleau-Ponty’s research proposal when he applied for the position as Professor 
of Philosophy at the College de France in 1952 which he held until his death in 1961.  
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to the concept of reasons. There is no rational reason as to why it should appear as if 
one line is longer than the other just because we attach the hashes. The change affected 
by the hashes cannot be explained via the associative principles of Empiricism either, 
because no collection of singular sense-data can explain the holistic change in the 
appearance. There are no separable and constant sensations common between the two 
appearances. What provides the appearance of a difference in lengths is said to be a 
‘deep operation’ of which the judgment is merely the final ascertainment (constat final). 
The ‘deep operation’ is the operating intentionality which is taken to be responsible for 
both our illusory and our veridical perceptions, and which is said to provide the 
constitution of our perceptual field that makes predication possible (PP, p. 46).  
If we look at the way Merleau-Ponty first adduces the Müller-Lyer illusion 
the problematic status of the primordial perceptual layer becomes clearer (PP, p. 12). 
Here Merleau-Ponty argues that the original mode of presentation of the two lines is one 
in which they are experienced as so to speak hovering above the ‘territory of being’ 
where a comparison is possible. He argues that the description of the illusion helps to 
bring out the original equivocacy of perceptual meaning which is covered up by the 
prejudice of the determinacy of being: we must recognize indeterminacy as a positive 
phenomenon and not just as deficient deviance from the norm of a clear and attentive 
perception. The appearance which motivates the false judgement now itself seems to be 
already a going beyond the primary layer of perception with its inherent 
indeterminacy.105 
There seems to be a fundamental problem with the position Merleau-Ponty 
develops here. As Merleau-Ponty stresses, the notion of motivation he appeals to is 
indiscriminate when it comes to the difference between a veridical and a non-veridical 
experience (PP, p. 46). In a similar way Merleau-Ponty talks of the hallucinating subject 
as returning to the primitive indistinction of the true and the false (PP, p. 396). And as 
we saw in the long quotation above he sometimes speaks of the perceptual world as 
simply a presence beyond what is taken to be true or false. This original indistinction of 
 
 
 
105 With reference to the Müller-Lyer illusion Brewer has offered arguments against McDowell and in 
favour of his own non-content view of perception, with which he, like Merleau-Ponty, denies that 
perception has representational content (Brewer 2008). McDowell responds by showing how the 
indeterminacy pointed out by Brewer is no different from the indeterminacy of propositions. It is not 
implied in the claim that one line is longer than the other that there must be answer to the question of 
whether the claim represents for instance the one as longer than it really is or the other as shorter than it 
actually is (McDowell 2008b, 201).  
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truth and falsity is presumably what is recognised when we realize that indeterminacy is 
an essential feature of the world of perception. But if the original meaning of perception 
is ambiguous then how is it to ground a belief that is unambiguously true or false? We 
seem to have lost the possibility of accounting for the inherent normativity of perception 
reflected in the phenomenal corrigible illusions. I think it was an aspect of this problem 
which found expression in Merleau-Ponty’s denial of any essential difference between 
the veridical perception of the patch of light and the illusory appearance of a flat stone.  
One could argue, in line with Merleau-Ponty, that the very idea of a 
judgement having a determinate truth-value is part and parcel of the idea of the 
prejudice of the determinacy of being which necessarily covers up the original 
perceptual meaning. But such an argument would assume an intellectualistic idea of the 
truth-predicate as a result of the application of universal rules explicable independently 
of a reference to their application in concrete situations. It is only if the correct 
application of the truth-predicate is supposed to be settled from a position which is 
taken to be independent of our concrete engagement with the life-world that it makes 
sense to complain that the very idea of true propositions buys into the idea of 
determinacy of being. There is, however, no reason to think that the idea of a 
determinate reality that finds expression in Scientistic Naturalism and the 
accompanying ideal of a view from nowhere is the only reasonable way we can make 
sense of empirical truths about the world.      
We also find another conception of the original layer of experience in 
Merleau-Ponty’s work, which seem to stand opposed to the idea of a realm beyond any 
normativity. We find this tendency when Merleau-Ponty writes of the ‘movement of 
existence’, another term for operating intentionality, as concealing the objectivity of the 
natural world of perception (PP, p. 340). Here the natural or pre-objective world of 
perception is not only claimed inaccessible to the methods of natural science it is said to 
be already covered up by the non-objectifying acts which provide the primary mode of 
givenness of the cultural world (PP, p. 340). Here Merleau-Ponty exploits an aspect of 
Husserl’s distinction between objectifying and non-objectifying acts different from the 
one I used in order to explicate McDowell’s distinction between having in view and 
carving out. According to Husserl there are fundamental kinds of intentional objects 
which are originally given in a non-objectifying mode of intentionality. Among such 
acts are the axiological acts in which we perceive objects as cultural objects with a 
certain value or a certain use. Such essentially non-objectifying acts are according to the 
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early Husserl necessarily founded on objectifying acts in which objects are presented 
with natural properties such as colour, size, shape and spatial location (Husserl 1992b, 
V, § 41). Merleau-Ponty argues that the non-objectifying acts cover up the original 
objectivity provided by the objectifying acts, and so apparently,  referring to Husserl’s 
Logische Untersuchungen, uses ‘objectifying acts’ as another term for what he calls 
‘operating intentionality’.106 A critical question now arises:  How can we reconcile the 
idea that what is covered up is the original objectivity of the perceptual world with the 
idea that what is lost of sight within the framework of Objective Thought is the original 
ambiguity of the perceptual field?  
From the standpoint of embodied conceptualism the position of 
phenomenological naturalism seems caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one 
side we have the idea of an ambiguous field of perception which makes it hard to 
conceive of any possible genealogy of critical thought, but which within the framework 
of Merleau-Ponty has the advantage of staying clear of the prejudice of determinate 
being. On the other hand we have the idea of a natural world of perception, where the 
sensibles such as the colours red or green are the sensibles of objects of perception and 
not sense data or qualia of consciousness (PP, p. 12). Such a conception has the 
advantage of actually giving content to the idea of a world of perception which as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it can guide our judgements (PP, p. 45). This is the idea of the 
natural or pre-objective world as an imperious unity which prescribes cognition its 
objective (PP, xiii). However, because Merleau-Ponty thinks we cannot assume the idea 
of the natural world of perception as a world of mind-independent objects without 
succumbing to the prejudice of determinate being, we cannot just leave it at that. If the 
pre-objective world is not to be merely another word for an internal coherence of a 
stream of subjective experiences and so be getting alarmingly close to a Berkeleyean 
idealism, we must understand it as the result of operating intentionality which 
impregnates meaning on the given (des données, PP, p. 27) and we return to the idea of 
an indeterminate field out of which grows the configuration of the natural world. The 
sensible is introduced as that which is to ‘delimit the zone of subjectivity or solitude’ 
and as an opacity that is to ‘make errors possible’ (PP, p. 55, n. 2 (56)). We have 
returned to the problem of making it intelligible how the ambiguity or opacity of the 
sensible is to provide the normativity which eventually should make intelligible the 
 
 
 
106 Merleau-Ponty stresses that the objectifying acts are essentially non-representational (PP, p. 340). 
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possibility of mistakes in judgements and of judgements as corrections of possible 
mistakes.   
It appears that Phenomenological Naturalism is caught up in the tension 
between the Myth of the Given and Coherentism. The Given now takes the form of 
ambiguous or opaque sensibles out of which operant intentionality is supposed to 
magically create a normative field of perception that eventually is to be make 
judgements possible as corrections of perceptual errors. Coherentism takes the form of 
‘mutually confirming perceptions’ (PP, p. xv) in which the world as tribunal of 
knowledge is reduced to an internal coherence that cannot instantiate an essential 
difference between genuine world-manifesting perception and mere appearances.107 If 
we define beliefs as possible corrections of our original perception, a perception that 
itself is beyond conceptual errors we seem to lose our entitlement to regard perception 
as the possible correction of a belief. We are losing our grip on the idea of the world as 
an imperative that can prescribe the objective of our thinking in perception.  
 
5.4.3 The advantages of Embodied Conceptualism 
Merleau-Ponty delivers a fundamental critique of an intellectualistic conception of 
concepts, which takes concepts to be forms that can be made intelligible independently 
of perception. He supplements this critique with a critique of Scientistic Naturalism and 
shows that such a conception of the natural world is prejudiced. However, in his own 
positive account he seems to rely on the validity of precisely the notions he criticizes. 
Though he stresses the need to develop a notion of critical thought in which we do not 
conceive of it as prior to or independent of our sensuous encounter with the world he 
seems to assume the intellectualistic notion of the mind in order to make his contrast 
between sensing and thinking. And though he stresses the necessity of not letting a 
merely causal mode of understanding dictate our understanding of empirical phenomena 
such as real hallucinations he seems to assume that any naïve realistic understanding of 
the world of perception must be an element of Objective Thought and must adhere to 
the prejudice of the determinacy of reality.  
 
 
 
107 It is the second tendency of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological naturalism which has lead Thomas 
Baldwin to the conclusion that his bracketing of Objective Thought leaves no thoughts possible at all 
(Baldwin 1988), and which Naomi Eilan stresses when she claims that Merleau-Ponty has no concept of 
objectivity (Eilan 1997).  
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The purpose of Phénoménologie de la perception is to demonstrate the 
relative legitimacy (droit relative) of Objective Thought and at the same times put it in 
its place by revealing the more fundamental logos of perception (PP, pp. 69, 419). If 
Objective Thought is identified as the adherence to the idea that the natural world must 
be through and through amenable to a merely causal mode of understanding and an 
adherence to the idea that if concepts are distinct form collections of sense-data they 
must be intelligible in isolation from perception, then embodied conceptualism stands in 
opposition to Objective Thought. The proposal of embodied conceptualism is that once 
we have disengaged ourselves from these commitments a passage has been cleared to 
the view that the logos of perception is the logos of language. Embodied conceptualism 
puts Objective Thought in its place by reminding us that natural science has not earned 
the rights to define the concept of nature. It recognizes the relative right of Objective 
thought when it draws a line between the phenomena that are made intelligible to us by 
being placed within the space of science and the phenomena that are manifest to us 
solely by being placed within the space of reasons.  
Merleau-Ponty finds a deep insight in the idea of a possible accordance of 
the sensible and the concept itself without concepts, which is what according to Kant is 
exemplified in the experience of beauty (PP, p. xxi). Merleau-Ponty generalises Kant’s 
idea of a necessary possibility of applying a rule correctly without having to refer to a 
further rule that justifies the correspondence between the particular instance and the rule 
or the concept (PP, p. 53). This is according to Merleau-Ponty what makes perception of 
singular objects possible. These exploitations of Kantian themes seem to go well 
together with the basic ideas of embodied conceptualism.      
McDowell has, with Wittgenstein, argued that it as deep-rooted prejudice 
about rationality that consistency in concept use must consist in one’s being guided by 
universal principles that can be formulated independently of any reference to particular 
instances of rule-following (McDowell 1998e, p. 58). If this is true then all applications 
of concepts, even mathematical concepts, will only be intelligible by virtue of a practice 
which cannot itself be grounded on a universal rule intelligible in isolation from the 
practice. With this conception of concepts Merleau-Ponty’s idea of a concordance 
between the sensible and the concept in perception which comes before any judgement 
can be understood as an idea of perceptual experience as permeated with concepts, 
without these concepts blocking out the singularity of the object. The idea that a 
judgement must involve a rupture with original motivational field of perception and that 
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therefore a judgement will never be able to make explicit all the background reasons 
that it relies on, can be seen as an expression of the idea the that our confidence in our 
ability to apply concepts can find no grounding in universal principles that are 
independent of our life form. This dependence does not render our concepts less apt to 
express objective thoughts; rather it shows that the idea of objective thoughts, 
understood as thinking in accordance with rules that somehow exist in an inhuman 
vacuum but nevertheless are accessible to humans, is infeasible. But if this is the nature 
of concepts there seems to be no need to speak of a rupture between perception and 
judgement. The actualisation of concepts in perception is not specific in its need to work 
without the guidance of universal principles. Merleau-Ponty says that language is both 
emancipation and a principle of slavery because it interposes itself between our thinking 
and the things of the world (SC, p. 188, n. 1). Language can be regarded as 
emancipatory because it, as Merleau-Ponty says, allows us to name our prejudices and 
through such recognition free ourselves from them. But if it is the initiation into 
language that initiates us into the world by permeating into the depth of our sensibility 
there seems to be no reason to think of language as a veil between us and the things 
themselves.  
Merleau-Ponty argues that we experience sensibles such as colours, shape 
or size as sensibles of objects but that we cannot understand such experiences by 
reference to the mind-independent objects understood as causes of our experiences. If 
we try we will disfigure the sensibles by placing them within the mind and thereby 
obstruct our openness to the world. The alternative picture of Merleau-Ponty is one that 
is supposed to show the interdependence of subject and world in what he calls a joining 
of extreme subjectivism and extreme objectivism (PP, p. xv): 
 
L’intérieur et l’extérieur sont inséparable. Le monde est tout au 
dedans et je suis tout hors de moi. (PP, 467) 
 
As we have seen the attempt to join the two extremes tends towards an ambiguous 
characterisation of subjectivity and objectivity. Embodied conceptualism argues that we 
can conceive of the objects of perception as mind-independent objects that both causes 
and rationalizes our experiences. This does not make the experience an inner event 
unless we accept a scientistic monism of events. On the relational view of perception 
based on a dual conception of natural events we can regard perception as 
interpenetration of subject and world. Further we can regard for instance the common 
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sensibles that are manifest in visual experience as a result of a passive actualisation of 
basic observational concepts such as shape, size, position and movements (McDowell 
2008, 5).108 The fact that such concepts are actualized does not mean we must conceive 
of perception as a snapshot of the world that reveals everything to the subject with the 
same high resolution. The intuitional content is content available for thought and, we 
may add with Merleau-Ponty, available for further perceptual exploration. However, the 
fact that there is a certain indeterminacy of content for each isolated moment does not 
mean that we need to assume a primordial layer of indeterminate presence. As Merleau-
Ponty stresses the indeterminate objects are given as object for potential fixation. Such 
fixation is not merely a determination of something that appears as if it was already 
realised in the object beforehand (comme réalisée d’avance, PP, p. 66), it is a 
manifestation of the very object that is coloured and have the shape and location that we 
perceive in veridical relational experiences.  
 Merleau-Ponty predicts that a reflection on perception that is equally 
capable of elucidating its inherent vitality and its rational intention or meaning can be 
certain to have located the centre of the phenomenon (PP, p. 65). Embodied 
conceptualism regards perception as a part of the natural life of humans and as 
belonging to the natural world just as much as does the blossoming of a cherry tree. It is 
only if we take the truly natural world to be reducible to the world of exact science that 
we need to deny this (cf. PP, p. 65). Further it conceives of perception as permeated 
with rationality in the sense that perception is what provides us with rational grounds 
for our most basic observational beliefs. Merleau-Ponty speaks of the primary meaning 
of perception as a text with its peculiar syntax which we try to enunciate in our thinking 
and he speaks of the discursive articulation as a translation of the meaning found in 
more primitive modes of consciousness (PP, pp. 45, 338, SC, p. 187). He gives very 
detailed descriptions of how the configuration of the perceptual field has its own 
specific structures. Embodied conceptualism does not need to deny that perception has 
its own syntax but it insists on the idea that there is a fundamental level at which 
perception and thinking speaks the same language: they are the two kinds of conceptual 
 
 
 
108 McDowell’s mentions ‘animal’ and ‘doing’ as other concept that might capture a distinctive kind of 
categorical form which can be realized in intuitional content (McDowell 2008a, p. 5).   
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articulations, one that is, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, mute and another that is, as 
McDowell puts it, discursive.109 
 
5.4.4 The challenge to come 
Even if it is right that the intuitional content on the basis of which we form belief about 
what we see is conceptual through and through it is not in the first instance obvious that 
there could not be a non-conceptual practical mode of perceiving essential for our 
practical engagement with the world. It could be claimed that the way intuitions make 
the world available for my doxastic rationality is different from the way perception 
function when it forms part of a practical engagement with the world. When I reach out 
to grasp an object I do not first have to carve out aspects of the object in order to make 
judgements about how to go about grasping the object. The object is immediately 
available for my grasping. It seems that the awareness I have of an object in activities 
such as grasping is of a different kind than the awareness I have of an object when I am 
scrutinizing it with the purpose of answering some theoretical question about its size, 
weight or its distance from me. I do not need to make any judgements about the 
objective size, weight or distance in order to grasp the object. Similarly, my awareness 
of my own bodily movements in the grasping is not an objectifying awareness. If I try to 
attend to my movement in the way I attend to a seen robotic arm in order to evaluate its 
objective velocity, aperture of grip or reaching range such attending will typically have 
an immediate negative effect on the smoothness and of my grasping. Such observations 
has been taken as evidence for the existence of a non-conceptual, practical mode of 
intentionality and it has further been argued that such a practical mode of intentionality 
is the most basic engagement with the world which the distanced attitude of doxastic  
rationality possible. I shall argue that we can understand such practical intentionality as 
permeated with practical concepts and that if we try to do without practical capacities 
our capacity to perform intentional bodily actions we will tend towards the 
 
 
 
109 Though perception is essentially a receptive capacity I think Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on perception 
as activity is crucial. One way to proceed in the development of embodied conceptualism could be via 
Alva Noë’s notion of practical sensori-motor knowledge as constitutive for concept possession (Noë 
2004). Further I think we may find useful resources in the vast richness of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology. McDowell has conceded that practical abilities that cannot be identified with 
propositional knowledge may be essential for the possession and actualisation of basic observational 
concepts in perception. However, this does not imply that such possibly sensori-motor practical capacities 
can be made intelligible independently of adverting to the conceptual content they enable, nor that they 
enter the content of the experience qua non-conceptual content (cf. McDowell 2006d).  
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unintelligible. I think it is a real insight that we need to understand our perceptual 
attending to our environment as able to take on a practical mode in which we do not 
carve out features as we do when we prepare the content of perception for theoretical 
judgements. Such practical perception, I argue, does not go beyond our conceptual 
capacities; it is permeated with practical concepts. Furthermore the conceptual content 
of such practical perception can serve as input to our doxastic rationality. I can see a 
stone as too heavy to lift, and on the basis of such a judgment I can assess the objective 
weight of the stone. 
 I shall now turn to Merleau-Ponty’s version of the transcendental problem 
of agency in order to take up challenges to embodied conceptualism raised via Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of motor intentionality. 
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CHAPTER 6   
MOTOR INTENTIONALITY AND THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY 
 
6.1 Merleau-Ponty’s problem of bodily agency  
6.1.1 Merleau-Ponty on the problem of bodily agency 
Merleau-Ponty presents the problem of bodily agency as analogous to what he calls the 
problem of perception. In both cases the problem is to recognize the sui generis 
character of the phenomena in relation to both the rational relations between reasons 
and the merely causal relations made intelligible by traditional natural science. The 
problem of perception is the problem of recognizing our perception as an original kind 
of cognition that ties us inherently to the objects of the world (cf. PP, p. 403). The 
problem of agency is to recognize our bodily actions as the way we can intervene in and 
modify the present reality. As long as consciousness is regarded as self-transparent and 
self-sufficient and our natural sensibility and motility is left for science to explain, such 
recognition is impeded: 
 
Corrélativement la perception et l’action prises dans ce qu’elles ont de 
spécifique, c’est-à-dire comme la connaissance et la modification d’un 
réalité, devraient se trouver rejetées de la conscience. (SC, p. 177) 
 
The problem is to recognize ourselves as conscious beings that are essentially perceivers 
and agents in the world.  
The notion of motor intentionality is developed by Merleau-Ponty in an 
attempt to capture what he characterizes as an original, practical way of relating to 
objects on equal footing with the original intentionality of perception (cf. PP, pp. 128, 
160): 
 
L’expérience motrice de notre corps n’est pas un cas particulier de 
connaissance ; elle nous fournit une manière d’accéder au monde et à 
l’objet, une ‘praktognosie’ (1) qui doit être reconnue comme originale 
et peut-être comme originaire. (PP, p. 164) 110 
 
 
 
 
110 The distinction between ‘original’ (originale) and ‘primary’ (originaire) can be understood as a 
distinction between being irreducible to a composition of other more fundamental kinds of intentional 
experiences and being at the origin of all other intentional experiences. When characterizing perception 
he sometimes uses the two concepts interchangingly (cf. SC, p. 241).     
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In the quote above it is the experience of moving that is said to constitute an original 
mode of intentionality. In other places it is said that it is in the actual moving of one’s 
body towards an object that we find motor intentionality: ‘…et mouvoir son corps c’est 
viser à travers lui les choses, c’est le laisser répondre à leur sollicitation qui s’excerce 
sur lui sans aucune représentation’ (PP, p. 161). In a movement that displays motor 
intentionality the movement and our awareness of the movement are, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, indissoluble (PP, p. 128). Motor intentionality is claimed to be 
characteristic of certain bodily movements and not just of certain mental occurrences 
that are intelligible in isolation from the actual movements. The notion of motor 
intentionality is to provide us with an understanding of bodily movements as 
phenomena that are intrinsically agency-involving. In so far as we take the notion of 
indissolubility to be symmetrical, the consequence of such agency-involving 
movements is a notion of the experience of moving as essentially body-involving.111 
Merleau-Ponty identifies the prejudice that blocks the view of motor 
intentionality as the Cartesian heritage that allows for only two modes of being: Being 
in-itself and being for-itself (cf. PP, p. 231). Being in-itself is everything that is 
understood as existing independently of consciousness and this region of reality is 
assumed to be intelligible exclusively from what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the third-
person perspective of natural science. Being for-itself is conscious being that is as such 
exclusively accessible from a first-person perspective, which allegedly reveals the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth about the being of subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty, 
like McDowell, finds a basic motivation for this dualism in the attraction of the idea that 
empirical reality must consist in whatever can be made intelligible by natural science.  
When Merleau-Ponty makes a contrast between the first-person 
perspective and the third-person perspective this is equivalent to a distinction between a 
phenomenological perspective and the perspective of natural science. The third-person 
perspective is the perspective from which we make items intelligible by placing them in 
the realm of science. The phenomenological perspective is the perspective from which 
we can make our experiential life accessible for methodical theoretical understanding. 
We can say that the phenomenological perspective is a perspective on the way the 
world, other human beings and we ourselves are experienced in our everyday life; a 
 
 
 
111 A further clarification of how we can interpret Merleau-Ponty’s notion of motor intentionality as 
essentially body-involving would need to analyse his account of phantom limbs.   
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perspective from which the phenomenologist attempts to characterize essential features 
of the phenomena in question in its first-person mode of givenness. The perspective of 
science, on the contrary, is an attempt to develop a view from nowhere in which the 
subjective features of our specific way of experiencing are supposed to be left behind as 
merely subjective. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the reason why such motor intentionality has 
not been recognized by philosophers and psychologists is that they assume an 
objectivistic conception of the body. The body is conceived as an object in itself 
consisting of parts that stand in merely external, causal relations to one another; it is 
identified with the body as understood by natural science (cf. PP, p. 86). Such a 
conception of the body goes hand in hand with the Cartesian idea of consciousness as 
self-transparent and intelligible independently of the body. The result is that 
consciousness must be conceived of as hidden somewhere in the flesh and blood of the 
body and thereby it is the least intelligible of all occult qualities (cf. PP, p. 401). The 
general problem is that if conscious experiences are claimed to be sui generis in relation 
to the processes of the objective body, then the subject of experiences cannot qua 
subject be placed within the world to which it supposedly has perceptual access and 
within which it acts. The subject is, with an expression from McDowell, expelled to a 
cosmic exile (McDowell 1998d, p. 238).  
The consequence of the dualism of the first- and the third-person 
perspective for an analysis of intentional bodily action is that the bodily movements can 
only be externally related to our intentions or our willing. Merleau-Ponty writes:  
 
On ne donnait à la volonté qu’un fiat instantané, l’execution de l’acte 
était livrée tout entière à la mécanique nerveuse. (PP, p. 68). 
 
We have the by now familiar picture of action as a certain combination of two 
independent items; a mental willing and a bodily movement. Merleau-Ponty argues that 
this evokes an occult picture of how the mind relates to the body, which leaves it 
unexplained by what magical operation intentions manage to excite just the right bodily 
movements (cf. PP, p. 161, n. 1 (p. 163)). If the subject is to re-enter nature by relating 
to the forces of nature discovered by natural science the relation is, as Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, barely conceivable (SC, p. 177).  
 The Cartesian conception of the mind that obscures our self-understanding 
as bodily agents is, according to Merleau-Ponty, equivalent to the idea that intentional 
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experiences are mediated by representational content. Representational content can be 
made the content of a judgement and is as such accessible to the subject. Cartesianism 
presumes that only what is given to consciousness in the form of a representation, i.e., 
as content, can be accessible to it (cf. SC, p. 187, PP, p. 62).  According to such a 
Representationalism, the subjective side of a bodily action consists in a representation 
of, at a minimum, the goal of the action and possibly also a representation of the bodily 
automatisms that are to be triggered by the representations and assure the execution of 
the action (SC, p. 188). Merleau-Ponty’s general argument against this intellectualistic 
model is that it makes bodily agency unintelligible. The model must assume some 
magical operation by which the representations can set in motion precisely the third-
person objective processes that eventually will lead to the desired outcome. This 
critique is voiced in the context of a discussion of a specific model of action developed 
by the neuro-physiologist Liepmann (PP, p. 161, n.1). Merleau-Ponty’s critique is 
however raised as a perfectly general critique of any model that assumes a dualism of 
representational capacities on the one side and bodily capacities on the other. In order to 
spell out this critique and compare it with the critique I set out in Part One, it is 
however helpful to take a brief look at the way Merleau-Ponty makes use of Liepmann’s 
work in his argument.   
 
6.1.2 Motor intentionality and motor apraxia 
Liepmann used the notion of motor intentionality (Bewegungsentwurf) in order to 
account for certain cases of motor disturbances, which he dubbed motor apraxia (cf. 
Rothi and Heilman 1996, p. 112). In Liepmann’s classical case of the Regierungsrat, the 
patient is unable to perform the most simple tasks with his right hand, but if he is forced 
to respond to a command with his left hand he responds swiftly and accurately (Rothi 
and Heilman 1996, p. 112). The case is neither a case of simple paralysis, as the motility 
of the hand is not completely missing, nor is it a case of a disturbance of what 
Liepmann called the ‘ideational preparation of the action’. A disturbance of the 
ideational preparation is a disturbance of the representation of the action to be 
performed. One way such an ideational disturbance can manifest itself is in a confusion 
of different parts of a more complex action. In the Regierungsrat case, Liepmann found 
no such disturbance. The fact that the patient is perfectly able to perform actions with 
his left hand is taken to show that the intellectual capacity to represent the action is 
intact. The representational understanding is furthermore demonstrated by the fact that 
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the patient can respond immediately and correctly to whole-body demands such as 
‘walk to the window’ (Rothi and Heilman 1996, p. 112).  
Merleau-Ponty argues that when Liepmann demonstrates that what is 
disturbed in cases of motor apraxia is a ‘knowing how’ (pouvoir / ein Können) and not a 
‘knowing that’ (savoir / ein Kennen) he is on the verge of breaking the spell of 
Objective Thought and dismantling the dualism of mind and body:  
 
On ne rendra compréhensible l’apraxie, on ne fera droit aux 
observations de Liepmann que si le mouvement à faire peut être 
anticipé, sans l’être par une représentation, et cela même n’est 
possible que si la conscience est définie non comme position explicite 
de ses objets, mais plus géneralement comme référence á un objet 
pratique aussi bien que théorique, comme être au monde, si le corps de 
son côté est défini non comme un objet parmi tous les objets, mais 
comme le véhicule de l’être au monde. (PP, p. 161, n.1 (p. 163)). 
 
The non-representational anticipation of the movement and the practical reference to an 
object are two aspects of the same phenomenon, which Merleau-Ponty with Liepmann 
calls motor intentionality. Without the assumption of such a non-representational motor 
intentionality, motor apraxia becomes, according to Merleau-Ponty, unintelligible. The 
pathology can neither be explained by a purely intellectual disturbance nor be a purely 
physiological incapacity to move. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty argues, we need to see it as 
a disturbance of a specific kind of motor intentionality. 
Liepmann’s notion of representations is obviously far from the Cartesian 
notion of self-transparent judgements and might to some extent be understood as what 
we would today refer to as sub-personal representations. Merleau-Ponty, however, finds 
a reminiscence of Cartesian dualism in Liepmann’s analysis, when Liepmann makes the 
‘knowing how’ a property of the ‘neurological substance’, because it cannot be placed 
on the side of representations.  
Merleau-Ponty’s attempt at showing the unintelligibility of motor apraxia 
within the framework of Representationalism can be seen as pointing to a deeper 
unintelligibility underpinned by such an intellectualistic conception of action. If we take 
our intentions with their representational content to be intelligible in separation from the 
bodily know-how and leave the latter to be explained solely by natural science, then 
Minimal Pragmatism is undermined. The need for an occult operation referred to by 
Merleau-Ponty can be seen as the need to re-establish Minimal Pragmatism by 
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introducing some kind of telekinetic ability that magically lets representations bring 
about what they represent.  
Merleau-Ponty criticises the intellectualistic model for drawing a distorted 
picture of the phenomenology of performing bodily actions: ‘Le sujet ne vit pas dans un 
monde d’états de conscience ou de représentations d’où il croirait pouvoir par une sorte 
de miracle agir sur de choses extérieures ou les connaître’ (SC, p. 204). In the 
intellectualistic model it is claimed that the representational capacities that can be 
actualized in intentions and empirical judgements are intelligible in separation from the 
actual bodily movements as well as from the deliverances of the senses. This leaves the 
agent with nothing to believe in except for a miracle that will secure that her intentions 
are actually carried out. Obviously not all first-person convictions that a certain action is 
possible for the agent are beliefs about what, in the intellectualistic picture, is the real 
cause of one’s arm reaching out for an object. We need not have any beliefs about the 
neuro-physiological mechanisms that enable us to reach out in order to do so with 
confidence. And even if the agent did have true beliefs about the neuro-physiology of 
reaching, such knowledge would be of no practical use to her in her grasping. 
Furthermore, in order to believe that she is capable of performing the action she would 
still need to believe that some power completely unknown to her ensures her success. 
She would need to believe in some occult power that secures that the mental occurrence 
that she is capable of bringing about and knows under the description of intending or 
trying to reach is also identifiable as exactly the neural event that is needed for her to 
begin to reach out. All she could do under such circumstances is try and hope for the 
best and even this might, as we saw in Chapter 3, be too much to hope for for the 
intellectualist, as it is the very idea of trying that is under threat.  
I think it is the fatal consequence of a total failure to make bodily agency 
intelligible that Merleau-Ponty gestures at when in a later work he writes:  
 
Nous ne ferions rien si nous n’avions, avec notre corps, le moyen de 
sauter par-dessus tous les moyens nerveux et musculaires du 
movement pour nous porter au but anticipé. (Merleau-Ponty 1969b, p. 
127). 
 
Here it is said that it is because of our body that we can bypass all the details of the 
objective body that science describes and directly reach out for an object, without the 
need to represent any means by which we are to reach out. It is our body understood as 
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already imbued with motor intentionality that allows us to act directly on perceived 
objects. It is claimed that without such motor intentionality we would never get 
anything done. One reading of this statement would be to say that in case we were 
forced to attend to and control all the details of the neuro-physiological processes such 
attending would stand in the way of any swift object-directed action (cf. Käll 2006, p. 
96). Applying the idea of a necessary Minimal Pragmatism we might also read the 
statement as an expression of the idea that we cannot understand our capacity to grasp 
an object by an appeal to objective knowledge of the functioning of our body plus an 
additional appeal to representational capacities actualized in intentions that are claimed 
to be intelligible independently of any possible bodily effects. Such scientific 
knowledge will neither do the agent who is about to act any good, nor will it do when 
we are trying to make intelligible how intentional bodily actions are possible from a 
theoretical point of view. 
The question is now whether the idea of the body as imbued with motor 
intentionality can be conceived as the body understood as a collection of practical 
conceptual capacities, or whether the notion of motor intentionality shows the need to 
assume a non-representational and non-conceptual kind of practical intentionality. I 
shall argue that we can distinguish between a critique of Intellectualism as characterized 
by Merleau-Ponty and a critique of a conceptual conception of practical, bodily 
capacities. I argue that whereas Merleau-Ponty does provide good reasons as to why 
Intellectualism fails, these reasons do not apply to a conceptualism that is combined 
with a dual conception of bodily movements and a disjunctive account of trying. I shall 
carry out my defence by first analysing Merleau-Ponty’s way of arguing for the non-
representational and non-conceptual nature of motor intentionality via certain 
pathological cases. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the so-called Schneider case in 
particular cannot pull the weight he intends. When we analyse Merleau-Ponty’s 
arguments they are revealed as ambiguous, and I argue that a possible way of 
accounting for this ambiguity is by the fact that the possibility of an embodied 
conceptualism is not recognized in the arguments. Next I turn to three different authors’ 
ways of appropriating Merleau-Ponty’s work. I argue that all three fail to deliver crucial 
arguments against the embodied conceptualism I developed in Part One. First, however, 
I shall introduce the notion of the lived body as a capacity for action. 
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6.1.3 Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the lived body   
When Merleau-Ponty, in the chapter on motility in Phénoménologie de la perception 
(‘III, La spatialité du corps propre et la motricité’), first directs his attention towards the 
body in movement, it is with a view to furthering our understanding of the relationship 
between our body and space and in particular the spatiality which is unique for what he 
terms ‘le corps propre’ or ‘le corps vivant’ and which I shall refer to as the lived 
body.112 The concept of the lived body is developed to describe the primordial sense of 
our embodiment which is covered up as long as Scientistic Naturalism is allowed to 
define what we can understand under the term ‘body’. The lived body is the body as the 
vehicle of our practical life in the world of perception; the body through which we live 
our worldly lives. It is the body understood primarily as a capacity (puissance) for 
action and for perception and as such it is claimed to be, by necessity, imperceptible 
from the exclusively third-person perspective of a science confined within the 
framework of Objective Thought (cf. PP, p. 90). The aspect of the lived body which 
Merleau-Ponty seeks to highlight in this chapter is its essential practical character, i.e., 
the body understood as power over a certain range of actions (cf. PP, pp. 122, 126). 
Before I turn to some of Merleau-Ponty’s specific arguments for his account of motor 
intentionality, I will highlight some of the descriptive characteristics of the body as a 
capacity for action and juxtapose these with the conception of our motility as permeated 
with practical conceptual capacities I suggested in Chapter 3. 
 The lived body is not moved like any other object and this indicates that it 
comes with its own characteristic spatiality; it is not experienced as placed in space in 
the same way as we experience objects around us as taking up positions in space: 
 
Je meus les objets extérieurs à l’aide de mon propre corps qui les 
prend en un lieu pour les conduire en un autre. Mais je le meus, lui 
directement, je ne le trouve pas en un point d’espace objectif pour le 
mener en un autre, je n’ai pas besoin de le chercher, il est déja avec 
moi, – je n’ai pas besoin de le conduire vers le terme du movement, il 
y touche dès le début et c’est lui qui s’y jette. Les rapports de ma 
decision et mon corps dans le movement sont de rapport magique. 
(PP, p. 110). 
 
 
 
 
112 Merleau-Ponty develops the concepts from Husserl’s notion of ‘Eigen-Leib’.    
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This description might seem to be in tension with Anscombe’s remark that there is 
really nothing easier than to move a matchbox just like I can move my arm, which I 
discussed at the end of Chapter 1. On my understanding of Anscombe’s remark, it is, 
however, an expression of exactly the fact that we move our body directly in contrast to 
the way we move the matchbox. When Merleau-Ponty stresses that we can move our 
body directly, this is a way of saying that we can move our body without our 
teleologically basic action being a body-directed trying in which, for instance, I intend 
to move my hand with a certain force and velocity in a specified direction. The direct 
way of moving my hand is exactly the way in which I would not normally move the 
match-box.113 To move the matchbox I would intentionally grasp it and then move it to 
a different location. There is of course no such grasping of my hand in order to move it. 
Nevertheless I can move my hand in a way that is at a certain level similar to the way I 
move the matchbox. If asked to demonstrate that I can move my hand from left to right, 
I can do so and my moving my hand will, just like my moving of the matchbox, be a 
teleologically basic action. In other words, the fact that we, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, 
directly move our body is what makes object-directed actions possible qua 
teleologically basic actions. Furthermore, it is the fact that this is possible which makes 
intelligible Anscombe’s likening of the way I move the matchbox and the way I move 
my hand when I attend to it.  
 When Merleau-Ponty writes that the relation between my decision and my 
body in movement is magical this is not an appeal to some occult power, it is an attempt 
to capture a phenomenological feature of what, in the terminology of Chapter 3, we 
could call our object-directed embodied tryings. We might say it is a way of registering 
that there is nothing I need to do in order to begin my movement towards an object 
which I intend to grasp. My grasping can be both procedurally and teleologically basic 
when the object is within reach. 
McDowell emphasized that once we manage to conceive of perception as 
directly attending to the objects of the world, there is no point in representing the 
objects we act on as ‘lying on the far side of an “output” interface’ (McDowell 1998g, 
p. 358). In a similar vein, Merleau-Ponty writes: 
 
 
 
 
113 I say ‘normally’ to leave open the possibility of incorporating objects, even a matchbox, within one’s 
body schema the way a blind person might incorporate a cane (cf. PP, p. 167).   
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Puisque l’âme reste coextensive à la nature, que le sujet percevant ne 
saisit pas comme un microscosme où parviendraient médiatement les 
messages des événements extérieurs, et que son regard s’étand sur les 
choses meme – agir sur elles n’est pas pour lui sortir de soi et 
provoquer dans un fragment d’étendue un déplacement local, […]. On 
peut dire, si l’on veut que le rapport de la chose perçue à la perception, 
ou de l’intention aux gestes qui la réalisent est dans la conscience 
naïve un rapport magique: mais encore faudrait-il comprendre la 
conscience magique comme elle se comprend elle-même. (SC, p. 
204). 
 
The problem with the conception of the body as pure object and the accompanying 
conception of pure consciousness was, as we saw above, that it cannot make intelligible 
the experience we have of our basic object-directed tryings. According to such a dualist 
picture, we ought to experience the magical connection as a kind of miracle, because it 
is not something that seems even thinkable in that picture. When we do not experience 
it thus, the consequence seems to be a need to evoke a kind of error theory concerning 
our experience of bodily agency, which can explain away our experience of being 
directed towards an object in a direct movement. The critical question is now whether 
we can make the idea that ‘the soul is coextensive with nature’ intelligible via the idea 
that we can regard our natural motility as permeated with practical concepts.  
 Merleau-Ponty describes the way we are aware of our body as a potential 
for action via an expression from Husserl: we have an embodied ‘I can’ awareness (PP, 
pp. 160). I do not know the power, weight and reach of my body as an engineer knows a 
machine; I know my body in its pragmatic meaning. I know my hands as my grasping 
power and my legs as my ambulatory power and it is in virtue of these powers that I can 
immediately see an object as within reach and a place as a place to go (cf. PP, p. 171). 
What gives unity to my hand as hand is the ‘I can’ awareness which always 
accompanies my hand when it is functioning normally (PP, p. 336). Merleau-Ponty calls 
this primordial unity of the body a pre-objective unity and argues that neither 
Empiricism nor Intellectualism can account for this original, pragmatic unity of the 
body. What I propose is that the pre-objective unity can be conceived as the unity of the 
agent as a rational, embodied agent with a bodily know how which we can characterize 
as a repertoire of teleologically basic capacities.  
 In the chapter on motility, Merleau-Ponty argues that we need a notion of 
non-representational motor intentionality in order to account for our bodily agency. 
Much of Merleau-Ponty’s argument concerning motor intentionality is carried out with 
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reference to certain psychopathological cases, as we saw with Liepmann’s case of motor 
apraxia. The case of which Merleau-Ponty makes the most extensive use is Gelb and 
Goldstein’s famous case of Schneider. In what follows I shall reconstruct the arguments 
proposed by Merleau-Ponty via the Schneider case. My aim is to demonstrate that 
Merleau-Ponty’s arguments are haunted by an ambiguity and that once we disambiguate 
the arguments we will also be able to see that the conceptualism of McDowell and the 
conceptualism of agency that I propose are not vulnerable to the objections against 
Intellectualism.  
 
6.2 Motor intentionality and the Schneider case 
6.2.1 The case of Schneider 
During the First World War on the 4 June 1915 the 24 years old mineworker Johann 
Schneider who was serving as a soldier in the German Army was wounded by mine-
splinters in the back of his head and went unconscious for four days (Goldstein and 
Gelb 1918, p. 9). The exact dimension of his wounds is uncertain but there is general 
evidence that he suffered from substantial brain injuries (cf. Marotta and Behrmann 
2004, p. 634). He was admitted at the Hospital for Brain Injury in Frankfurt in February 
1916 where he became the patient of the psychologist Adhémer Gelb and the 
neurologist Kurt Goldstein (Goldstein and Gelb 1918, p. 9). In their first paper on the 
case Gelb and Goldstein diagnosed Schneider as a case of visual agnosia and they took 
the case to be of fundamental importance as a particularly pure example of the 
apperceptive kind of agnosia (Goldstein and Gelb 1918, p. 137). The term apperceptive 
mind-blindness or visual agnosia had been introduced by Lissauer in 1890 who 
distinguished it from associative visual agnosia; a distinction which is still in use in 
neuro-psychology (cf. Farah 2004, p. 4). Apperceptive visual agnosia is generally used 
about patients who have a failure of normal visual object recognition, in spite of 
relatively preserved elementary visual functions, such as acuity, brightness 
discrimination and colour vision as well as reasonably well-functioning general 
cognitive abilities (Farah 2004, pp. 11-12). Associative visual agnosia is used about 
patients who have a selective impairment in their recognition of visually presented 
objects, despite an apparently intact visual perception, which is shown in their ability to 
copy drawings in which they don’t recognize the motive (Farah 2004, chapter 6). Gelb 
and Goldstein argues that apperceptive visual agnosia is a matter of an inability to 
integrate the visual impressions into a Gestalt, and that when Schneider is able to 
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recognize visually presented objects such as letters this is only in virtue of kinaesthetic 
feedback from compensating tracing movements of hand and head. 
The debate about the nature of visual agnosia is ongoing and there is no 
general consensus as to how we should understand the Schneider case on the basis of 
modern neuro-psychology. Farah classifies the case of Schneider as a case of 
apperceptive agnosia in the narrow sense she with Benson and Greenberg terms “visual 
form agnosia” (Farah 2004, p. 13).  Marotta and Behrmann suggest interpreting the case 
as a case of what Riddoch and Humphrey calls “integrative agnosia” (Marotta and 
Behrmann 2004, p. 636), a notion Farah critically discusses under the heading of 
“associative visual agnosia” (Farah 2004, pp. 78-82).  
Because of the medical uncertainties surrounding the Schneider case it can 
seem to be hazardous to try to base any philosophical arguments on the case. Recently 
the neurologist Jonathan Cole expressed his doubts about the case. Cole writes that he 
for one has never become clear on what kind of psychiatric problem Schneider suffered 
from (Cole 2008, p. 27). He dubs the tendentious use of psychopathological cases he 
finds amongst philosophers the “Schneider” problem”.114  The neurophysiologist Georg 
Goldenberg has argued that not only is the philosophical use of the Schneider case 
tendentious, the empirical studies of the case made by Gelb and Goldstein and their 
collaborators are useless as science (Goldenberg 2003). Goldenberg argues that the case 
is the fabricated result of an unhappy alliance between scientists blinded by their 
enthusiasm for a certain holistic solution to the mind-brain-problem and a patient eager 
to please. He further claims that Schneider was motivated by the money he received for 
being a subject of investigation as well as perhaps his fear of returning to the war 
(Goldenberg 2003, p. 295, p. 282).115 I shall only briefly comment on the debate 
concerning the genuineness of the case, as my real concern is the way the case figures in 
Merleau-Ponty’s argument. If, however, Goldenberg’s accusations were to be altogether 
true it would make it futile to even begin analysing the arguments of Merleau-Ponty 
with any philosophical purpose in mind; they would be of merely philological interest.  
Goldenberg does not claim that Gelb and Goldstein deliberately faked 
their case report and he acknowledges that the case reports indicate that Schneider did in 
 
 
 
114 Cole’s remark appears in a critical discussion of Gallagher and Zahavi’s book The phenomenological 
Mind (2008). The authors reply that they do not refer to the Schneider case in their book partly because of 
their uncertainty about the extent of Schneider’s brain damage (Zahavi and Gallagher 2008, p. 99)  
115 Goldenberg does not document to what extend Schneider was paid.    
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fact suffer from substantial brain damage (Goldenberg 2003, pp. 291, 297).  What he 
argues is that a range of the most distinct symptoms described by Gelb and Goldstein 
were really invented “fantastic embellishments” (Goldenberg 2003, p. 282). He bases 
his dismissal of the case study on both later investigations of Schneider and on what he 
takes to be internal incoherencies in Gelb and Goldstein’s account. Let me just mention 
two reasons as to why I don’t think the evidence presented by Goldenberg’s 
convincingly establishes his harsh conclusion. For one thing, as Farah notes, one reason 
that the neurologists Richard Jung and Eberhard Bay in 1942 and 1945 were unable to 
confirm Gelb and Goldstein’s findings could simply be the recovering of the patient, the 
possibility of which is testified by at least one other similar case-study (Farah 2004, p. 
21).116 Furthermore it was in particular the compensatory tracing movements that Jung 
and Bay did not find convincing evidence for, but taking into consideration that later, 
visually impaired patients have spontaneously adopted similar tracing strategies it 
seems unlikely that Schneider should have originally invented the behaviour to satisfy 
the scientists (cf. Farah 2004, p. 12, Marotta and Behrmann 2004, p. 635). 117  
 Disregarding the medical uncertainties I shall now present the parts of 
Gelb and Goldstein’s research that are most relevant for the arguments of Merleau-
Ponty.   
In the 1918-paper Gelb and Goldstein stated that there were no signs of 
either apraxia or of linguistic disturbances (Goldstein and Gelb 1918, p. 12). In the 
following examination such signs were detected and Goldstein’s 1923 paper describe a 
number of disturbances, which he takes to be the result of Schneider’s visual agnosia. I 
shall focus on the motor disturbances appealed to by Merleau-Ponty. When Schneider 
was asked to point or to grasp his own nose in an experimental setting where he was 
blindfolded he was unable to perform these tasks in the ordinary, immediate fashion 
(Goldstein 1923, p. 158), whereas in ordinary life he would seem to have no difficulties 
in for instance finding his handkerchief in his pocket and putting it to his nose. Even 
 
 
 
116 As a matter of fact Schneider recovered to an extent that he could run his own grocery shop from 1932 
until 1944 when his house was bombed. After the Second World War he was even elected mayor of the 
village he lived in (cf. Goldenberg 2003, p. 294). 
117 Concerning the internal coherence Goldenberg seems too quick when he argues that Gelb and 
Goldstein present contradicting evidence concerning Schneider’s tracing movements (Goldenberg 2003, 
p. 285). What Goldenberg points out as revealing their incompetence is exactly noticed by Gelb and 
Goldstein’s and they provide a coherent explanation of the facts, which Goldenberg does not take into 
consideration (cf. Goldstein and Gelb 1918, pp. 81-83).  
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when asked to perform such habitual acts with closed eyes he would in general be able 
to do so (Goldstein 1923, p. 173). In a later paper Goldstein interprets the combination 
of a preserved ability to lead the hand to a specific body part in habitual actions and a 
disturbed ability to point out locations of the body on request as an expression of a 
dissociation of what he calls a grasping attitude and a pointing attitude (Goldstein 
1973). This is not to be understood as a distinction between two kinds of movements 
which can be differentiated by the physical position of the hand in relation to the body. 
Two movements which qua isolated physical movements seem identical can be carried 
out with a grasping attitude and a pointing attitude respectively (Goldstein 1973, p. 
264). Goldstein argues that we need to assume these two different ways of performing 
actions in order to account for the seemingly arbitrary behaviour of certain patients with 
brain-damage including Schneider. Some of these patients, who can repeatedly grasp 
their own nose, do not consistently fail to point to their nose. The fact that they 
sometimes seem to be able to point is made sense of by assuming that they perform 
what looks like a pointing in the grasping attitude. Evidence for this assumption is that 
when the patients are asked to perform actions which are presumably very difficult to 
perform as grasping movements, such as pointing to a location 2 cm in front of their 
nose, they fail consistently (Goldstein 1973, p. 264).  
In his 1923 paper Goldstein introduces the distinction between abstract 
and concrete movements as a distinction between isolated, arbitrary movements 
performed on request and habitual movements performed in everyday life (Goldstein 
1923, p. 156).118 Making a circle with the hand in front of oneself in the experimental 
setting is an example of an abstract movement. The movement is said to be arbitrary, in 
the sense that it does not serve any further purpose than simply performing the 
movement itself and it is isolated in the sense that it is performed in isolation from any 
other act.  In the terms introduced by the end of Chapter 1 we might say that being 
arbitrary and isolated is equivalent to being a body-directed, teleologically basic action 
which is not performed as a means for any further end. The same circular movement 
made in the abstract might be performed when one is clearing the mirror from steam in 
which case it would be carried out as a concrete movement. Schneider was able to 
 
 
 
118 Goldstein is here wrestling with the methodological problem of experimentally investigating the 
concrete behaviour of daily life. He states that he will observe the concrete behaviour in experimental 
settings in order to investigate them more closely (Goldstein 1923, p. 173). 
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perform such habitual movement in a way almost indistinguishable from normal 
persons, as when he takes out his handkerchief in order to blow his nose. But when he 
was asked to raise his hands and make a circular movement he could not do this in the 
normal immediate manner. Goldstein describes what happens as follows. Schneider sets 
his whole body in motion and then progressively narrows down the movements to the 
relevant limbs (Goldstein 1923, p. 157). He then raises his arms and moves them in 
apparently planless straight or curved lines, until he recognizes, according to Goldstein 
on kinaesthetic grounds, one of these movements as of the correct shape, after which he 
promptly performs the circle (Goldstein 1923, pp. 158-59).  
In later writings Gelb and Goldstein generalize the distinction between 
two kinds of movement and talk of two different attitudes, one called abstract the other 
concrete. The distinction between a pointing and grasping attitude is an instance of this 
general distinction between an abstract and a concrete attitude. Not only goal-orientated 
movements but also for instance ways of perceiving and of understanding language are 
categorized as concrete or abstract. The concrete and the abstract attitudes are to be 
understood as “capacity levels of the total personality” and not as isolated to specific 
capacities (Goldstein and Scheerer 1964 [1941], p. 1). Goldstein and Scheerer further 
emphasize the interdependence between the two attitudes in the normal case:  
 
Although the normal person’s behaviour is prevailingly concrete, this 
concreteness can be considered normal only as long as it is embedded 
in and co-determined by the abstract attitude. For instance, in the 
normal person both attitudes are always present in a definite figure-
ground relation. (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941/1964, p. 8) 
 
They characterize the neuro-pathological as in general to be understood as different 
forms of disintegration of the two attitudes, which under normal circumstances are 
integrated: 
 
In pathology this relation [the figure-ground relation] becomes 
disorganized, if not disintegrated, into an abnormal condition. (ibid., 
p. 9)  
 
The methodological implications and the explanatory role played by the concepts of 
concrete and abstract attitude are not straightforward. Besides from its usefulness in 
highlighting the phenomenon of motor intentionality Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the 
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Schneider case constitutes his attempt to work out the kind of understanding of the 
subject of psychology and the nature of psychological understanding or explanation 
implied in Gelb and Goldstein’s concept formations. 
 
6.2.2 The internal tension of Merleau-Ponty’s text  
In a footnote Richard M. Zaner has pointed out an apparent inconsistency in Merleau-
Ponty’s interpretation of certain pathological cases, in particular his interpretation of the 
Schneider case: Schneider is said both to have a preserved and an impaired non-
representational familiarity with his own body and his surroundings (Zaner 1964, p. 
186). I shall argue that the apparent consistency is a symptom of a methodological 
ambiguity. Though Merleau-Ponty might not be presenting a formally contradictory 
interpretation of the Schneider case, his text can easily leave the reader confused about 
the methodological status of the case.  The apparent contradiction is a product of the 
fact that Merleau-Ponty uses the case of Schneider in two manners that seem mutually 
exclusive: Motor intentionality is to be revealed both by its perspicuous preservation 
and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. This double use of the 
Schneider case has received very little critical discussion in the literature. 119  It does 
however manifest itself in the fact that we find interpretations of Merleau-Ponty’s text 
and the Schneider case which more or less advertently opt for one of the two diverging 
lines of argumentations present in the text. 
Sean Kelly interprets the Schneider case as a case in which we find “a 
kind of pure motor intentionality” and in line with Merleau-Ponty’s first line of 
argument he argues that the unreflective, skilful coping activities of normal subjects 
involve the same kind of experience as that which is intact in the pathological case 
(Kelly 2004, p. 75). In contrast Hubert Dreyfus, in his most recent writing on motor 
intentionality, follows Merleau-Ponty’s second line of argument when he puts the 
emphasis on the differences between the pathological version and the normal version of 
 
 
 
119 Charles Siewert comes close to making the problematic double use of the Schneider case explicit. He 
registers that though the Schneider case is supposed to bring motor intentionality to light, i.e. make it 
evident by its perspicuous preservation, it is exactly taken to be present also in the normal execution of 
spontaneous actions that prove difficult for Schneider (Siewert 2005, p. 273). Just after this Siewert refers 
to places where Merleau-Ponty explicitly exposes his procedure as one of making what is the case in the 
normal subject evident by its contrastive disruption in the pathological case. Glen Braddock also notices 
how the “practical, embodied knowledge” is said both to be missing, namely when so called abstract 
movements are to be performed but returns when he is to perform the “concrete” actions, but he does not 
raise this as a problem for a coherent understanding of the case and of Merleau-Ponty’s text (Braddock 
2001, p. 13).  
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motor intentionality (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 64).120 A prima facie reason for a preference for 
the second line of argument is provided by the fact that it is during this line that 
Merleau-Ponty first introduces the notion of motor intentionality (PP, p. 128), but as we 
shall see Kelly’s interpretation is not unmotivated and Merleau-Ponty’s text is in need 
of clarification.     
I will argue that the most promising way to disambiguate Merleau-Ponty’s 
analysis is to put the emphasis on the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument 
and moderate the conclusion of the first line of argument accordingly. This reading will 
not only avoid the potential contradiction. The reading will provide the most coherent 
reading of the two lines of argument in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s general 
methodological reflections on psychopathological cases. Furthermore it will correspond 
with Merleau-Ponty’s references to other pathological cases as well as with the specific 
interpretation of the Schneider case we find in the text after the two lines of arguments 
are presented. The analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s text will help bring out the reasons as to 
why I think embodied conceptualism is not vulnerable to the critique Merleau-Ponty 
launches against Intellectualism. Once we see that the first line of argumentation cannot 
be taken to establish a kind of Common Kind Assumption concerning the motor 
intentionality of the pathological cases and the motor intentionality of the normal case it 
becomes easier to see how we can block the arguments to the effect that motor 
intentionality is non-conceptual. The analysis will be particularly useful for the 
demonstration of how Kelly’s arguments, which are an attempt to re-enact Merleau-
Ponty’s first line of argument, can be questioned.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 Dreyfus notes we must assume such two versions of motor intentionality as motor intentionality is said 
to be what Schneider lacks but Schneider nevertheless is able to perform some actions in an apparently 
flexible manner, such as those  involved in the wallet making he worked with while in rehabilitation 
(Dreyfus 2007a, p. 63). When Dreyfus adds that Schneider is able to perceive stable sizes and shapes he 
seems to go to far in attributing abilities to Schneider compared with the empirical evidence presented by 
Gelb and Goldstein. Waldenfels also emphasises Merleau-Ponty’s second line of argument concerning 
Schneider (Waldenfels 2000, ch. 3).  
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6.2.3 An impasse for Intellectualism and Zaner’s contradiction 
In Phénoménologie de la Perception the Schneider case is first introduced as a difficult 
case for what we might call an intellectualistic theory of action and it is in this part of 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion that we find the imminent contradiction indicated by Zaner. 
As a theory of action the view Merleau-Ponty criticizes under the heading of 
intellectualism implies that all intentional bodily actions can be analysed into two 
independent components. First, the conscious intention representing as a minimum the 
goal of the action and possibly also the movement to be performed. Second, a physical 
movement causally initiated by the representation but in itself to be explained in purely 
third-personal, naturalistic terms (cf. PP, p. 161, n. 1, SC, p. 188). As we have already 
seen Merleau-Ponty’s critique of this dualism of intentions and movements is also 
applied to Liepmann’s model which is not obviously intellectualistic in the strong sense. 
In the strong sense Intellectualism is committed to the idea that all conscious 
representational content, at least in the case of mature human beings, is conceptual 
content (PP, p. 121). It is such a strong Intellectualism that forms the target of Merleau-
Ponty’s first round of arguments against an intellectualistic interpretation of the case.121   
It is a natural consequence of Intellectualism that all inabilities to perform 
actions in a normal way must be due to at least one of two factors: An impaired 
representational function or a purely physiological damage such as in the case of 
paralysis (cf. PP, p. 140). Consequently Intellectualism is committed to the claim that 
representational consciousness is a necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility 
of intentional actions, given that the purely physiological enabling conditions are 
fulfilled. We can call the two sides of the commitment of Intellectualism, the Necessity 
Thesis (I) and the Sufficiency Thesis (I). The two lines of argument concerning 
Schneider which give rise to the internal tension in Merleau-Ponty’s text each target one 
of the two theses. In what follows I will reconstruct the two lines of arguments 
separately. 
The first line of argument focuses on the preserved ability of Schneider to 
engage in concrete behaviour and carry out concrete movements (PP, pp. 120-124). 
 
 
 
121 The oscillation of the chapter on motility flows as follows: First a critique of an intellectualistic 
conception of psychology (PP, pp. 121-130), then the empiricist has a go at a causal explanation of the 
Schneider case (pp. 130-140), the criticism of which leads to the revival of intellectualism (pp. 140-148). 
The final defeat of intellectualism is said to justify the return of naturalism unless a new method is 
provided (p. 147). 
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With this line it is argued that a representational consciousness of the spatial location of 
one’s own body and of surrounding objects is not necessary for a grasping to be 
directed towards such a location. Merleau-Ponty formulates the critical question which 
arises within the framework of Intellectualism as follows:  
 
Si je sais où est  mon nez quand il s’agit de le saisir, comment ne 
saurais-je pas où est mon nez quand il s’agit de le montrer? (PP, p. 
120) 122 
 
Such questions are troublesome for Intellectualism in Merleau-Ponty’s depiction, 
because it is committed to the claim that all spatial awareness of an object consists in a 
conceptual representation of its location in an objective, three-dimensional space (PP, p. 
121). Two representations differing in content can of course be of the same object. As 
Merleau-Ponty writes it takes an intellectual synthesis to come to realize that for 
instance the evening star and the morning star are but two appearances of the same 
object, called Venus (PP, p. 266). In the case of a representation of the location of for 
instance one’s own nose one do not need any such intellectual synthesis in order to 
discover that the nose pointed to is the nose that one can also grasp. The location of the 
nose must according to Intellectualism be represented with the same sense, and if we are 
not to violate Frege’s rationality constraint on the ascription of senses, the subject must 
be said to either have or not to have a representation of the location of the nose. 123   
The patient is able to perform a movement similar to the pointing except 
for the fact that the movement ends up in a grasping, therefore the pointing ought to be 
equally possible (PP, p. 142). To the extent the Intellectualist explains the inability to 
point by appeal to a disturbance of the spatial representations, the ability to grasp 
becomes proportionally inexplicable. The intellectualist could argue that when 
Schneider is capable of whisking away a mosquito from his nose, then this is no 
 
 
 
122 In this formulation in the first- person Merleau-Ponty refers to another patient than Schneider, a patient 
who, in contrast to Schneider, was still able to grasp his nose on request, i.e. able to perform an arbitrary 
grasping (cf. PP, p. 120, n. 3). 
123 Bermúdez has proposed a re-interpretation of the Schneider case that regards the case as evidence for 
the existence of two different ways of representing the location of limbs and of points on one’s own body. 
He argues that Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the experience of the phenomenal body and the 
experience of the body as an object is a difference at the level of sense and not at the level of reference 
((Bermúdez 2005, p. 305). Embodied conceptualism has quarrel with Bermúdez’ interpretation because 
he claims that the representations are non-conceptual. Furthermore I think his interpretation misses an 
essential pragmatic dimension of our bodily awareness, what Merleau-Ponty calls the ‘I can’-awareness 
(cf. Grünbaum 2005, pp. 126-127).  
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different from what we can do in our sleep (cf. PP, p. 142). However, the fact that 
Schneider can perform concrete actions on command and not just when the appropriate 
stimuli are present makes it implausible to regard his behaviour as conditioned reflexes. 
As Goldstein states the patient performs the movement with some sense of spatial 
directedness which distinguishes them from the involuntary and forced movements of 
certain other patients with brain damage as well as from the reflex movements of a 
decapitated frog (Goldstein 1971, p. 273).124 
The second line of argumentation focuses on the impaired ability of 
Schneider to engage in abstract behaviour and to perform abstract movements (PP, pp. 
124-128). This line argues that a representational consciousness of a movement to be 
carried out, paired with the physical availability of the movement is not sufficient for the 
normal, swift execution of such movements. The second line of argument runs parallel 
with the line of argument we have already seen Merleau-Ponty employs in his 
interpretation of Liepmann’s cases of motor apraxia: 
 
Ce qui lui manque n'est ni la motricité, ni la pensée, et nous sommes 
inviteés à reconnaître entre le mouvement comme processus en 
troisième personne et la pensée comme représentation du mouvement 
une anticipation ou une saisie du résultat assurée par le corps lui-
même comme puissance motrice, un ”projet moteur” 
(Bewegungsentwurf) une ”intentionnalité motrice” sans lesquels la 
consigne demeure lettre morte. (PP, p. 128).125 
 
When Schneider is asked to perform an abstract action, like a circular movement, he 
knows intellectually what he is supposed to do. Furthermore he is capable of 
recognizing the beginning of a circular movement when his ‘blind’ attempts take the 
right shape and immediately carry out the movement requested (PP, p. 128). The fact 
that a movement that is similar qua physical movement to the abstract task can be 
carried speaks against a purely physiological explanation of the difficulties of the 
 
 
 
124 As Merleau-Ponty notes Goldstein comes close to identifying the grasping with a pure reflex in the 
text I refer to above. Merleau-Ponty states that Gelb and Goldstein have done more than any others to 
overcome the dichotomy between mind and body, but that they remain inchoately aware of the purport of 
their work and therefore tend to relapse into the dichotomy (PP, p. 142, n. 1).    
125 A homological argument is used when Merleau-Ponty discusses the linguistic disturbances of 
Schneider: ‘Cette puissance essentielle à la parole, nous aurons chance de l’apercevoir dans les cas où, ni 
la pensée ni la <<motricité>> ne sont sensiblement atteintes et où  cependant la <<vie>> du langage est 
alterée.’ (PP, p. 228). 
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patient. Consequently Intellectualism is under pressure to give up the Sufficiency Thesis 
(I).    
When formulated in terms of such negative conclusions, the two lines of 
arguments are clearly not inconsistent; they merely respectively target the Necessity 
Thesis (I) and the Sufficiency Thesis (I). It is not until we take a closer look at the 
positive conclusions that a contradiction threatens to make Merleau-Ponty’s 
interpretation unintelligible. In the first instance Merleau-Ponty argues that we have to 
assume a non-representational anticipation of the completion or endpoint (terme/fin) of 
the movement, as that which enables Schneider’s and related cases concrete movements 
of grasping (PP, p. 120). In the next instance he argues that we have to assume a non-
representational anticipation of the objective (résultat) of the movement, called motor 
intentionality, as that which is missing in the case of Schneider and which normally 
enable us to perform the abstract movements (PP, p. 128).126 In the second line of 
argument the normal performance of abstract movements is said to be assured by the 
body as motor power (puissance motrice, PP, p. 128). In the first line of argumentation 
the body of Schneider is characterized in similar terms as a power over a certain world 
(puissance d’un certain monde, PP, p. 124). It should be clear by now that the 
contradiction which Zaner indicated concerns the phenomenon of motor intentionality.  
When Merleau-Ponty, after his long discussion of the Schneider case, 
concludes that we have finally reached an unequivocal understanding of motor 
intentionality as an original kind of intentionality, he characterizes the phenomena in the 
exact same terms he used to describe Schneider’s intact grasping capacity (PP, p. 160). 
In Schneider’s grasping behaviour he was said to magically anticipate the endpoint in a 
non-representational manner. A similar description is now given of the way a normal 
person is able to relate motor intentionally to objects and such motor intentionality is 
said to be what is disturbed in cases of motor apraxia. Apparently motor intentionality is 
both claimed to be what is preserved in the Schneider case and thereby enables the 
performance of concrete behaviour and claimed to be what is impaired in the Schneider 
case, an impairment which is to explain the disability to perform the abstract 
movements. If this is the case then either the interpretation is contradictory or it is 
 
 
 
126 I use Colin Smith’s translation here, which I think captures the meaning of Goldstein’s original 
presentation of the abstract movements. Goldstein speaks of Schneider’s abstract movements as having a 
definite purpose or objective: ‘Festgelegt ist wesentlich die Erfüllung eines bestimmten Zweckes, die 
Erreichung eines bestimmten Zieles der Bewegung.’ (Goldstein 1923, p. 179).  
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vacuous. It is contradictory if motor intentionality is at the same time and in the same 
respect ascribed to and denied ascription to Schneider. It is vacuous if all that is said is 
that motor intentionality is present precisely when we are to perform concrete action 
and vanishes when we are to perform abstract actions. 
I don’t think we are obliged to take Zaner’s contradiction to be more than 
apparent. For Merleau-Ponty’s text to come out as logically inconsistent we have to 
assume that he with the concept of motor intentionality intends to identify a cognitive 
function that can enter a binary variable as either present or absent. Such a conception 
of motor intentionality and the corresponding general conception of the mind as a 
collection of separable functions is exactly what Merleau-Ponty argues against (cf. 
Merleau-Ponty, pp. 139-49, 158). I do think, however, that the appearance of a 
contradiction is a consequence of an overestimation of the similarities between the 
between the normal and the pathological case in his first line of argument. In order to 
make this point let me first focus on Merleau-Ponty’s general methodological 
considerations.  
     
6.2.4. Methodological considerations 
Anthony Marcel has put the constant problem of what to infer from psychopathological 
dissociations in the following way: 
 
Whether a psychological dissociation reveals a basic separation 
hidden by the normal integrated functioning or whether it reflects an 
abnormal mode or some compensatory attempt to deal with a 
dysfunction. (Marcel 2003, p. 56) 
 
On the one hand dissociations might reveal the possible separations of two functions 
that in the normal case always travel together and therefore might not even have been 
suspected to be two distinct passengers.  On the other hand the functioning which is 
present in the pathological case might merely reflect the fact that some normal function 
is disturbed and we should therefore be careful not to mistake a compensatory coping 
strategy for a normal function in splendid isolation. It is such a confusion Goldstein 
warns against when he writes that we should not mistake Schneider’s swift performance 
of the abstract movements once he recognizes the beginning of the intended figure for 
the way we normally perform such actions. The precision and the uniformity of 
Schneider’s abstract movements are exactly pathological features and therefore cannot 
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directly tell us something about the mechanisms that enable the normal execution of 
such movements (Goldstein 1973, p. 178).  
In his general reflections on the methodology of psychopathology 
Merleau-Ponty puts emphasise on a method which seeks to make sense of the 
compensatory strategies via their indirect reference to fundamental features of our 
existence:  
 
Il faut comprendre les suppléances comme des suppléances, comme 
des allusion à une function fondamentale qu’elles essayent de 
remplacer et dont elles ne nous donnent pas l’images directe. (PP, p. 
125).  
 
The general methodological conclusion, which Merleau-Ponty reaches through his 
analysis of the Schneider case, is that we need to develop a new method of existential or 
intentional analysis which can make the pathological cases intelligible as variations of 
the total being of the subject (cf. PP, pp. 71, 158, 528).127 The claim is that the cases 
cannot be understood by a merely causal mode of explanations which proceed by 
isolating variables that are either present or absent (cf. PP, p. 159).  
 In his interpretation of other aspects of Schneider’s condition it is obvious 
that Merleau-Ponty interprets the dissociations found as reflecting a pathological mode 
which by contrast can make us aware of what the normal experience is like. He argues 
that the way Schneider identifies a visually presented object via conjectures and 
inferences can make the normal immediate configuration of the visually given evident 
to us:  
 
Ce procédé met en evidence, par contraste, la méthode spontanée de la 
perception normale, […].(PP, p. 153). 
 
Neither the inferences nor the dissociated visual ‘content’ of the patient are elements 
which are to be found in the normal perception (PP, p. 160). The same goes for the 
tactile sensations of Schneider. When Goldstein says that only in the pathological case 
 
 
 
127 Here we get a glimpse of Merleau-Ponty’s dialectic conception of the relation between 
psychopathology and philosophy. Philosophy can make use of psychopathology exactly because the latter 
must make the phenomena intelligible by reference to fundamental existential features and precisely 
because of this feature of psychopathology it stands in need of philosophical vigilance to avoid the traps 
of Objective Thought. In a catch phrase: induction without intuition of essences is blind and intuition of 
essences without induction is empty.   
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can we study the tactile sensations in themselves, Merleau-Ponty adds that Goldstein’s 
own descriptions suggest that we cannot understand the pathological case as presenting 
us with a purified version of what is already present in the normal case: 
 
La conclusion est juste, mais elle revient à dire que le mot “toucher”, 
appliqué au sujet normal et au malade, n’a pas le même sens, que le “ 
tactile pure” est un phénomène pathologique qui n’entre pas comme 
composante dans l’expérience normale, que la maladie, en 
désorganisant la fonction visuelle, n’a pas mis à nu la pure essence du 
tactile, qu’elle modifié l’expérience entière du sujet, ou, si l’on 
préfère, qu’il n’y a pas chez le sujet normal une expérience tactile et 
une expérience visuelle, mais une expérience intégrale[…]. (PP, p. 
138). 
 
If we apply the integrative model used in the above quotation on the relation between 
the concrete and the abstract attitude this would mean that we should understand the 
pathological case as a case of disintegration of two attitudes and not just as the lapse of 
the abstract attitude. The consequence would be that ‘concrete movement’ would mean 
something different when applied to the pathological case than when applied to the 
normal case. The fact that this is the general structure of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
the relation between the concrete and the abstract attitude comes out when he discusses 
Schneider’s intellectual capacities. He argues that though Schneider’s arithmetic 
capacity is somewhat diminished we cannot say that he is deprived of the concept of 
number, as he is able to count visually presented objects using his fingers (PP, p. 156). 
Furthermore he argues that in general we cannot speak of a pure concept of number 
which the normal person possesses and which Schneider is then deprived of, because 
even in the normal case the series of numbers is a structure which is more or less (le 
plus et le moins) tied to melodic series of kinaesthetic experiences (PP, p. 141). As 
Merleau-Ponty notes the same integrative model is found in Goldstein’s work. At one 
point Goldstein concludes that even the grasping-attitude of the normal requires the 
categorical attitude (PP, p. 144, n.1, Goldstein 1971, pp. 279-280). The interdependence 
between the two attitudes in the normal case is what we have already seen emphasized 
by Goldstein and Scheerer, when they claim that the two attitudes are related as figure 
and ground in the normal case (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1964, p. 8).  
 The consequence of the integrative model is that we should not expect the 
concrete movements of Schneider to be of phenomenologically the same kind as that of 
the normal person moving under similar circumstance. To claim that the pathological 
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case provides an isolated version of a highest common factor shared with the normal 
case would neither be coherent with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology nor his 
reading of Gelb and Goldstein’s work as on the verge of breaking with a merely causal 
mode of understanding. Such a claim does however seem to be the main thrust of 
Merleau-Ponty’s first line of argument concerning Schneider. 
The modest conclusion of the first line of arguments Merleau-Ponty is that 
at least in certain pathological cases we have evidence for a way of being directed 
towards objects in action which is independent of a conceptual understanding of the 
location of the object. Merleau-Ponty goes further that the modest conclusion when he 
applies the findings directly to the normal case. His text shifts between descriptions of 
the Schneider case and general descriptions (cf. PP, pp. 122-124): 
 
Ce n’est jamais notre corps objectif que nous mouvons, mais notre 
corps phenomenal, et cela sans mystére pusique c’est notre corps déja, 
comme puissance de telles et telles regions du monde, qui se levait 
vers les objets à saisir et qui les percevait (1). De meme le malade n’a 
pas à chercher pour les movements concrets une scene et un espace où 
les déployer, […]. (PP, p. 123).128 
 
I think the best way to make this line of argument intelligible within the framework of 
Phénoménologie de la perception is to regard it as an attempt to employ the 
pathological case as a case where a certain aspect of the normal mode of motor 
intentionality is accentuated. On this interpretation the aspect of motor intentionality 
which is highlighted in the pathological case would be the non-conceptual and non-
representational directedness, which is claimed to characterize the object-directed 
actions of the normal person as well. This makes Merleau-Ponty’s first line of argument 
analogue to the way he argues that the synaesthetic effect of mescaline can be 
understood as an accentuation of a fundamental intertwinement of the senses already 
present in normal perception (PP, pp. 264-265). Merleau-Ponty does refer to the 
difficulties of ‘stripping pure motor intentionality naked’, only such talk appear in the 
 
 
 
128 It is in the run of the first line of argument that Merleau-Ponty confuses a statement of Goldstein’s for 
a report made by Schneider (PP, p. 122).  As I have shown in my master-thesis the first-person statement 
which Merleau-Ponty attributes to Schneider is in fact a first-person description provided by Goldstein to 
illustrate the normal mode of experience involved in performing habitual action in the flow of our daily 
life (cf. Goldstein 1923, p. 175). The misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun might be seen 
as symptom of Merleau-Ponty’s exaggeration of the similarities between the pathological and the normal 
case in his first line of argument.       
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context of his arguments concerning the cases of motor apraxia, where motor 
intentionality is said to be revealed indirectly by its disturbed mode of functioning (PP, 
p. 161, n. 1).   
After the run of the two lines of arguments Merleau-Ponty qualifies the 
difference between the patient and the healthy person. These qualifications make it 
evident that his interpretation is opposed to a common factor view of the experience of 
performing concrete actions. Merleau-Ponty claims that only when we realize that there 
is a certain way of structuring one’s surroundings which serves as the background for 
normal movement and vision and that it is this structuring which is disturbed in the 
pathological case, will we be able to procure a coherent account of the dissociation of 
the grasping and the pointing attitude (PP, p. 133). Gelb and Goldstein report that when 
Schneider walks by the house of Goldstein he will not recognize it unless he already has 
the intention to pay Goldstein a visit (PP, p. 157). In accordance with this report 
Merleau-Ponty describes Schneider’s condition as a contraction of the awareness of 
motor possibilities on the horizon (PP, pp. 136, 157, n. 5). The characterization of 
Schneider contrasts with Merleau-Ponty’s description of the normal open-ended horizon 
of the field of action accompanied by full-fledged ‘I can’- awareness: 
 
Quand je me déplace dans ma maison, je sais d’emblée et sans aucun 
discourse que marcher vers la salle de bain signifie passer prés de la 
chamber, que regarder la fenêtre signifie avoir la cheminée à ma 
gauche, et dans ce petit monde chaque geste, chaque perception se 
situe immédiatement par rapport à mille coordonnées virtuelle. (PP, 
pp. 150-51). 
 
Let me sum up the conclusion of my discussion of the arguments based on the 
Schneider case. Merleau-Ponty downplays the differences between the pathological 
cases and the normal case in his first line of argument. The downplaying creates the 
impression that motor intentionality is claimed to be fully preserved in the Schneider 
case and consequently the appearance of a down right contradiction, since motor 
intentionality is simultaneously claimed to be what is disturbed in the case. To avoid the 
contradiction we need to accentuate the differences between the concrete actions of the 
patient and the corresponding actions performed by the normal person. In this light 
Merleau-Ponty’s first line of argument can be read as highlighting an aspect of normal 
motor intentionality while at the same time regarding the way motor intentionality finds 
expression in the Schneider case as having undergone a thorough transformation. We 
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can with Merleau-Ponty speak of a contraction of the field of action in the case of 
Schneider. Motor intentionality is not a question of either/or; it is a matter of degree 
(comporte le plus et le moins, PP, pp. 141, 145, 156).   
 
6. 3 Embodied conceptualism and motor intentionality 
6.3.1 Embodied Conceptualism and visual pathologies   
The modest conclusion of Merleau-Ponty’s first line of argument was that at least in 
certain pathological cases we find a way of being directed towards an object that is 
independent of a conceptual understanding of the location of the object. I have proposed 
that we can read Merleau-Ponty’s extrapolation of the case as an attempt to reveal an 
aspect of all our object-directed actions. Under such a reading the general claim the 
argument is supposed to substantiate is a claim about the existence of an inherent layer 
of non-representational motor intentionality persistent in all our intentional bodily 
action, even in the so called abstract movements. In order to make this line of argument 
coherent with Merleau-Ponty’s second line of argument we need to claim that the 
original functioning of motor intentionality has been distorted in the case of Schneider. 
Such an interpretation still implies a disanalogy between the way the case is used to 
make motor intentionality evident and the way it is used to make the normal 
configuration of the visual field evident. As regards perception the pathological 
conditions are used to bring forth the normal workings of operant intentionality solely 
by its contrastive distortion. As regards the elucidation of motor intentionality the case 
serves the further purpose of highlighting the non-representational aspect of the object-
directed bodily actions via its perspicuous presence in the Schneider case.  
I will argue that embodied conceptualism can provide an alternative 
framework for making the pathological cases in question intelligible. The proposal is 
that we can at least begin to make sense of the cases by regarding them as cases of 
disintegration of on the one hand sensibility and motility and on the other hand 
spontaneity. I shall first argue that this can be done with regard to the perceptual 
disturbances. In the following section I argue that a similar interpretation is open 
concerning the motor disturbances of Schneider. Finally, I argue that this leaves the first 
line of argument hanging in the air and that trying to hold on to it will result in us losing 
our grip on our conception of ourselves as agents who can engage in intentional bodily 
actions.  
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In Merleau-Ponty’s further characterizations of the case of Schneider he 
describes the primordial function which is disturbed as a projection function (PP, p. 
129). The projection function is said to construct an anthropological space on top of the 
primordial geographical or natural environment (PP, p. 30). The projection function 
‘conjures up’ a manifold of signs that direct our actions like the signs of a museum 
direct the visitors (évocation, PP, p. 130). Further the isolated sensations present in the 
pathological case are said to figure in normal consciousness as ‘motives’ or ‘points of 
support’ rather than as isolated impressions (PP, pp. 154, 155). The projection function 
is said to promote the free development of such ‘motives’ which goes beyond their own 
meaning (PP, p. 159). We might say that ‘projection function’ is here used as a term that 
puts emphasis on the practical dimension of the configuration of the perceptual world 
that Merleau-Ponty generally describes as procured by operating intentionality.  
Merleau-Ponty is perfectly aware of the risk of adopting the mythology of 
pure sensations in his characterization of the projection function. He defines the 
intellectual task we are facing as one of describing the milieu where the antinomy 
between matter and form becomes conceivable (PP, p. 148). In the case of Schneider the 
contradiction we need to be make conceivable is that apparently he is both able to see 
and not able to see. He can see in the sense that he has sensuous impression. He cannot 
see in the sense of being able to visually point out features of his environment and on 
the basis of such ‘carving out’ make non-inferential judgements about the objects seen. 
Cases such as Schneider help to bring out the shortcomings of the empiricist reduction 
of perception to content and of the intellectualistic idea that the form of perception must 
be autonomous in relation to the content (PP, p. 147).129 Because we cannot understand 
the impairment as pertaining unambiguously to either the autonomous form or to 
contingent content, such cases will stand out as paradoxical as long as we think in terms 
of the dualism of schema and content. 
Embodied conceptualism does not need to place the responsibility of the 
disturbance in either a disturbance of the conceptual form or in a distortion of the non-
conceptual content because it regards the content of perception as already given in a 
conceptual form. According to embodied conceptualism the possibility of a disturbance 
 
 
 
129 Here Merleau-Ponty uses ‘content’ in the sense it is used in Davidson’s schema-content dichotomy. It 
is the idea of in themselves meaningless sensations the lot of which according to Empiricism is somehow 
to make intentionality possible.  
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of the co-operation of receptivity and spontaneity is a real possibility. As Merleau-Ponty 
states the disturbance experienced by Schneider is not metaphysical, it is the result of 
being hit by mine-splinters in the occipital region of the brain (PP, p. 146). As argued 
by Merleau-Ponty this fact does not imply that the disturbances can be made fully 
intelligible in merely causal terms. We can take the workings of spontaneity to depend 
on the workings of the brain without identifying the perceptual experience and our 
intentions and tryings with brain events if we take on board the idea of a dual 
conception of natural occurrences.  
Some of Merleau-Ponty’s characterizations of the pathological cases can 
be directly accommodated by embodied conceptualism: in the Schneider case it is the 
‘junction’ of sensibility and the meaning-giving that is broken; it is the ‘intentional 
arch’ that provides the unity of the senses and the intellect which is loosened (PP, p. 
158). In cases of colour amnesia what is affected is said to be the grip spontaneity has 
on the sensible world (PP, p. 224). Merleau-Ponty puts it in Kantian terms and says that 
it is the productive imaginations and not understanding as such (Verstand) that is 
affected. McDowell uses Kant’s notion of the productive imagination as a name for a 
cognitive function which is essentially involved in the bringing forth of the intuitional 
content in which we have presented not only flat surfaces but full-blown objects with a 
categorical unity (McDowell 2008a, p. 5). It is such a presentation of the objects in their 
bodily presence which the patients suffering from apperceptive visual agnosia lack 
(presence charnelle, PP, p. 127).  
On Merleau-Ponty’s account the visual pathologies in question are an 
expression of a disturbance of operant intentionality. However as we saw above his 
account also appeals to the idea of a function that serves to integrate sensibility and 
spontaneity. Merleau-Ponty’s account seems be faced with a dilemma here. The 
dilemma is a consequence of the following two options: Either Merleau-Ponty 
maintains that it is, as he puts it, the milieu where judgement or spontaneity is given 
birth and not spontaneity itself that is affected (cf. PP, p. 224), or he claims that it is an 
original integration of sensibility and spontaneity that is disturbed. If we choose the 
former option we will face the difficulties I expounded in Chapter 5. If we choose the 
latter option the position merges with embodied conceptualism.  
The intellectual task at hand was defined by Merleau-Ponty as the task of 
making it intelligible that there is a milieu where the contradiction between the idea of a 
grounding empirical content or matter and the idea of the necessarily conceptual form of 
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judgements can be overcome. The first option mentioned above, consists in the claim 
that the milieu where we are to make the apparent contradiction between matter and 
form conceivable is intelligible on its own term, i.e. without presupposing the 
intelligibility of spontaneity. It is by appealing to the basis of an original milieu brought 
forth by the impregnating of meaning on the given sensibles that we are first to make 
spontaneity intelligible. Here the gap between the form impregnated on the sensible and 
the conceptual form of judgements opens. Further we face the problems of accounting 
for the intrinsic normativity of the primordial field of perception that I exposed in 
Chapter 5. The alternative option is to put emphasis on the descriptions I draw attention 
to above, in which Merleau-Ponty speaks of the spontaneity as loosing its grip on the 
sensible world. Now we are no longer trying to make the pathological cases 
comprehensible by appealing to something that is itself intelligible independently of a 
reference to spontaneity. When Merleau-Ponty writes the following, it can be read as 
pointing in the same direction: 
 
De sorte qu’on ne peut pas dire que l’homme voit parce qu’il est 
Esprit, ni d’ailleurs qu’il est Esprit parce qui’il voit: voir comme un 
homme voit et être Esprit sont synonymes. (PP, p. 149). 
 
If we choose this second option the interpretation of the pathological cases becomes 
virtually indistinguishable from what we can say on the basis of embodied 
conceptualism. According to embodied conceptualism the apparent antinomy between 
the idea of contingent empirical content and autonomous conceptual forms is resolved 
when we realize that we are entitled to regard the content of perception as through and 
through conceptual. Perception is not blind because it never travels without the light of 
spontaneity and thoughts are not empty because they can be corrected by the world as it 
is made manifest in perception through the passive actualization of conceptual 
capacities in sensuous awareness. 
  
6.3.2 Embodied conceptualism and the motor disturbances 
Returning to the disturbances of Schneider’s motility I want to propose a possible way 
of describing such disturbances from the perspective of embodied conceptualism. We 
can regard such cases as cases of disintegration of the normal integration of motility and 
practical spontaneity.  
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In the healthy person there is an ability to freely and flexibly move forth 
and back between actualizing teleologically basic capacities that are more or less 
immediate in relation to the objective the agent has in mind. We can speak of basic 
actions as being more or less immediate in relation to the objective of the agent 
according to how much practical means-end knowledge the agent actualizes in order to 
reach her objective by performing her teleologically most basic action. If my objective 
is to get my shoelaces tied then tying my shoelaces might be my teleologically most 
basic action and my basic action is as immediate as it gets. If my shoelaces are frozen 
and I am wearing thick gloves then I might need to bend the laces with force and even 
need to intentionally grasp the lace between my thumb and my index finger in order to 
get a hold on it. The normal fluidity of the action is carved out into smaller actions 
carried out as basic. In the normal person the flexibility to move up and down between 
more or less immediate basic actions gives series of actions their flow. When driving a 
car my gear shifting might meet unexpected resistance and I immediately lower the 
degree of immediacy of my teleologically most basic action. I intentionally apply a bit 
more force or I loosen my grip in order to reach a higher gear and accelerate the car. 
 Besides from a repertoire of acquired basic practical capacities we also 
possess the ability to simply move for the sake of moving. We constantly and passively 
engage in idle moving of our body. We move our tongue around in our mouth, we tap 
our fingers, bob our feet and rock our torso forth and back. While engaging in idling we 
do not experience any loss of agency, and there is no need for a searching for the 
relevant limbs if we decide to engage in some intentional action. Even if I am at a given 
moment not actually performing any intentional bodily action my awareness of my 
body is the awareness of a potential for intentional actions. My self-awareness as agent 
is my awareness of this potential; an awareness we, with Merleau-Ponty, can refer to as 
an ‘I can’-awareness. At any moment I can modify my idle moving into an intentional 
moving with a certain purpose. The counterpart in perception is the awareness of 
intuitional content as embodying an immediate potential that can be actualized in my 
carving out of features of the presented objects. Even if I am at a given moment not 
carving out any features of the objects that are given in my intuition they are given as 
potential objects of a modified perception in which I attend to the object in an 
objectifying modus and carve out aspects of the intuitional content.  
The fact that we do not just have teleologically basic capacities to perform 
action that are ‘at a distance’ from our bodily movements but can return to our bodies 
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and make arbitrary movements is crucial for our freedom in action. If I did not have the 
capacity to simply stop moving or to let my movements spin in an aimless running on 
the spot I would be forced to engage in a new intentional bodily action in order to 
interrupt the one I am engaged in. My situation would be the practical analogue to a 
person who could only come to change his mind about a matter of fact by believing 
something contradictory to what he initially thought. Such a person would not be able to 
step back and assess the putative reasons for a belief. He would only change his mind if 
he already had a belief which he discovers to be in contradiction to another of his beliefs 
or if he just arbitrarily changed his viewpoint. A person without the potential to 
deliberately disengage himself from a goal-directed bodily activity without immediately 
turning to another action would not be able to step back and question the ends of his 
actions. He would only be able to change the purpose he has in mind by assuming a 
contrary purpose.  
 Returning once again to the visual disturbances found in cases of 
apperceptive visual agnosia it seems that they are at least partly disturbances of the 
ability to passively actualize concepts of common sensibles such as the form and size of 
objects in our perceptual experience. This is what we can express by saying that 
spontaneity has lost its grip on the sensible world. If I lack such a capacity I cannot have 
my basic recognitional capacities intact, i.e. the capacities to non-inferentially see what 
is the case. According to embodied conceptualism some basic empirical concepts must 
be actualized in perception in a non-propositional but conceptual unity, if I am to see 
any object at all. I may make inferences on the basis of such observations and I may 
even have acquired concepts which are immediately and passively actualized when I 
perceive an object of a certain kind. An ornithologist may have the visual capacity to 
immediately recognize a cardinal as a cardinal and may gain non-inferential knowledge 
about the fact that a specific bird is a cardinal simply by perceiving the bird (cf. 
McDowell 2008a, p. 3).130 However if he is in doubt about whether some bird is a 
cardinal he will usually be able to look for traits which will count as evidence. In other 
words he will be able to inferentially achieve the same knowledge he would have 
achieved immediately had the bird been presented in plain view. Not all observational 
 
 
 
130 This idea is the first of the two changes McDowell makes in ‘Avoiding the Myth of Given’ (2008a). 
The idea is that we can be entitled to non-inferential observational beliefs without the content of the belief 
being embodied in the non-discursive, intuitional content of perception.  
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knowledge can be based on the presence of such circumstantial evidence. If there was 
no possibility of an immediate translation of my perceptual content into the content of a 
belief, I could not have the world manifest itself in my experience. I would need to 
construct a world view based on experiences that fall short of the facts of the world and 
we would loose the idea of perception as the place where my belief can be corrected by 
the world’s direct manifestation. In cases of visual form agnosia the subject still have 
some disfigured sensuous experiences with conceptual content which can serve as the 
basis for inferential knowledge, but such experiences are only intelligible as the basis 
for inferential knowledge if we understand them as aberrations from the normal 
experiences. They could not serve as the basis of our original openness to the world. 
Coming back to Schneider’s motor disturbances we may say that it is the 
practical analogue of the basic observational concepts which is disturbed in his case and 
this may be a way to at least make certain symptoms comprehensible. Goldstein notes 
that when Schneider succeeds in carrying out some abstract movements they are 
performed with a precision and a uniformity which is pathological (Goldstein 1923, p. 
170). When Schneider is asked to pretend he salutes an officer he must first make some 
apparently random jerks with his body in order to locate his hand, after which he carries 
out the action with an unusual precision and without the usual variation in how the task 
is solved on different occasions. Goldstein observes how Schneider lacks the ability to 
cope with unforeseen changes in a situation that is essential to the normal subject 
(Goldstein 1923, p. 170). When he met unforeseen hindrances while carrying out 
abstract movements his movements were interrupted and he could only complete the 
task piecemeal, in what Goldstein describes as isolated, arbitrary movements (Goldstein 
1923, pp. 176-177). In the terminology applied here, we may say that what is impeded 
is the ability to flexibly shift between more or less immediate basic actions relative to 
the objective of the agent. The fact that the movements which appear to cause the most 
trouble for Schneider are bodily movement carried out as isolated and arbitrary 
movements suggests that it is the basic ‘I can’-awareness which holds all our 
teleologically basic capacities together which is disturbed. The fact that such motor 
impairments goes together with a visual form agnosia indicates, as stressed by Merleau-
Ponty, that there exists an internal connection between sensibility and motility. 
Embodied conceptualism suggests that this internal connection is in the case of mature 
human beings a consequence of spontaneity permeating at once our sensibility and our 
motility.  
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What embodied conceptualism suggests is to generalize Merleau-Ponty’s 
conclusion concerning the linguistic disturbances of Schneider and other pathological 
cases. Merleau-Ponty uses such cases to contrastively highlight what he takes to be the 
essential structures of linguistic capacities and concludes as follows: 
 
On ne peut dire de la parole ni qu’elle est une « operation de 
l’intelligence » ni qu’elle est un « phénomène moteur »: elle est tout 
entière motricité et tout entière intelligence. (PP, p. 227). 
 
Similarly we may say that our intentional bodily actions are through and through the 
operation of our spontaneity and through and through the actualization of our motility. 
Our motility is permeated with practical spontaneity.   
 
6.3.3 Embodied conceptualism and motor intentionality 
However, it might still be claimed that there is a relevant disanalogy between 
Schneider’s visual and his motor disturbances. Schneider was capable of carrying out 
the so called concrete actions, like engaging in the activities required to carry out his job 
as portefeuiller at the habilitation clinic. Furthermore, it could be claimed, this is not so 
much of a disanalogy because Schneider’s vision is in fact working perfectly well when 
it is to guide such practical engagement with the environment. This line of reasoning 
would constitute an attempt to hold on to the strong interpretation of the first line of 
argument. In the strong interpretation it is claimed that what is revealed by its 
perspicuous intactness in the Schneider case is a necessary condition for all intentional 
bodily actions. What is disturbed is a layer of spatial and visual understanding which is 
build on top of the primordial level of motor intentionality. This is the line of argument 
pursued by Sean Kelly, who has recently presented arguments for the need to assume a 
basic notion of non-conceptual motor intentionality which run parallel to Merleau-
Ponty’s first line of argument. I think this line of argument faces problems analogue to 
the problem we face if we try to explain the inherent normativity of perception by 
appealing to a primordial level of perception prior to any distinction between veridical 
and non-veridical perception.  
Kelly interprets the Schneider case as a case in which we find “a kind of 
pure motor intentionality” (Kelly 2004, p. 75). In line with what I have termed Merleau-
Ponty’s first line of argumentation Kelly argues that the skilful coping of normal 
subjects involves the same kind of experience as that of Schneider (Kelly 2004, p. 75, 
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cf. Kelly 2000, p. 168). He further argues that the dissociation found in the Schneider 
case is in important respects similar to the more recent case of DF described by Goodale 
and Milner.  
DF’s condition has been diagnosed as apperceptive visual agnosia. Just 
like Schneider, DF has problems recognizing the shape and orientation of visually 
presented objects. However, if she is to grasp an object she can grasp it with accuracy 
indistinguishable from that of a normal sighted (Goodale and Milner 2005, p. 21ff). In 
another experiment DF was presented with a vertical display with a slot cut into it that 
could be rotated to different orientations. DF was given a card with a size that just made 
it possible for it to be pushed through the slot. She was then either asked to show the 
orientation of the slot by orientating the card so that it matches the slot and without 
moving her hand toward the slot or she was asked to “post” the card through the slot. 
The latter task she managed almost as well as a normal sighted, whereas her attempts at 
solving the first task were close to random (Goodale and Milner 2005, p. 20). In 
simplified terms the explanation of the dissociation given by Goodale and Milner is that 
our visual system has to ways of processing visual information, one used for the 
immediate unconscious visual control of skilled action (the dorsal stream) and another 
used for the conscious, visual perception of for instance the size, orientation and shape 
of the object (the ventral stream). According to Milner and Goodale it is the ventral 
stream that is deficient in the case of DF whereas the dorsal stream of information is 
still working impeccably.   
 Kelly suggests that if Goodale and Milner’s dual-pathway hypothesis is 
correct it could provide an explanation at the neural level of the phenomenological 
distinction Merleau-Ponty draws between two kinds of spatial understanding, one 
involved in grasping and the other involved in pointing (Kelly 2000, p. 172, 2003 p. 
66).131 He further makes use of the case of DF to underpin two of his main thesis 
concerning motor intentionality. First, he argues that the case demonstrate the existence 
of non-conceptual motor intentionality present in object-directed actions such as 
grasping. Second, he argues that the case of DF provides substantial evidence for his 
thesis that motor intentional content is content that it is in principle impossible to 
 
 
 
131 Goodale and Milner also talks about how the perception of location is compromised in the case of DF 
just as is the perception of orientation and geometrical features of the object (Goodale and Milner 2005, p. 
80). 
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articulate conceptually (Kelly 2005, p. 11). In contrast to Merleau-Ponty Kelly 
emphasizes that the content of motor intentionality is representational. Kelly argues that 
motor intentionality is representational in the sense that it involves a non-conceptual 
representation of the object as being in certain way (Kelly 2005, p. 17, Kelly 2004, pp. 
73-74). In motor intentional activities we are said to take into account a multiplicity of 
aspects of the object acted on such as its size, shape, orientation, weight and fragility 
and do so in manner that orientate us towards the object in its entirety (Kelly 2000, p. 
174). Further, motor intentional activities are said to essentially disclose the world to us 
(Kelly 2004, p. 75).  
Kelly argues that in the case of DF there is no possible distinction between 
the attitude and the content of the motor intentional activity. The lack of such a possible 
distinction he takes to support his claim that the motor intentional content is in principle 
ungraspable in conceptual thought. It may seem that DF could make her motor 
understanding of the orientation the content of a propositional attitude by referring to 
the way she puts her hand through the slot.  She could for instance say, “I believe that 
the slot is orientated this way”, as she pushes her hand through the slot (Kelly 2004, p. 
74). Such an indirect reference to the orientation via a reference to the hand is however 
different from the direct sensitivity to the actual orientations which is displayed in the 
motor activity.  To use an analogy of Adrian Cussins’: It is like the pointing to a dancer 
saying, ‘Look there! That’s what the dance expresses’ (Cussins 2003, p. 162). Just as 
such a demonstrative reference could be claimed not to tell us anything about the nature 
of the content expressed in the dance, so the possibility of referring to the motor 
intentional activity does, according to Kelly, not tell us anything about the content of 
such activity. Because the motor understanding involves sensitivity to the actual 
orientation, Kelly argues, the content of the motor intentional activity of DF cannot be 
specified independently of the actual activity and so is not a content that can figure as 
content of various attitudes. If this is the case then motor intentional content is of a kind 
that cannot even in principle become conceptualized. It is this strong thesis about the 
inaccessibility to conceptual consciousness which Kelly argues we can transfer to the 
normal subject (Kelly 2004, p. 25). The critical question is whether this extrapolation of 
his conclusions concerning the case of DF is justified.    
There are relevant differences in the way perception shapes the 
intentional, object-directed actions of the visually agnostic and the way a normal sighted 
acts on the perceived. Just by looking at an object a normal sighted can carve out 
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different affordances of an object. If I am looking at a knife I can switch between seeing 
it as affording different actions. I can see it as needing grinding or I can see it as ‘matter 
out of place’ and so as affording the action of putting it into the drawer where it is 
supposed to be. Because of DF’s form agnosia objects will not immediately present the 
same action potentials as they do for a normal sighted. How the normal ability to see the 
use of an object reflects on our grasping of objects can be seen from an experiment 
where subjects are asked to pick up a screwdriver. The normal sighted will usually 
grasp the screwdriver by the handle also in cases where the handle is positioned so that 
they have to adopt a rather awkward hand posture. DF, who is unable to recognize the 
screwdriver, will grasp it by its shaft if that is what is pointing towards her (Goodale 
and Milner 2005, p. 107). In the experiment with the screwdriver my action would be 
intentional under the description, ‘grasping that screwdriver by the handle’. We can say 
that my teleologically basic trying is, ‘trying to grasp that screwdriver by the handle’. A 
visual form agnostic would not be able to perform a similar intentional action. We 
might describe her trying as, ‘trying to grasp some object in front of me’.  
It is true that when I am to grasp and lift an object I do not normally 
consider how to adopt the aperture of my grip to the object or how much force to use. 
My action is not intentional under a description that specifies the details of my bodily 
movement as they are described, for instance, by bio-mechanics, nor is it intentional 
under the description of grasping an object that is, for instance, six inches wide. 
However, this does not show that my awareness of the object and of my bodily activity 
is not conceptual. My perceptual awareness of the handle of the screwdriver as 
affording grasping is conceptual in the sense that there is no aspect of the content of my 
awareness that could not serve as input to by practical rationality. And my awareness of 
my bodily activity is conceptual in the sense that there is no aspect of my bodily activity 
that could not be intentionally modified in case I should meet unforeseen hindrances or 
simply decide to experiment with my way of performing actions that are otherwise 
performed as teleologically basic actions. 
It is true that in my grasping the handle I have a motor understanding of 
the object which is unique compared to any perceptual carving out of affordances for 
use in my practical deliberation. This is comparable to the way the intuitional content of 
perception will always exceed my actual carving out of aspects of the intuitional content 
for use in my theoretical deliberations. We might speak of motor content as a 
counterpart to intuitional content and say that we manifest a motor understanding of an 
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object in our acting on it just like an object manifest itself in our intuition when we 
perceive it. Embodied conceptualism can recognize that there is an original kind of 
perceptual intentionality and still claim that such intuitional intentionality has 
conceptual content. Similarly embodied conceptualism can claim that there is an 
original kind of motor intentionality characteristic of object-directed embodied tryings 
and still maintain that the intentionality of embodied tryings is conceptual. There is no 
aspect of the motor content that cannot be articulated so as to contribute to the content 
of our means-end deliberation. Whether it is the size, shape, orientation, weight or 
fragility of an object we might take them into consideration when deliberating about 
what to do and about how to do it. In other words the features of the object we are aware 
of when we act on it are the features which could serve as reasons for actions if we were 
to step back and deliberate.  
My awareness of my own bodily activity is conceptual in the sense that 
there is no aspect of my bodily activity that I cannot intentionally modify. I can grasp 
faster, higher and stronger and such modification of my grasping activity can be 
intentional. Such modifications are in fact modifications of my embodied trying and it is 
crucial that they do not immediately disturb my perceptual awareness of the affordances 
I act on. I can stay in the flow of the activity while flexibly modifying my embodied 
trying. This is why we can say that in the experiment which I mentioned in the 
Introduction, in which the subject sub-consciously control the unpleasant sounds by 
twitching his fingers, we are not dealing with  a case of intentionally doing anything. 
The subject has no way of modifying the activity intentionally; she can only intervene 
in order to hinder its unfolding or she can let it unfold without any control over the way 
it oscillates in response to the perceptual stimuli. The movements are not agency-
involving and so do not display motor intentionality.  
Kelly could object that in stepping back from actually acting on an 
affordance, we immediately and necessarily turn the affordance into something else 
namely the content of a conceptual awareness, which in principle cannot access the 
motor content of our bodily activities. Noticing either features of the object or noticing 
what my hand is doing ‘breaks the spell that the world had over it’ (Kelly 2005, p. 20). 
Kelly argues that the experience of solicitations or affordances is intrinsically 
motivating and that this is reflected in what he takes to be an essential characteristic of 
motor intentional activity (Kelly 2005, p. 21): it is in principle impossible that there 
should be a mismatch or slippage between the activity which is solicited by the 
 
 
 
212
perceived affordances and the activity one actually engages (Kelly 2005, p. 19). Motor 
intentional activities are qua motor intentional phenomena infallible and it is only when 
we retrospectively interpret the activity in terms of conceptual reasons that they may 
appear as mistakes. 
I think this model makes it impossible to understand how we should ever 
be able to perform any intentional bodily actions, because it makes the transition 
between unreflectively carrying out an action and one’s intentional modification of 
one’s teleologically most basic trying unintelligible. If it is in principle impossible that 
it is an element of the content of the motor intentional activity that the activity has to be 
appropriately coordinated with objective reality (cf. (Kelly 2004, p. 21), then the world 
of affordances becomes a dream world. Kelly argues that when standing in front of a 
trompe d’oeil painting of a door I might be genuinely solicited to walk through the door 
and instead walk right into the wall. The fact that one would afterwards say that one 
thought there was a door does, according to Kelly, not imply that it was part of the 
motor intentional content that there was a door there (Kelly 2005, p. 21). In genuinely 
absorbed coping there is no room for any intending or trying or hoping to go through 
the door, we simply respond in an infallible way to the solicitations of the world (cf. 
Kelly 2005, p. 20). If this is the true nature of unreflective skilful coping it becomes a 
mystery how, once we are absorbed, we should ever have the experience of not 
succeeding and so simultaneously how we should ever have the experience of actually 
succeeding. If there is no inherent possibility of a mismatch at the level of absorbed 
coping there is no room for any motivation that could ever give rise to the reflective 
attitude and we are lost in absorption. We are in a predicament similar to the 
predicament of the position of phenomenological naturalism when it claims that at the 
original layer of perception there is no distinction between a veridical and a non-
veridical perception. We cannot make beliefs intelligible as possible corrections of 
perceptual mistakes if no mistakes are possible at the original level of perception. 
Similarly we cannot make bodily tryings intelligible as possible modifications of motor 
intentional activities if no mistakes are possible at the level of unreflective skilful 
coping.   
Our perceptual experiences and the bodily activities that are expressive of 
our agency are what they are by virtue of being actualizations of the same capacity that 
allows us to step back and ask whether we have reason to believe and whether we have 
reason to act.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the first part of this thesis I have argued that there is a transcendental problem of 
agency corresponding to the transcendental problem of perception diagnosed by 
McDowell. The problem of agency is the problem of making it intelligible that we are 
creatures who can perform bodily intentional actions, i.e. actions that are carried out 
through the execution of bodily movements. Our status as bodily agents is threatened 
when we assume that the motility of our body must be susceptible to a natural scientific 
explanation that in principle can explain all aspects of the capacity of our body to 
execute movements. On such an assumption it follows that it must be possible to make 
the occurrences of all bodily movements intelligible independently of any reference to 
the presence of rational agents in the world. When we are to understand our capacities 
as rational agents we therefore have to reconstruct our notion of bodily actions in terms 
of such agency-neutral movement and add some mental item such as an intention or a 
trying by virtue of which the movements can become expressions of agency. Such 
mental items might be claimed to be dependent for their existence on the existence of a 
body with which they are actually or potentially could be suitably connected. However, 
the connection with a body can amount to no more than a merely causal connection.  
This is a corollary of the Scientific Naturalism which in the first place led to the idea 
that all bodily movements are agency-neutral.  
According to Scientific Naturalism all natural events that are causally 
related must be identifiable as events that can be given a natural scientific explanation. 
This is the Scientific Monism of events which may or may not be combined with 
anomalous monism. If the bodily movements that are involved in bodily actions can be 
given an exhaustible explanation by natural science, then the capacity to perform bodily 
action must be intelligible in terms of merely causal connections between mental items 
and the agency-neutral motility of the body. However, in order for it to be intelligible 
that a person can intentionally carry out bodily actions it is not enough that we ascribe 
some causal power to mental events like tryings or intentions. If such events are to be 
recognizable as tryings or as intentions we must be able to make it intelligible how they 
can lead to the intended outcome and not just how they can qua brain events cause some 
neuro-physiological processes. We must be able to make sense of the agent’s possession 
of at least some teleologically basic practical capacities. Within the framework of 
Scientistic Naturalism this requirement seems unrealizable. If the causal powers of the 
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agent is restricted to the causal powers of her mental occurrences qua brain events then 
the fact that she can, at least sometimes, succeed in achieving what she was trying to 
achieve becomes mysterious. She succeeds by virtue of some causal mechanisms of 
which she may have no knowledge and which cannot be rationally constrained by her 
intentions. Under such circumstances her capacity to carry out her intentions takes on 
the appearance of a telekinetic power to move objects around solely by having 
something in mind. 
If we deny the Scientific Monism of events we gain a way of making 
bodily actions intelligible. We can claim that some bodily movements are essentially 
agency-involving. When we carry out a bodily action we move our body and by doing 
so we actualize basic practical capacities. Such capacities cannot be made intelligible in 
separation from the motility of our body and our motility cannot be made intelligible in 
separation from our teleologically basic capacities, i.e. from basic practical concepts. 
Bodily movements without practical concepts are mere happenings and tryings without 
motility are not really happening at all. The consequence of this idea is what I call a 
dual conception of bodily movements. When we individuate a bodily movement as the 
movement of a rational agent we do not at the same time identify an event or series of 
events that could be given a natural-scientific explanation. We make the movements 
intelligible in terms of the rational practical capacities of the agent to perform bodily 
intentional actions and such intelligibility is sui generis in relation to the intelligibility 
provided by natural science.  
To deny the monism of events of Scientistic Naturalism is not to deny the 
value of natural science nor is to deny the validity of natural scientific investigations. It 
is simply to deny that all empirical occurrences are of a kind that is intelligible in the 
way science makes events intelligible. Once we allow for essentially agency-involving 
movements we can also make sense of the idea of essentially movement-involving 
tryings. Such tryings not only relate to bodily movement form the outside in the way we 
relate to objects in perception. The tryings are expressed in the bodily activities and 
such activities embody our tryings. Consequently, we can deny that the possibility of a 
trying-experience indistinguishable from an actual bodily doing, forces us to the 
conclusion that tryings are essentially independent of bodily movements. We can 
formulate a disjunctivism of trying: Any trying is either an idle trying or it is an 
essentially embodied trying.  
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The combination of the idea of embodied tryings and the idea of bodily 
movements as essentially agency-involving by virtue of basic practical concepts I call 
embodied conceptualism concerning bodily agency.  
In the second part of this thesis I return to the issue of perception that was 
the primary subject of the first two chapters of the first part. I expound and develop 
McDowell’s new conception of the content of perception as non-propositional yet 
conceptual content. I argue that this view is well motivated and has significant 
advantages compared to McDowell’s former view. In order to challenge what I call 
embodied conceptualism concerning perception I draw on the early works of Merleau-
Ponty. I argue that McDowell’s new position can provide answers to the challenges I 
raise on the background of Merleau-Ponty’s work. In turn I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s 
own position possesses an inherent tension, which I identify as a new version of the 
oscillation between the Myth of Given an Coherentism. In the case of Merleau-Ponty 
the tension between the two positions is moved from the relation between beliefs and 
perception out into perception itself.  Merleau-Ponty’s move is motivated by a deep 
insight in the need to recognise the non-propositional nature of the meaning we are 
presented with in perception. However, such meaning can be conceived as conceptual if 
we do not over-intellectualise the mind as we do if we take concepts to be intelligible in 
abstraction from their use in a shared life-world. If we refuse to take on board the idea 
of a conceptual, non-discursive content of perception there seem to be good reasons to 
suspect that the restless oscillation McDowell pinpoints will find its way into our 
thinking in some disguise or another.  
After my critic of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of perception I turn to his 
exposition of the transcendental problem of bodily agency. I argue that his use of the 
case of Schneider contains a fundamental methodological ambiguity. I demonstrate how 
we might overcome the ambiguity if we adopt embodied conceptualism concerning 
perception and concerning bodily agency. Finally I show how Kelly’s appropriation of 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of motor intentionality faces difficulties that were already 
imminent in Merleau-Ponty’s own account. The account seems to face fundamental 
difficulties that I diagnose as a consequence of the idea of a split between our life as 
rational agents and our life as embodied agents. We can overcome the difficulties if we 
can make sense of the idea that our most basic bodily coping skills are permeated with 
practical concepts. This is what I have argued we can and this is what is claimed by 
embodied conceptualism.  
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Afhandlingsresumé 
Handling og Perception. En analogisk tilgang 
I første del af afhandlingen argumentere jeg for eksistensen af et problem med hensyn 
til handling, der er analog med det problem, som McDowell har diagnosticeret som et 
transcendentalt problem med hensyn til perception. Perceptionens problem er hvorledes 
perception kan ligge rationelle bånd på vores formodninger. Handlingens problem er 
hvorledes vore intentioner kan komme rationelt til udtryk i vore kropslige bevægelser. 
McDowell finder roden til perceptionens problem i antagelsen om at alle naturlige 
hændelser må kunne forklares udelukkende ved brug af naturvidenskabelige metoder: 
Videnskabelig Naturalisme. Jeg argumenterer for at Videnskabelig Naturalisme fører til 
et tilsvarende problem, når vi forsøger at gøre vores evne til at udføre kropslige 
handlinger forståelig indenfor dens rammer. 
 Jeg viser hvorledes Videnskabelig Naturalisme fører til en opfattelse af 
kropslige bevægelser som agent-neutrale hændelser, samt hvorledes en sådan opfattelse 
synes dømt til at gøre vores opfattelse af os selv som handlende individer ubegribelig. 
Hvis vi hævder, at vi kan gøre vores bevægelses-evne forståelig uafhængig af nogen 
henvisning til handlende individer, da underminerer vi muligheden for at give mening 
til ideen om os selv som besiddende handlemuligheder. Som alternativ foreslår jeg en 
dobbelt opfattelse af bevægelser, ifølge hvilken bevægelser der er involverede i 
intentionelle handlinger, er af en slags der kun kan gøres forståelige, hvis vi anser dem 
for at være udtryk for rationelle agenters handlekraft. Når vi først har etableret denne 
mulighed, bliver det tilmed muligt at opfatte vores forsøg på at udrette noget som 
essentielt kropslige. Vi kan formulere en disjunktivisme med hensyn til forsøg: enten er 
et forsøg et tomt forsøg eller også er det et essentielt kropsliggjort forsøg. 
Kombinationen af ideen om kropsliggjorte forsøg samt ideen om essentielt agent-
involverende bevægelser kalder jeg kropsliggjort konceptualisme. Jeg benytter dette 
navn, fordi ideen om agent-involverende bevægelser er ideen om bevægelser, der er 
udtryk for en agents basale teleologiske kapaciteter og sådanne kapaciteter er essentielt 
begrebslige. 
 I anden del af afhandlingen argumenterer jeg for at McDowells nye 
opfattelse af perceptuelt indhold som ikke-propositional men stadigvæk begrebsligt 
indhold, har betydelige fordele i forhold til propositional konceptualism. Jeg 
argumenterer for at denne nye opfattelse kan give tilfredsstillende svar på de 
udfordringer, der rejser sig når vi bringer den tidlige Merleau-Pontys værker ind i 
billedet. Yderligere argumenterer jeg for at Merleau-Pontys opfattelse af perceptionen 
rummer en iboende spænding, som jeg identificerer som en ny udgave af oscillationen 
mellem Myten om det Given samt Kohærentisme. I den sidste del af afhandlingen viser 
jeg hvorledes Merleau-Ponty’s argumenter for nødvendigheden af at antage en ikke-
begrebslig motorisk intentionalitetstype rummer en tvetydighed, der korresponderer 
med den spænding, jeg fandt i hans perceptions opfattelse. Jeg argumenterer for at 
kropsliggjort konceptualisme formår at afklare disse tvetydigheder.           
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Abstract 
Action and Perception. An analogical approach  
In the first part of the thesis I argue that there is a problem concerning bodily agency 
which is the analogue of the problem McDowell has diagnosed as the transcendental 
problem of perception. The problem of perception is how perception can rationally 
constrain our beliefs if perception is a natural occurrence and beliefs are conceptually 
structured items. The problem of agency is how our bodily movements can be rationally 
constrained by our intentions if bodily movements are natural occurrences. McDowell 
identifies the root of the problem of perception as the assumption that all natural events 
must be explainable in purely natural scientific terms: Scientistic Naturalism. I argue 
that Scientistic Naturalism causes similar problem for our ability to make our bodily 
agency intelligible.  
I argue that Scientistic Naturalism leads to a conception of bodily 
movements as essentially agency-neutral events and that such a conception is likely to 
obscure the intelligibility of bodily agency. If it is claimed that our motility can be made 
intelligible independently of any reference to an agent, then our conception of ourselves 
as bodily agents is undermined. As alternative I propose a dual conception of bodily 
movements, which takes the movements involved in bodily actions to be of a kind that 
can only be made intelligible if we regard them as the expression of rational agency. 
Once we allow for essentially agency-involving movements then we can also make 
sense of the idea of essentially movement-involving tryings. We can formulate the idea 
of such movement involving tryings in terms of a disjunctivism of trying: Any trying is 
either an idle trying or it is an essentially embodied trying. The combination of the idea 
of embodied tryings and the idea of bodily movements as essentially agency-involving I 
call embodied conceptualism concerning bodily agency. I call it embodied 
conceptualism because the idea of agency-involving movements is the idea of 
movements that are the expression of an agent’s basic teleological capacities and such 
capacities are conceptual.  
In the second part of the thesis I argue that McDowell’s new conception of 
perceptual content as non-propositional yet conceptual content has significant 
advantages compared to propositional conceptualism. I call the new view embodied 
conceptualism concerning perception. I argue that embodied conceptualism can answer 
several challenges to conceptualism found in the early works of Merleau-Ponty. I 
further argue that Merleau-Ponty’s own position possesses an inherent tension, which I 
identify as a new version of the oscillation between the Myth of Given and 
Coherentism. In the last part of the thesis I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s argument in 
favour of non-conceptual motor intentionality contain an ambiguity that corresponds to 
the tension in his account of perception. I argue that embodied conceptualism can avoid 
the problems Merleau-Ponty diagnoses as the problems of Intellectualism and at the 
same time avoid the ambiguities that seem to be inherent in Merleau-Ponty’s position.   
 
 
 
